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ABSTRACT 
 
Seeking cheap and submissive labor is a trend for transnational enterprises in the 
globalization era. As a robust economic body, Taiwan-based multinational enterprises 
follow the pattern and rearrange its business globally. When the transnational enterprises 
relocate in another country, only a few managerial personnel will transfer to the new 
locale. For employees in the host country, these foreigners’ decisions and organizational 
strategies decide their working condition and well-being. It is hard to deny that 
foreigners in these locales hold strategic positions in the host country. However, 
scholarly discussions of global factory tend to focus on the interaction between the 
global capital and the local culture. The studies mainly focus on how global capital 
shapes or manipulates the local culture to satisfy their purposes. Only a few briefly 
discuss the effects of managers’ background.  
  This dissertation tries to fulfill the hole in the literature and discuss how work 
ethic and cultural values that are carried by foreign managerial personnel affect the daily 
operation of a maquiladora on the US-Mexico border city—Tijuana. The maquiladora I 
studied is owned and operated by a Taiwanese manager with several Chinese engineers. 
I examine their interaction with other Mexican employees and explore the reasons 
behind their behaviors and decision-making processes. Taiwanese manager follows the 
work ethic that he developed from previous working experience in Asia and directs the 
operation in Mexico accordingly. However, even in a power-unevenly-distributed 
environment such as a maquiladora, the Taiwanese manager still needs to negotiate with 
 iii 
 
local employees. By delineating how the cultural that brought by the representatives of 
the multinational enterprise affect the operation and work arrangement, I try to 
emphasize that the importance of cultural values carried by these representatives should 
be treated more seriously in the studies of global production. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
   Soon after the United States government ended the Bracero Program
1
, the 
Mexican government implemented the Border Industrialization Program (BIP) since it 
expected the returning Bracero workers might become an unemployed labor force in 
border cities. At first, BIP was meant by the Mexican government to solve the 
unemployment problem and then it became one of the most important ways to boost its 
domestic market. Based on the fact that the Mexico-U.S. border area has its unique geo-
economic advantages, BIP attracts foreign enterprises to relocate production bases 
(maquiladoras) during the trend toward global production. From then on, maquiladoras 
became the mainstream mode of production in Mexico to create revenue rapidly and to 
industrialize. Mexico is one of the most successful countries to benefit from programs 
like BIP.  
    Since it is already more than a half of a century after the BIP implementation, 
the global economy has experienced several cycles that affect all nations. During this 
half of a century, transnational enterprises have been like nomadic tribes, pursuing 
cheap, docile labor and other advantages around the globe to improve their abilities to 
compete in the increasingly competitive global market. In this context, although the 
Border Industrialization Program remains significant for Mexico’s revenue, the 
                                                 
1
 Bracero Program was initiated on August fourth, 1942 and terminated in 1964. The purpose of Bracero 
Program was to fill the labor shortage in agriculture industry. It provided many Mexican workers jobs and 
work visa to work in the US. 
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participants are changing. Except for enterprises from the United States, transnational 
enterprises from Japan, Korea, Europe and recently from Taiwan and China have joined 
the list during the past fifty years. The newest players who have enter the game are those 
enterprises which are based in either Taiwan or China. Transnational enterprises from 
these countries affect how residents and workers experience capitalism in their life. On 
the one hand, regardless of the background of these multinational enterprises, while they 
pursue profits from BIP, they also contribute to Mexico’s economic development. On 
the other, each enterprise from a different cultural background might affect the local 
community and people differently.   
    Soon after BIP implementation, researchers from different disciplines have 
studied maquiladoras and accumulated a large amount of literature to understand this 
export-oriented mode of production and its impacts toward Mexican society. Some 
researchers take the macro perspective to discuss the effect of industrialization on 
Mexico’s economy and its border cities (Collins, 2009; Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; 
Fullerton 2001; Kopinak, 1997; Thomas, and Schauer, 2001). Others examine the impact 
on the workers and residents (Cravey, 1998; Lee, 1998; Wilson, 2002). Feminists focus 
on the feminized labor force that is hired by maquiladoras. They explore the impact of 
the local culture and society of women taking wage work, and how the wage work 
affects women’s status, social and cultural positions in their community (Bandy and 
Mendez, 2003; Fernández-Kelly, 1983; Fussell, 2000; Sklair, 2012; Wright, 1997). 
Moreover, some researchers focus on the labor process, labor control and how workers 
respond and resist to this control (Munoz, 2016; Ong, 2010; Plankey-Videla, 2012; 
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Salzinger, 2003; Tiano, 1994). Researchers are aware that cultural values are important 
when discussing the labor process and labor control inside maquiladoras and the shop 
floor. However, when talking about cultural values, most researchers concentrate on the 
interaction between global capital and local cultures, while cultural values and working 
ethic which are carried by agents of global capital are rarely studied. In this dissertation, 
I argue that cultural values and working ethic that was brought by the agents of global 
enterprises should be given a proper place to enhance our understanding of the labor 
process inside maquiladoras.    
    The reason I want to emphasize cultural values of the agents of transnational 
enterprises is that a production base like a maquiladora is a place that power is unevenly 
distributed among different cultural groups. In a place like this, the cultural background 
of foreigners is at least as important as that of host society’s since most foreigners in a 
maquiladora occupy managerial positions, and decide the daily operation in the shop 
floor. As Acker argues, workplaces are not neutral but gendered (Acker, 1990). That is 
to say, all workplaces have some arrangements related to gender. Maquiladoras are not 
only gendered workplaces but also cultured ones since each transnational enterprise 
owns and operates its maquiladoras differently. In the business forms, particular 
production arrangements, economic rationale, and cultural values, one can observe these 
cultural variations. Each of these factors should be weighted equally while we try to 
understand the labor process inside a maquiladora. When we try to understand the 
difference between maquiladoras, cultural factors should be the one that required more 
attention to evaluate because the long term overlooked.  
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    To maximize profits and to increase competitiveness is the primary reason for 
most transnational enterprises to relocate production bases to foreign locations. 
However, each enterprise adopts different strategies and methods to serve the same 
purpose. To understand the reasons behind these different arrangements and decisions, 
cultural factors should not be absent from consideration, especially those carried by the 
foreign agents because these foreign agents tend to be the key personnel who determine 
the daily operation of maquiladoras. 
 
 
1. Maquiladora—A Cultured Workplace 
 
    When a transnational enterprise relocates production around the world, the 
company usually will adapt the original organization to the new production site. The 
typical scenario is that except the human resources manager, the most important 
positions will be occupied by agents from headquarters. These agents from headquarter 
are not only in charge of communication and supervise the production for headquarter, 
but they are also responsible for making most decisions for the factories they are 
managing. Therefore, the cultural values they bring penetrate into local workers' 
everyday life at least from two aspects. One is the organizational structure; cultural 
values usually embedded in the most organizational structures might serve for specific 
goals or purposes that are guided by these cultural values. Second, the work ethic that is 
introduces by the representative of transnational enterprise might affect the daily 
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operation of maquiladoras. In other words, when a transnational enterprise relocates 
production to another country, it automatically brings the cultural values and work ethic 
it follows to the new locale. Since each transnational enterprise has its cultural 
background (McKay, 2006) and follows different working ethics to guide its own 
operation, overlooking such cultural factors inside a maquiladora might limit our 
understanding of labor process and labor control.     
      By definition, maquiladora is a place that people with different cultural 
backgrounds interact with each other on a daily basis. In this environment, it is hard to 
overlook how cultural encounter will create effects on both groups of people and how 
different cultural values affect social relation inside a maquiladora. While workers work 
in a maquiladora, they also experience a foreign culture at the same time. For 
maquiladora workers, global capitalists never are homogenized “los jefes (bosses);” each 
maquiladora is a different cultured place. In other words, they experience the capitalistic 
mode of production in and through a cultured place. Once we recognize that 
maquiladora is a cultured workplace, it is realized that all workers are immersed in a 
workplace that is structured and deeply affected by foreign cultural values. How does 
this cultural workplace affect our understanding of maquiladoras’ operation is the first 
question I want to address in this dissertation. 
The next question is how the cultural values originally shape the workplace that 
does not belong to the indigenous cultural group. To be clear, the cultural values that I 
refer to in here are not those deeply rooted in a cultural group as a tradition or long 
history such as Confucianism for Han people or the Protestant ethic for those who 
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created capitalism (Weber, 2013). The cultural values I focus on in this dissertation refer 
to those work-related tendencies or habits that managers developed and created through 
their previous working experiences. Representatives from transnational enterprises who 
manage maquiladora in Mexico most likely are those people who already have a long 
working experience and climbed to the high positions in their homelands. It is likely that 
these representatives will try to copy their previous success to conduct similar tasks in a 
foreign country. Moreover, since most of them tend to have the power to make important 
decisions for the maquiladora that they manage, it is highly likely they will follow 
previous experience to conduct their tasks in foreign countries.   
    To be clear, I do not want to define cultural values or working ethic as 
something that is deeply rooted in the specific cultural background. It is also not a thing 
with essence. The cultural values and working ethic that is referred in this dissertation 
are instead to be defined as working experience or work ethic which developed from a 
group of people in a unique work culture. This particular circumstance might include the 
trajectory of economic development, legal regulation in a country, institutional structures 
and other related features. In fact, the cultural values that are discussed here are the 
outcomes of a long-term competition in a locale. Companies that compete in and survive 
in similar environment tend to develop similar strategies and work ethic. Even after they 
expand the scale and become substantial transnational enterprises, these values and work 
ethic still could be seen in their managerial practices and orientation. 
       My fieldwork that shows, the Taiwanese general manager or his assistant 
from China are neither familiar with any concept that are presented in the maquiladora 
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studies, nor understand the so-called Mexican culture correctly. Consequently, their 
daily interactions with local people heavily rely on their original habits which created 
from their previous working experience both in Taiwan and China. The ideal work 
regulation, how a factory should operate are mainly based on their understanding learned 
from their previous working experience. 
 
2. “Gong De2” Taiwan in Mexico 
 
               Scholarly works in topics such as globalization, capitalism, export-oriented 
manufactories, or the working condition in the Global South are already aware that while 
scholars use the term culture, it refers mostly to the behavior that is part of cultural 
activities indigenous of a local community. Researchers are fully aware that culture, 
significantly affects the way that people respond to the external change and their 
economic activities. While most scholarly studies follow this path to discuss culture-
related issues, the cultural factors from the external side, from the foreign investor and 
manager in the case I discuss in this dissertation, of that a personnel associated with 
introduce enterprise have been neglected for a long while.  
              This is also true for maquiladora studies. For some unknown reasons; most 
researchers have not paid much attention to introduced cultural factors from the foreign 
capitals' side. The interesting thing is most researchers admit that introduced cultural 
                                                 
2
 See Chapter III.   
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factors are important and possibly create significant impact in many aspects, but they 
have not seriously analyzed them. 
              Once the cultural values and work ethic of employers of the maquiladora are 
focus on, one will be able to see how their cultural logic can affect the daily operation 
and local workers’ experience of work in a maquiladora. Therefore, I argue that if we 
add the cultural features from employer's side into the picture, we will get a more clear 
understanding of the entire scene.  
              In this dissertation, I will use a Taiwanese operated maquiladora as an example 
to illustrate how the Taiwanese work ethic which developed from 1970s-80s affected the 
managerial strategies and Mexican workers’ experience of work in Tijuana, Mexico.  
Taiwanese people experienced an economic boom starting in the early 1970s during 
which they encountered the capitalistic mode of production through the putting-out 
production system and a unique wage-calculated method. Taiwanese people developed 
the “Pure Labor” work ethic (which was so named by sociologist G.S. Shieh) through 
daily work. Even until now, some features of the “Pure Labor” work ethic still can be 
recognized in recent discourse that appeared in Taiwan and this has been called “Gong 
De Taiwan”.  In this dissertation, I will first describe how this “Pure Labor” work ethic 
emerged from a particular context which existed in Taiwan, and how this “Pure Labor” 
work ethic affected the way that the Taiwanese general manager and Chinese managers 
of this maquiladora I studied, Clever Monitor & Screen Company (CMSC), operated. 
         I argue that when the Taiwanese general manager manages CMSC, the experience 
he uses to make decisions and the managerial philosophy that he adopts to manage the 
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maquiladora I studied can be traced back to his previous work experience in Taiwan and 
China. As he is the boss of Mexican employees who work for CMSC, the general 
manager's idea of work and management deeply affect the way that Mexican employees 
experience this foreign enterprise.                                               
 
3. Modern Nomadic Folks 
 
  Another issue addressed in this dissertation is the temp work. Temporary workers 
are hired by temp agencies but work in maquiladoras. After the Mexican government 
reformed its labor law in 2014, it granted more flexibility to employers to hire and fire 
employees with less compensation. Many temp agencies appeared after the parliament 
passed the Labor Reform Act in 2014. These companies significantly changed the local 
labor market for maquiladoras in Tijuana. In the past, maquiladoras needed to hire a 
sufficient number of employees to match the productivity requirement during the busy 
season. But after the busy season ended, most workers would have not enough work. 
From an employer’s point of view, these idle workers were an extra expenditure. Before 
2014, there were more restrictions on firing employees. Therefore, most maquiladoras 
tended to use other strategies to “adjust” their labor force without extra costs such as to 
make workers need to take a long rest after tiresome and intensive work for a period of 
times. Now, under the new labor law, maquiladoras managers no longer need to worry 
about this problem since they can avoid firing any of their original employees by hiring 
temporary workers during the busy season. Because temp agencies actually employ the 
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temporary workers, maquiladoras are only the host for them to work at, while temp 
agencies responsible for all temporary workers’ salary, benefits, and other work-related 
compensation. In this context, maquiladoras no longer require to compensate any 
workers they send away once they no longer need their services after the busy season. 
The new phenomenon of adopting temporary workers to adjust labor demand in 
maquiladoras has not been in previous conducted under a different labor regime. Hence, 
this study provides insight into how this new labor policy is impacting maquiladoras and 
their workers. 
      The fast-growing outsourcing industry has significantly changes the local labor 
market through the employment relationship for both employer and employee, a matter 
this dissertation will address. On the one hand, the temp agencies relieve the effort for 
most human resource managers and staff to be exposed to hire the hot summer or cold 
winter while walking the streets to hire workers to work. Now, these traditional HR tasks 
are conducted by temp agencies. Meanwhile, for workers, in the past, they needed to 
knock on the door by door to find a position in a maquiladora. Now, all they need to do 
is go to temp agencies and ask for jobs. In other words, the existence of temp agencies 
makes the hiring process more convenient for both employers and employees. 
    Furthermore, temporary workers also provide a new method for maquiladora 
managers to conduct labor control policies easily. In the past, maquiladora managers 
needed to maintain shop floor order and keep their employees under control. Some 
maquiladoras used several different strategies, such as adopting patriarchal ideology and 
rhetoric to manipulate the employment relationship and the interaction between male 
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line leaders or managers and female workers (Plankey-Videla, 2012; Tiano, 1994). Other 
maquiladoras used sexual harassment or other gendered strategies to discipline and 
control their employees (Salzinger, 2003; Sklair, 2012). These labor control strategies 
have been used to control maquiladora workers for a long period of time. Even today, it 
is not difficult to see similar strategies applied in maquiladoras. However, maquiladora 
managers find it is easier to control workers and keep the shop floor in order by hiring 
temporary workers to conduct the same tasks as other maquiladora's employees. Because 
now maquiladora managers can send away the unwanted workers to another 
maquiladora without any compensation or extra cost, temporary workers become a 
means for maquiladora managers to control the shop floor more efficiently. 
    Temp agencies and temporary workers change both local labor market and 
maquiladoras' labor control strategies. In this study, I will indicate that hiring temporary 
workers to fill the most production spots during busy seasons has its cultural elements 
behind this managerial decision. The reason for CMSC to hire many temporary workers 
is based on the Taiwanese style of management that emphasizes “Pure Labor” which can 
be satisfied by hiring temporary workers. 
 
4. Chapter Overview 
 
          In chapter II, I discuss the general methodological questions of this dissertation. 
For example, how did I enter the field site? As many researchers mentioned in their 
studies, it is not easy to enter a workplace and conduct fieldwork along-side with 
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workers.  Researchers need to get approval from gatekeepers to allow them to conduct 
survey inside factories. In chapter II, I will briefly discuss why I was accepted to conduct 
my fieldwork in Clever Monitor & Screen Company (CMSC), the company I studied in 
Tijuana. I suggest that the shared nationality between the general manager of CMSC and 
me might be the key for me to enter the fieldwork site. In this chapter, I first introduced 
the gatekeeper of this study, and then, I briefly described a day in CMSC to provide a 
scene of daily routine inside this Taiwanese maquiladora in Tijuana. I provide details of 
my entrance to the fieldwork site, how I started my fieldwork and a day inside CMSC. I 
give as much detail as possible in order to build an image of how an Asian researcher 
takes part in an Asian maquiladora in Tijuana. Since I look physically similar to the high 
ranking managers inside CMSC, but my daily schedule was actually with workers. This 
arrangement makes my actual identity was for a period of time not clear to the 
Taiwanese, Chinese and Mexican managers, as well as to Mexican workers. Moreover, 
Outstanding technology, the mother corporation of CMSC, is originated from Taiwan 
but now the biggest stockholder is Chinese enterprise. This makes the citizenship 
(Taiwanese vs. Chinese) an important factor for the corporation to make its business 
plans and directly affect the composition of foreign representatives of headquarter in 
CMSC. Therefore, in the second half of Chapter II, I will discuss how nationality 
becomes a concern for a researcher from Taiwan conducting a study in a factory that is 
operated by a Taiwanese and Chinese joined enterprise.  
        Then here, I consider how the political and historical relationship between Taiwan 
and China affects the operation of a maquiladora in Mexico.  This is important since it 
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will address how the general manager of CMSC used this ambiguous relationship to 
manipulate his contacts with agents of both governments and benefited from them. 
Finally at the end of this chapter, I will turn to the explicit methodologies that I used 
during the fieldwork time and the descriptive information about this study. Participant 
observation, open-ended, semi-structured interviews were the main methods used during 
the nine months of my stayed in CMSC. I interviewed 79 people including the 
Taiwanese general manager, Chinese support team members and manager, all Mexican 
managers, some engineers, CMSC’s workers and temporary workers.  
        In chapter III, I discuss how the cultural factors that managers carry with them to 
Mexico affects the operation of CMSC. The cultural factors I refer in here are involved 
work-related features such as work ethic and behaviors. From the booming economic era 
of 1970s, Taiwanese people experienced capitalistic mode of production through 
factories and related contract/ sub-contracted work system which also be known as 
putting-out system.  When factories could not catch up the quantity of production, they 
would sub-contract some portions of production quantity to subcontractors to match the 
need. Subcontractors received works and their “salary” from these factories. 
Subcontractors’ “salaries” were calculated by piece work. Subcontractors were not 
official employees of their contractors; they arranged their productivity and labor by 
their own wills; therefore, these subcontractors tended to consider themselves as 
“bosses”. But meanwhile, these “bosses” are the primary labor force to finish the amount 
of work they receive from contractors (Shieh, 1992).  
 14 
 
        Under such arrangement, Taiwanese people develop a unique work ethic which 
sociologist G.S. Shieh names it as ““Pure Labor”.” This refers to a blurred boundary 
between labor and labor force, and both labor and labor force can be purchased or 
exchange via money. More importantly, “Pure Labor” also contains the idea that “Do 
more, get more; do none, get zero.” Following this idea, Taiwanese people pay less 
attention to reasonable working hours. Even though the putting-out system no longer 
popular and does not applies to most workers nowadays in Taiwan, but the work ethics 
which developed from that era remain important. The speech given by the premier of 
Executive Yuan of Taiwan in 2017 which has been called as “Gong De Taiwan” can be 
seen as a new version of work ethic that is similar t o “Pure Labor.”  
          After I elaborated the Taiwanese work ethic, I would illustrate how the general 
manager’s philosophy corresponds with this work ethic and how his management style 
shows his cultural root in the second part of chapter III.  
        In chapter IV, I will discuss how Mexican workers experience this regime that is 
guided by the Taiwanese work ethic. Before the Taiwanese corporation purchased all the 
facilities and established CMSC, another Japanese transnational enterprise operated the 
same maquiladora. Many senior workers and managers have worked for both companies 
in the same factory. Considering the high turnover rate and the recent popularity of 
temporary workers in Tijuana, even those workers who newly start their career in CMSC 
have had some experience in working for other maquiladoras. Based on their 
testimonies, I will discuss the way they experience the capitalistic mode of production 
and globalization and show that it is not a homogenous experience. It turns out that this 
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variation is based upon the cultural difference of employers. This chapter uses data 
collected from interviews of workers and tries to reconstruct their experience of working 
for a Taiwanese/Chinese enterprise. Despite both Mexican workers and managers tend to 
conduct similar tasks before and after the Taiwanese enterprise purchased the 
maquiladora of the Japanese company in 2009, and the space arrangement of production 
area remained the same, both workers and managers have this highly instrumentalized 
feeling because the decreased work autonomy, lacked of respect, and longer working 
hour when they started working for Taiwanese enterprise.  
        Also in chapter IV, I will discuss the impact that created by the temp agencies and 
temporary workers. After the Mexican government passed the labor reform act in 2014, 
outsourcing industry starts booming in Tijuana. Now, temp agencies become the primary 
brokers to send workers into maquiladoras. The appearance of temp agencies changes 
the local labor market and the hiring procedure. For both workers and maquiladora 
managers, temp agencies save both sides times to find each other. Moreover, because 
there is almost no cost to send a “problematic” or “unwanted” temporary worker to 
another factory, this revolving door significantly saves maquiladoras times and energy to 
deal with workers they don’t like. On the contrary, for workers, being an temporary 
worker almost equally to mean they have no ability to act collectively and have no rights 
to change the working condition they don’t like but endure it. In this regard, the booming 
outsourcing business further undermines the-already-weak collective bargaining power 
that maquiladora workers have.  
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         In this context, I suggest that the theoretical meaning of the booming outsourcing 
business lies in the place among its impact toward the management and labor-control 
strategies. Outsourcing works constructs a regime that makes the labor-control process, 
even more, individualize and more invisible. Plus, the outsourcing work itself already 
decreases the social connection between workers due to the unstable, short-term, project-
oriented work relationship. This provides a faster and more convenient way for 
maquiladora managers to control the labor force in their shop floors. Although 
temporary workers and the outsourcing industry are a relatively new phenomenon for the 
maquiladora studies, it is necessary to point out that not every maquiladora has adopted 
the same strategy and weights temporary workers in the same way. I suggest that the 
cultural values such as “Pure Labor” work ethic, in this case, plays an essential role to 
determine what percentages of labor demand will be filled by temporary workers. 
        Now, let me knock on the door of CMSC and start my fieldwork journey. 
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CHAPTER II  
STEP THROUGH THE GATE 
“THE AMBIGUOUS ENTRANCE” 
 
 
Difficulties gaining entrance to a workplace is common for anthropologists and 
sociologists who conduct their fieldwork and research in such areas. A factory is a 
capitalist shrine, and not everyone is permitted entrance. To gain access, researchers 
must obtain approval from the gatekeeper. After writing long, sincere letters introducing 
themselves, describing their research intention and purposes, and highlighting the 
potential benefits to the company, those seeking to study what happens inside a factory’s 
gate usually find themselves involved in a series of evaluations and background checks. 
During these evaluations, a researcher’s background (such as their nationality, political 
identity, education, and other personal features) can be seen as advantages or 
disadvantages, and thus serve as the grounds for granting or denying access. For 
anthropologists, fieldwork is full of uncertainty. If lucky, they eventually gain access.  
This chapter discloses how my social background impacted this study. I first 
describe the process by which I gained access to CMSC. Then, I briefly introduce basic 
information about my fieldwork site: The Clever Monitor and Screen Company 
(CMSC). Next, I discuss why nationality matters in this research. It is nationality that 
allowed me the privilege of entering the factory and on several occasions changing my 
job therein. With each position, I enjoyed new opportunities to approach people. I also 
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discuss how the Mexican employees interacted with me according to my position and 
nationality, and the assumptions these generated. After providing basic information 
about my fieldwork site, I describe the methods I employed while conducting my 
fieldwork.   
 
1. The Gatekeeper and the Entrance 
 
1.1. The Gatekeeper 
 
Since I am interested in the issue of cultural encounters in social spaces in which 
power is unevenly distributed, a factory was an ideal place for me to conduct my 
research. I began to look for a fieldwork site in 2015. In the beginning, I contacted 
Oficina Económica y Cultural de Taipei en México (OECTM), which is the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Mexico. From them, I hoped to obtain 
basic information such as where Taiwanese owned and operated factories were located 
in Mexico, and what kinds of businesses they were. Most importantly, I hoped to access 
contact information for such factories, since the OECTM is an embassy-like institution 
that the Taiwanese government operates in Mexico. As such, I expected them to have the 
information that I needed. I wrote to them, hopeful that they would provide me with 
some useful information.  
A couple of days later, an agent from OECTM told me:  
 
 19 
 
        “Due to security reasons, most Taiwanese companies refuse to provide 
their basic contact information to anyone. Even though we do have a list, we 
are not authorized to provide you with any information, even a list of company 
names. However, you could contact the business association. We have two 
names and their contact information. They are leaders of local business 
associations. You may want to contact them first. Good luck, and we wish you 
all the best.”  
 
So, I received two names and email addresses from the OECTM. It turned out 
that the two companies were located in border cities. One was in Ciudad Juárez, 
Chihuahua, and another was in Tijuana, Baja California. Since these were the only 
sources I had, I contacted them immediately. Luckily, they both replied to my email in a 
very short period of time, and indicated that they would like to know more about me and 
my project. Most importantly, they promised me that they would help me as much as 
they could. I then wrote an additional email with more detail about my research project 
and myself. I received one reply and at the time of writing, I’m still waiting for the other.  
Jackie Chan, a pseudonym for the gatekeeper and Taiwanese general manager 
referenced in this research, was the individual with whom I came in contact. He was the 
leader of a Taiwanese business association and general manager of CMSC, my future 
fieldwork site in Tijuana, Mexico. I explained to him my research project and intention 
to work in a Taiwanese owned and operated factory for my dissertation fieldwork. At 
first, I did not expect that he would permit me to conduct my research at his plant. 
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However, I did provide him with a short summary of my proposal in Mandarin, as well 
as an English version of the complete proposal. I hoped he would introduce me to some 
Taiwanese business owners or managers. Surprisingly, he simply replied: "Sure, we can 
talk about what you want to do after you arrive in Tijuana." He then forwarded my 
emails to the Human Resources (HR) manager of his company, without a word of 
comment or concern about my proposal.  
He was very kind and patient, answering all of my questions about a work visa, 
living costs, and other important topics. He also generously provided me with a room in 
the company-owned dormitory for housing, which helped me to save a significant 
amount of my limited research funding. The company dormitories were rented to guest 
engineers from China. This provided me with the opportunity to closely observe the 
Chinese engineers who came from China to Tijuana to support either a special project or 
just assist with daily production. At the time I learned I could stay in the company 
dormitory, I was not yet aware that I would live with other Chinese engineers. I was still 
not sure that the gatekeeper, Jackie Chan, fully realized what I was doing in Tijuana, but 
I believed I had obtained an entrance ticket from him. Thus, I booked a flight and began 
my journey in May of 2016. 
 
1.2. The Entrance 
 
I arrived at San Diego International Airport around noon. For a doctoral 
candidate who had spent the previous six years in Texas, the weather in San Diego in 
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May still held the chill of winter. In our email exchange, the HR manager told me that he 
would send the company driver to pick me up at the airport. However, no one was 
waiting outside for me holding a whiteboard with "Mr. Cho" on it. I was quite nervous at 
that time, since if I failed to meet the company driver, I had no idea how to find the 
proper location of the factory.  As I was nervously calling the HR manager, an old man 
with a big smile came towards me. "Good afternoon. You are Mr. Cho, right? Please 
follow me." I got into his minivan and headed to the factory where I was destined to 
spend the next nine months. The trip from San Diego International Airport to Tijuana 
was shorter than I imagined, though I should not have been surprised. Originally, the 
entire Border Industrialization Program was designed to be close to the US – Mexico 
border in order to attract US-based enterprises to invest in Mexico, while still being in 
close proximity to the US market.  
Before I departed from Texas, I confirmed several times with the Mexican 
embassy that there were no specific requirements for a visa for research. All I needed to 
do was check with the customs people at the border to apply for an FM visa, and then I 
could stay in Mexico for 180 days. Just like other Mexicans I met, the customs officer 
was very friendly and spoke in slow but clear Spanish to help me understand the 
procedure to obtain my visa. After he stamped the FM visa and gave it to me, I left the 
customs office with 180 days of permission to conduct my research in Mexico. At that 
point, I knew my fieldwork had officially begun. We got back into the car and headed to 
the factory. Again, different from my expectations, it only took three minutes to arrive at 
our destination, the Clever Monitor and Screen Company (CMSC).  
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The factory is literally located on the border. In fact, the factory shares a wall 
with the border. Outside the wall is a road heading to the border checkpoint. Every day, 
hundreds of eighteen-wheelers come across the US – Mexico border through this 
checkpoint. For the maquiladora, this is the road heading to the North American market, 
the road to profit. The company driver dropped me off at the front door and made a 
phone call to the HR manager, Pablo Martinez. He was in his mid-60s, and about to 
retire. He gave me a strong and friendly handshake, and then introduced me to the 
special assistant to the general manager, a Chinese engineer named Yin Shan. Yin Shan 
was a Chinese engineer in his mid-30s. When I arrived at CMSC, he had already worked 
in Tijuana for more than six years. According to other workers I interviewed, he was 
“the right hand of the boss [la mano derecha del jefe] to Jackie Chan.” When he talked to 
me, he was friendly, polite, and extremely humble. However, I later I learned that he had 
another face when interacting with the Mexican employees. He offered to show me the 
work environment and introduced me to his colleagues.  
It was not until I stepped into the factory that I realized this was a TV assembly 
maquiladora. As mentioned above, I received only two names of business association 
leaders from OECTM, and Jackie Chan gave me no detailed information about his 
factory. There were four lines in the production area. The month of May is not part of 
the busy season for the television assembly industry. Thus, only one line was running at 
that time, and the entire production had no more than 130 workers. The atmosphere was 
quiet and relaxed. When Yin Shan introduced me to the line leaders and production 
managers, the line had been stopped for some unknown reason. People were chatting 
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with one another and waiting for the line to restart.  Nervously, both in Spanish and 
English I tried to explain to Yin Shan and the Mexican managers and workers I met that 
I was an anthropology PhD student from Texas A&M University, and I planned to 
conduct my research at the factory. After several tries, I realized that they did not really 
understand what anthropology was or what fieldwork entailed. They decided to 
introduce me to other line workers, based on their understanding of my intention. 
"This is Hey-You. He is an intern from Taiwan (this is how they understood me). He 
will stay with us for a couple of months." At that time, people’s faces showed only 
curiosity. I did not know that most Asian employees in the factory rarely came to the 
production line, let alone worked there. At that time, I felt nervous but excited to meet 
the workers. I had no idea what was waiting for me.   
The second day, the HR department gave me a factory uniform vest with a white 
shoulder line on it. At the time, I did not know what that color meant
3
.  They also 
granted me the access to the company computer and gave me a desk in the HR office. I 
put on the vest and walked to the production line. The production manager placed me 
beside a female worker. Her name was Bonida, and she became one of the most 
important informants in this research. Bonida showed me the first task I performed on 
the assembly line: attaching information stickers to the back of each television set, and 
then scanning the barcode on each sticker. Finally, my job was to connect a wire to the 
motherboard. All of these steps needed to be completed in 22 seconds. Bonida asked me 
                                                 
3
 CMSC’s uniform vest has different colors on the shoulder, which are used to represent different 
departments. For example, assembly line workers and managers wear blue, quality control personnel wear 
red, and only general managers, HR managers, and HR staff wear white. 
 24 
 
to watch her perform the task for thirty minutes. Then she let me do half the moves. It 
was at that moment that I knew my fieldwork as an assembly operator had officially 
begun. 
2. The Site 
 
The maquiladora in which I conducted my fieldwork, CMSC, mainly produces 
television and computer monitors. Its mother company is one of the largest television 
and monitor assembly enterprises, called Outstanding Technology
4
 (OT). According to 
the information provided on the OT website, the corporation has 37 production plants 
around the world. Its major manufacturing factory is located in Xiamen, China, and 
employs  more than 4,000 workers. CMSC is one of the smallest sub-companies of the 
corporation. Although it is small in scale, its geographical location makes it an important 
site. OT was established in Taiwan in the 1960s. The Chinese government opened its 
market in 1987, and it was at this time that the Taiwanese corporation gradually shifted 
its production to China. Now, it is a China Fortune 500 transnational enterprise. 
Currently, its biggest investor and shareholder is a Chinese state-owned assets 
supervision and administration commission, which holds 37.1% of OT stock. Thus, the 
corporation is mainly based and invested in China, but is operated by Taiwanese 
managers. OT still has its headquarters in Taipei, Taiwan, but its largest factory is in 
China.  
                                                 
4
 Outstanding Technology will be abbreviated as OT in later text.  
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CMSC is fully owned by OT. It is composed of the following departments: 
production, electrical engineering, industrial engineering, research, quality control, 
computer engineering, logistics, purchasing, finance, and human resources. These 
departments have corresponding counterparts in the mother company. Each department 
of CMSC has its own head manager, but occasionally a manager might be in charge of 
two or more departments. Although at the time of my fieldwork the highest manager at 
CMSC was Jackie Chan, all department heads followed orders from both Jackie Chan 
and the corresponding department head at headquarters. In other words, medium-level 
managers considered themselves as having two bosses, one that was Jackie Chan, and 
the other the department head at headquarters. At times, this arrangement caused 
confusion and the managers to feel frustrated, especially when they received conflicting 
orders from CMSC and China
5
.  
                                                 
5
 For the Mexican managers, this arrangement made them feel untrusted by headquarters; every step of 
their daily operations had to be reported not only to the general manager of CMSC, but also to the 
corresponding department heads at headquarters in China. This meant that they needed to write endless 
reports. Furthermore, some specific departments had to wait for headquarters to make decisions for them. 
Since there is a 13-hour time difference, this arrangement often forced production to be postponed. They 
needed to wait for the decision makers to wake up and go to work in China.   
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Figure 1 Tijuana Map (by Google Map) 
 
The building occupied by CMSC was a sharp contrast from its previous 
condition, when it housed a Japanese corporation. The building was located in the Otay 
district and literally attached to the border (see Figure 1). OT purchased the facility from 
a Japanese enterprise in 2009. Some of the Mexican employees had also worked for the 
Japanese company. According to them, one day the Japanese manager got everyone 
together in the morning and declared that the factory had been sold to a Chinese 
company. The next day, human resource agents and a general manager from the Chinese 
corporation came and re-negotiated contracts with all of the employees who were willing 
to stay. Most were rehired by OT and became employees of CMSC on that day. They 
returned to their work as usual, but with a lower salary; also, all of their accumulated 
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seniority had vanished. Only a few remained when I started my fieldwork, including a 
Japanese manager.  
The internal space was separated into two parts by a narrow hallway (see Figure 
2). The hallway began at the cafeteria and headed to the workers’ restrooms. When 
facing the cafeteria, the right side of the gallery was production and warehouse space, 
the human resources department, and a tiny health center with a full-time nurse. The left 
side housed the main office, finance department, one conference room, and a small 
office for the general manager, his special assistant, and secretary. Daily events occurred 
primarily in the main office and production area. Since the office was designed by the 
previous Japanese enterprise, the main office space was a large and open room with a 
smaller enclosed section. The small section was reserved for the general manager, his 
secretary, and special assistant. Only the finance department and human resources had 
their own offices. All other departments and department managers were in the same 
large office space. The main office was occupied by personnel involved in quality 
control, research, logistics, purchasing, production, electrical engineering, and industrial 
and computer engineering. Because the main office was designed as an open space, 
everyone who worked in the office could see and be seen by all the others.   
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Figure 2  CMSC Floor Plan 
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There were five assembly lines inside the production area on the other side of the 
hallway. Each included three zones: assembly, quality control, and packing. The number 
of workers on a line varied between 60 and 130, depending on the season and model 
under production. There were two warehouses close to the production lines, one for 
materials and the other for finished goods. The materials warehouse was located on the 
assembly side of the shop floor, and the finished goods warehouse was located on the 
packing side. A security guard stood in front of the finished goods warehouse to keep 
irrelevant personnel out. There was open access to the entire production area, except for 
the finished goods warehouse (to prevent pilfering) (see Figure 3). In contrast, the main 
office, financial department, and human resource office all had magnetic card access 
control systems. Only authorized personnel were able to access their specific offices.  
Unauthorized personnel who wanted access needed to knock and wait for the door to be 
opened. Most managers and engineers were authorized to enter the main office, except 
for the financial department. However, only the general manager, department heads, 
GM’s special assistant and secretary, and members of the Chinese support team were 
allowed to enter the small office area.  
Only the highest-ranking department heads and the general manager's secretary 
were Mexicans with access to the small office area. However, all members of the 
Chinese support team, and even myself, "a Taiwanese intern," could access the small 
office area with their magnetic card.  The accessibility of specific spaces inside the 
factory underscores how power was unevenly distributed among the workers. It also 
suggests an invisible system of segregation and established hierarchy among ethnic 
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groups. This segregation was even clearer in the routes used to enter the building. After 
entering the gate, line workers needed to walk a long way, around to the side door; they 
entered through the cafeteria. Conversely, managers entered the building through the 
front door. There was also a restroom located in an area used only by managers and 
engineers.  
Taiwanese and Chinese managers only visited the production area when needed. 
On an ordinary day, they remained in their offices and communicated directly with OT. 
Junior engineers on the Chinese support team visited the shop floor or warehouse several 
times a day, but usually didn’t spend much time there. In this setting, the shop floor and 
warehouse areas were full of Mexican workers. Most CMSC workers, even though they 
understood they were working for a Chinese factory, rarely had a chance to interact with 
any Chinese or Taiwanese people, even though they were in the same building. (This 
was true for all Chinese and Taiwanese workers except myself, a weird anthropology 
apprentice.) 
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Figure 3  The Security Guard in Front of the Product Warehouse.  
 
 
3. A Day at CMSC 
 
I remembered the first month when I worked as an assembly worker in CMSC, 
usually around three o'clock in the afternoon; I would start to feel tired. My knees and 
ankles felt sore, my feet were on fire, and my lower back was extremely stiff. I never 
experienced anything like this before I conducted my fieldwork in CMSC. I have 
developed severe plantar fasciitis one month after I worked as an assembly worker. I 
expected CMSC workers might experience similar fatigue and body pain after a typical 
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day at CMSC. The workday at CMSC officially began at 7:00 am, but that was not 
universal to all employees and managers. Line workers, Mexican managers and 
engineers, and Chinese managers and engineers all had different work schedules. In the 
following section, I will briefly describe these various work schedules. These differences 
not only created different timelines for people to follow, but also resulted in the invisible 
segregation of Mexican and Chinese employees in the same factory.  
The line workers’ official workday began at 7:00 am, but most workers’ days 
began two or more hours earlier, since many lived far from the factory. They also likely 
needed to bring their children to school and prepare food for other family members. 
Since workers who came to work late were fined, most arrived well before 7:00 am. 
There was a locker room near the cafeteria, and each CMSC worker had a small locker. 
The workers usually stored their company vest in that locker. Before 7:00 am they put 
on their vests and walked into the production area. The CMSC day began with a bell 
ringing. Workers were given a 15 minute breakfast break starting at 9:00 am and 
staggered depending on how many lines were running that day. A contracted vendor 
came to the cafeteria to sell burritos and juice. Both the CMSC employees and 
temporary workers paid for their own breakfast. Since the cafeteria was not big enough 
to host all workers at once, groups of workers took their breaks together, line by line. At 
the end of each break, a warning bell would ring. When a line of workers went back to 
work, workers from another line would take their break. The rotation went on until every 
line had its breakfast break.  
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Starting at noon, workers were given a 30 minute lunch break. Theoretically, this 
was the longest break in the day for workers, but in practice that was not always the 
case. Since the cafeteria only had two small serving tables, it could only serve two 
workers at a time. Therefore, the line was very long, and sometimes it would take 20 to 
25 minutes to get a lunch plate. Workers who were at the end of the line might only have 
five minutes to finish their lunch. Because of this, many workers preferred to bring their 
own lunches to the factory, even though the company paid for the lunch that was served 
in the cafeteria. After the lunch break, workers went back to the assembly line and 
continued their repetitive work until 3:00 pm, when there was short 10 minute break. A 
bell would ring, and all the workers would take their breaks at the same time. Since there 
were limited numbers of restrooms and water fountains, many workers did not have 
enough time to use them. Moreover, there was no specific rest area or sufficient number 
of chairs or benches for workers to sit.  
Normally, if managers needed workers to work overtime, line leaders inquired 
with workers individually, before the lunch break. According to Mexican labor law, 
companies need consent from individual workers to work overtime. Thus, line leaders 
would approach each worker and ask if they could work overtime. If the answer was yes, 
the line leader would provide a consent form and the worker would sign it. During the 
lunch break, line leaders would send these consent forms to the human resources office. 
After 5:00 pm, workers who stayed for overtime were given a short break to use the 
restroom. They would then go back to work until 7:00 pm. When the 7:00 pm bell rang, 
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workers left the building in the dark, just as they had walked in before sunrise. For them, 
exposure to sunlight was a weekend luxury.   
For most production workers, each workday was similar and repetitive. However, 
for Mexican managers and engineers, work was full of challenge and uncertainty. On an 
ordinary day, all Mexican managers and engineers came to the factory at the same time 
as the line workers. Both managers and engineers enjoyed more flexibility and autonomy 
in their work (as compared to line workers), but since their jobs were related to 
production, they needed to follow the same work schedule as the line workers. If the 
production line had to work overtime that day, at least one of the Mexican engineers or 
managers from each department needed to stay until the end of the production day to 
make sure the assembly line flowed flawlessly. When any abnormal situations occurred, 
they had to stay until the problem was solved. Theoretically, the job title and tasks for 
Mexican engineers and managers were similar to those of their Chinese colleagues, but 
the work requirements were different.   
A third group in the factory was the Chinese support team members. This group 
included Chinese engineers and a Chinese manager who had come to Tijuana to replace 
a Japanese manager who had retired during my time at the factory. Their work schedule 
was quite different from that of the Mexican workers. Each morning, Yin Shan, the 
general manager’s special assistant, drove a company-owned minivan to work with the 
support team members. They arrived in it at 8:00 am. Even though their work time 
started one hour later than the production line, they spent more time together at the 
factory. Due to the time zone difference between Tijuana and Xiamen, China, most 
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Chinese support team members and managers began to get busy after 3:00 pm, since that 
was when departments in China began their work.  Even though the Chinese personnel 
were physically in Tijuana, their work schedule was much closer to that of Xiamen. 
Therefore, the Chinese support team usually stayed in the factory till 8:00 pm, or even 
later. Since the Chinese engineers and managers followed a very different work 
schedule, Mexican engineers and managers’ workday experiences were closer to those 
of the assembly workers than their Chinese counterparts. 
Inside the CMSC factory, Chinese employees usually enjoyed more autonomy 
and flexibility than did their Mexican counterparts, since they supported specific projects 
or provided special skills and knowledge to solve problems occurring during production. 
If everything progressed smoothly, they did not have much work to do. In this sense, 
even if their time spent in the factory was frequently much longer than that of their 
Mexican counterparts, their days were more relaxed than those of the Mexican managers 
and engineers. For example, except for the lunch hour which was always at 1:30 pm, 
Chinese engineers could decide when they wanted to take breaks. In contrast, Mexican 
engineers needed to follow the work schedule of the factory.  Superficially, members of 
the Chinese support team followed the CMSC work schedule, since they came to work at 
8:00 am per the request of the general manager. However, most of the time they 
followed the orders of their department heads in China. Despite the support team 
members’ role in Tijuana being that of helpers, the aid they provided to Mexican 
engineers and workers was limited.  
 36 
 
As David Harvey argued, because of the advanced transportation and 
communication technology, the globalization era is constructed as a “time and space 
compression” environment (Harvey, 1989). Modern transportation and communication 
technology allow transnational corporations to invest in production lines across the 
globe. However, no matter how advanced the technology is, no corporation can 
overcome time zone differences. That is to say, if the headquarters of a transnational 
corporation wants to oversee production on a daily basis, it is unavoidable that the 
corporation sends agents to production sites to oversee the ongoing operation. In 
CMSC’s case, this situation created at least two work schedules, one followed by the 
Chinese and another by Mexican employees. The different work paths and rhythms 
between the two ethnic groups created a sense of segregation that I constantly heard 
discussed by Mexican managers, engineers, and workers. This sense of segregation 
reinforced the differences between the Mexican and Chinese employees at CMSC. I will 
return to this topic in later chapters. Now, let us discuss the password I received to enter 
the field site.    
 
 
4. The Ambiguous Password: Citizenship 
 
No matter what kind of fieldwork an anthropologist engages in, how to enter the 
fieldwork site is a matter of great importance. It is always difficult for researchers to find 
associates and resources in a new fieldwork environment. For maquiladora researchers, 
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the situation is especially acute, since maquiladoras are subject to close surveillance and 
control by designated personnel. As many maquiladora researchers have described (Choi 
and Kenney, 1997; Salzinger, 2003; Plankey-Videla, 2012), persuading maquiladora 
managers to grant them permission to enter a factory and work alongside others is not 
impossible, but it is definitely not easy. Some have only been allowed to interview 
managers, while others were permitted to interview workers but never had the chance to 
work and to observe subjects throughout the day. The worst situation a maquiladora 
researcher might encounter is that he or she is prohibited by the manager from entering 
the factory. In such cases, they can only interview workers outside the factory and never 
have the chance to learn what really happens inside the gate.  
While gaining entry can be extremely difficult, it is not entirely impossible. For 
example, Plankey-Videla believed that the reason her field manager granted her 
permission to conduct fieldwork in a maquiladora was due to the fact that the director of 
human resources attended to the same university as she did (Plankey-Videla, 2010, p. 
16). She also mentioned that her child went to the same school as the manager’s 
children, and similar medical needs helped to create a sense of commonality between her 
and the manager. These features might have been key to her gaining access to the 
factory. Most researchers studying maquiladoras owned and operated by Asian 
corporations do not have the opportunity to conduct fieldwork and interviews inside 
factories (Choi and Kenney, 1997).  Since they cannot collect first-hand information 
from the shop floor, they instead collect stories and rumors from workers once they step 
outside the factory. In this regard, I was especially lucky to engage in my research in 
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CMSC, and work with the line workers for nine months. This peculiar luck stemmed 
from Jackie Chan and I sharing the same citizenship. However, both of us being 
Taiwanese were just the surface reason for Jackie Chan allowing me to stay at CMSC. 
The true cause was related to the ambiguous identity represented by the term 
“Taiwanese.” 
Before explaining why this ambiguous identity was the key to my being allowed 
to conduct fieldwork at CMSC, it is necessary to fully define and explain what it means 
to be Taiwanese. The term connotes multiple identities that are the product of 20th-
century history. It is not uncommon for Taiwanese people to refer to very different 
identities when using the term Taiwanese. The major ethnic group in Taiwan is the Han 
people, who came to Taiwan from China at different times over hundreds of years. Han 
Taiwanese share a similar language, writing system, and other cultural features with the 
Chinese. The most recent influx of immigrants from China to Taiwan was after the 
Kuomintang (KMT) was defeated by the Communist Party in 1949. At that time, 
approximately two million people immigrated to Taiwan, together with the KMT 
government. Until recently, these immigrants called themselves “mainlanders,” in order 
to distinguish themselves from other Taiwanese Han
6
.   
With aid from the United States, the KMT government continued its regime in 
Taiwan until the end of the 20th century. The KMT government educated both 
mainlanders and Taiwanese that their identity should be “Chinese.” Starting in its early 
                                                 
6
 Not all immigrants who came with the KMT government to Taiwan were Han. Some were indigenous 
people from China but categorized as mainlanders once they followed the KMT government and resettled 
in Taiwan.   
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years, the KMT government banned Taiwanese Han from using their mother tongue
7
  or 
Japanese, which the Taiwanese people learned from a previous Japanese regime. The 
KMT government forced them to speak only Mandarin. Moreover, the government 
eliminated the Japanese sections of local newspapers, replacing it with Mandarin. 
Combining these language policies with certain educational guidelines, the KMT 
government sought to wipe out the original Taiwanese identity and replace it with one 
that was Chinese. In 2000, the KMT party lost the election to the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP). The DPP government readjusted the education policy. Also, 
civil society argued for the need to rebuild the Taiwanese identity. For example, the DPP 
government adjusted the school curriculum to emphasize the history and geography of 
Taiwan, and reduced contents related to China. 
In 2008, KMT returned to power. Soon after, the KMT government signed the 
Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with the Chinese communist 
government. CSSTA was a trade agreement designed to open the service industries such 
as finance and communications to enterprises from Taiwan and China. According to an 
agreement, once it was passed and implemented, Chinese personnel and capital could 
enter Taiwan with fewer barriers. The majority of the citizens of Taiwan believed this 
would undermine the local economy and culture so valued by Taiwanese society. A 
significant social movement known as the “Sunflower Movement” occurred in March of 
2014. This social movement pushed the Taiwanese identity to its historical peak.  
                                                 
7
 Most Taiwanese (Han) people originally came from the Fujian province. They spoke Taiwanese, a 
dialect similar to the Minnan dialect, as their mother language. 
 40 
 
The Taiwanese identity has become consistently more prominent since the 1990s, 
and the voice of independence has gotten louder, including mainlanders. Still, today 
about 40% of Taiwanese and mainlanders consider themselves to be “both Taiwanese 
and Chinese
8
 ” (see Figure 4). This double identity provides a grey area that can be taken 
advantage of by people on both sides of the Taiwanese strait. As a result of this history, 
the word “Chinese” in Taiwan now refers both to those who are culturally Chinese, such 
as Taiwanese Han and mainlanders, and people who are citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Since its inception, the communist government of the PRC 
has claimed that the Republic of China ceased to exist after 1949. Therefore, only one 
China now exists in the world, the PRC.  Meanwhile, the KMT government has 
continually claimed that it is the only legitimate regime to rule both mainland China and 
Taiwan, and the government and its people represent the authentic "China." Since both 
the Taiwanese and mainland governments do not admit that the other is legitimate and 
both claim that they are the only "China" in the international community, these two 
"Chinas" remain in conflict.   
Despite the fact that both governments do not recognize each other as legitimate, 
there are some shared administrative activities, such as cross-strait mail service and 
allowing KMT veterans to visit their hometowns and relatives who remain in China. In 
                                                 
8
 It is necessary to emphasize here that the word “Chinese” in Taiwan is not reserved for cultural identity, 
similar to how Aihwa Ong referred to the Han ethnicity in the context of several Asian countries. For Ong, 
being Chinese and a citizen of China are different, and refer to different groups of people. Chinese refers 
to people who consider themselves blood tied with China, but does not guarantee their loyalty to the 
Chinese nation (Ong, 1999, p. 61). A citizen of China is someone who holds citizenship in China. 
Although Ong didn’t clearly define the version of Chinese to which she referred, according to the context 
of the book, it is the People’s Republic of China 
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1992, a meeting was held in Hong Kong by semi-official representatives of both the 
Taiwanese and PRC governments. The outcome of this meeting is called the "1992 
Consensus." According to this consensus, both regimes are considered to belong to one 
China, but each can interpret this China differently. The 1992 Consensus creates a grey 
area that allows the PRC government to tolerate Taiwanese Chinese.  
 
Figure 4  Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese
9
. 
 
                                                 
9
 Sources: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.    
https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166# 
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On the one hand, this dual identity allows Chinese propaganda to claim that 
“blood is thicker than water,” and assign China to serve as a big brother in a symbolic 
extended family responsible for all Han people’s wellbeing. If Taiwanese businesses act 
like younger siblings and obey the “family rules,” they are able to share in the benefits of 
the recent economic growth in China. Meanwhile, since the Taiwanese economy 
expanded before China’s and now is mature, featuring advanced technology and 
business experience, China benefits by attracting Taiwanese enterprises to invest in the 
Chinese market, allowing the Chinese economy to enjoy a latecomer advantage
10
  
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1990). On the other hand, this dual identity also creates a 
unique position for Taiwanese business personnel, allowing them to take advantage of 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait. By claiming to be Chinese, Taiwanese businesses are 
able to establish a social network in China and manage their relationships with a 
minimum of difficulty and political harassment. By claiming to be Taiwanese, they 
enjoy the image of a successful business with a reputation in Taiwan, even though they 
do business in China.  
                                                 
10
 Latecomer advantage is an economic theory which argues that developing countries enjoy a certain kind 
of benefit and advantage. The development of a modern economy relies on long-term, continuous, and 
consistent technological innovation and industrial upgrading. Both developed and developing countries 
face similar situations but from different positions. Developed countries are pioneers of technological 
innovation. They need to invest significant capital into research, and at the same time face the risk of 
failure. Conversely, developing countries can adapt existing technology and knowledge by 
purchasing/importing/stealing from developed countries. This creates a shortcut for developing countries 
to achieve economic development, allowing them to do so in a shorter period of time. This is the latecomer 
advantage. 
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This dual identity provides Taiwanese people with access to the Chinese market 
and the opportunity to establish “guanxi11 ” through their shared Chinese identity. 
However, this does not mean that there is always rapport between Taiwanese business 
people and their counterparts in China, including the Chinese government. This is 
similar for Taiwanese people living in China. Chinese businesses are required to hire 
Chinese employees. They must ask these Chinese employees to share the responsibility 
of operating in China, but they cannot fully trust Chinese people. There are many similar 
stories on both sides of the Taiwanese Chinese investors circle. For example, I once 
interviewed a tea vendor for research related to my master’s degree. A decade before I 
met him, he was a Taiwanese Chinese investor. He told me:  
 
I was part of the first trend of Taiwanese Chinese who invested in China. 
During that time, even the Chinese government had not opened their market yet. 
As a tea maker, I went there to operate both a tea farm and tea factory. I also 
taught local employees the secret skill of making tea with a special flavor. At the 
very beginning, people welcomed and treated me like an honored guest. I kept 
really good relationships with local political figures and leaders. Once, I thought 
my business was well settled in China. However, one day when I walked to my 
factory, the door was locked and public security came to arrest me and accuse me 
                                                 
11
 "Guanxi" is a word that describes a relationship or connection between two people in China. In his book 
The Flow of Gifts: Reciprocity and Social Networks in a Chinese Village, Yunxiang Yan described how 
villagers constantly exchange gifts. Ostensibly, gift exchange is a reciprocal activity, but Yan argued that 
in Chinese society, gift exchange involves a utilitarian logic. Exchanging gifts establishes a connection 
and relationship between gift-giver and gift-taker; "guanxi" is created and maintained through constant gift 
exchange. According to Yan, Chinese people use "guanxi" as a safety net, or to satisfy self-interest. 
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of non-existent crimes. I was barely able to run back to Taiwan without anything I 
brought with me to China.        
 
This tea vendor was not the only a victim of the “gold rush” that encouraged 
Taiwanese Chinese to invest in China. Similar stories are not uncommon (China 
Marketing Business Monthly, 1992). In general, gunxi exists between Taiwanese 
Chinese and local Chinese, but that does not mean that the two groups trust each other 
on all occasions.  
Jackie Chan, the general manager of CMSC, expressed similar notions. When 
OT opened CMSC in Tijuana, they faced a group of employees who spoke a completely 
different language and had a wholly different culture. In my fieldwork, the Taiwanese 
general manager and Chinese support team were close allies. When I interviewed them, 
however, there was a sense of mistrust of their Mexican colleagues. It was this mistrust 
that actually allowed me to enter this field site. The Taiwanese manager needed someone 
with whom they could communicate, who could also communicate with the Mexican 
employees. My Taiwanese citizenship provided me with the chance to conduct fieldwork 
at CMSC. Later, I realized that this citizenship was crucial in allowing the general 
manager to access resources from Taiwan and China, as well. More and more Chinese 
corporations are searching for cheaper laborers and other advantages offered by overseas 
operation. Therefore, the number of Chinese owned and operated maquiladoras in 
Tijuana is rapidly increasing. Consequently, the Chinese embassy in Tijuana has 
gradually become an increasingly important player in Tijuana’s political and economic 
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arenas. Since CMSC was registered as a Chinese maquiladora in the local lists and had a 
significant business relationship with its headquarters in China, Jackie Chan maintained 
a very good relationship with the Chinese embassy.  
The first thing I had been told by the company driver on our trip from the San 
Diego Airport to CMSC was never to call Jackie Chan Chinese, or he would be very 
angry. I kept this advice in mind, but later observed that Jackie Chan tended to call 
himself Chinese when in front of other Chinese support team members. This practice is 
similar to what other Taiwanese business people do in China. This suggests that Jackie 
Chan embodied two identities at the same time. These dual identities provided some 
advantages and a level of flexibility in his business strategy. As soon as I introduced 
myself as a Taiwanese student studying in the United States, Jackie Chan gave me a 
warm welcome. Almost every time I contacted him from the US, he expressed that he 
wanted me to come to Tijuana as soon as possible. Later, after I spent more time with 
him, I realized that the reason for this initially warm welcome was my citizenship. It 
created a “we group” feeling between the general manager and myself, a fellow 
Taiwanese.    
I entered the fieldwork site with a face and physical features that were clearly 
Asian. Moreover, after I began to get to know each individual inside CMSC, I realized 
that I was only one of two Taiwanese in the factory. Sharing the same nationality with 
the general manager made the human resources department treat me nicely, providing 
me with a dormitory and thus solving my housing problem in Tijuana. However, because 
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I walked onto the shop floor with an Asian face, my future Mexican colleagues greeted 
me initially with suspicion.   
 
 
5. An Asian Researcher on a Mexican Production Line 
 
I started my fieldwork on the production assembly line as an assembly worker, 
but I did not stay in that position for long. During those nine months, both the general 
and production managers thought I was an intern from the United States who had come 
to their factory to fulfill a school requirement. This belief persisted, no matter how hard 
and how many times I tried to explain what an anthropological apprentice actually did in 
the field. Consequently, they arranged for me to transfer from department to department. 
All of these different positions affected my relationships with the other workers, 
especially when the factory hired a significant number of temporary workers with a high 
rate of turnover. Thus, I needed to form a rapport with new workers every couple of 
weeks. I began my fieldwork as an assembly worker, where I worked side-by-side with 
Mexican employees (as Figure 5 shows). We followed the same schedule, worked or 
stopped at the same time, rested in the same area, and felt the same pain and fatigue after 
work.  
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Figure 5  Line Workers and the Author by the End of the Year.  
 
Participating in the first line of workers made it easier to approach Mexican 
employees, because of the experience I shared with them. In the beginning, I was not 
aware that my physical appearance and ethnicity mattered on the shop floor. This only 
became clear after I saw the Mexican workers interact with Yin Shan, Jackie Chan’s 
special assistant, days after I had worked with them. The attitude and respect they 
showed towards Yin Shan were very different from what they showed me. Some 
workers did not hide their fear and discontent in the presence of Chinese engineers and 
managers. In fact, in the very beginning, some line workers considered me a spy sent 
directly by Jackie Chan. However, after they observed me for a period of time and 
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considered me a functioning assembly worker like themselves, did they begin to share 
information and recipes for Mexican food. Once they started sharing their stories with 
me, I came to realize that a rapport had been established. Once they accepted me as a 
part of their everyday lives, I was able to ask them questions about their work, family 
situation, and life experiences.  
The department in which I remained for the longest time (about six months) was 
the repair department. On each production line, there was a table outside the assembly 
line. All malfunctioning television sets were sent to this table. Repair workers needed 
not only to fix the televisions sent to the repair station, but also help the line workers 
solve any issues they couldn’t handle. Therefore, repair workers enjoyed more mobility 
than did workers from other departments. Even the salary for a repair worker was 
slightly higher than that of other workers. Once Mexican workers accepted me as a 
colleague and not a “chino,” they did not show obvious differences in the way they 
interacted with me as compared to other Mexican workers (except when speaking 
Spanish to me at a slower speed).  Since the turnover rate was very high during my stay, 
the Mexican workers tended to be friendly and patient with foreigners. The fact that I 
was foreign did not cause significant difficulties with my fieldwork. However, when I 
was assigned by Jackie Chan to be an industrial engineer, thus leaving the line for a 
couple of weeks and returning to production with a stopwatch in my hand, new 
temporary workers who did not know me interacted with me as they did with other 
Chinese engineers or managers. In the last couple of weeks of my fieldwork, I spent less 
time on the production line and more time in the office; thus, most temporary workers 
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did not know me. One day, when I walked into the cafeteria and tried to join a group of 
temporary workers, they welcomed my company but called me “el jefe” (i.e., the boss).  
From this experience, I realized that a boundary between ethnic groups existed 
inside the maquiladora. Even though most workers might not have fully understood what 
kind of foreign enterprise they worked for, they did realize that the factory was owned 
and operated by foreigners. Most foreigners they met on the shop floor were either 
engineers or managers. Therefore, when they met Asians inside the factory, they 
assumed they held a higher position than they themselves occupied. Even when the 
production manager introduced me as an intern, it was only after I spent time with the 
line workers and gained their trust that I could dismantle the stereotype. Yet once I left 
the production line and worked as an industrial engineer and new temporary workers 
joined the line, this stereotype returned and would have been reconfirmed if I had done 
nothing to change it.  
 
 
 
 
6. Methods 
 
I used several methods to collect information during my fieldwork. While 
conducting my fieldwork, I was allowed to access the factory’s database. Therefore, I 
could review historical data, including annual production goals and achievement rates, 
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balance sheets for the factory, CMSC employees’ personal information cards, production 
process standard operation procedures (SOPs), and other non-sensitive data such as 
attendance rates and the salary information for each department. I usually reviewed this 
information on those afternoons when my fatigue and body pain were at their worst after 
I spent some days on the assembly line and started to be given some other tasks from the 
general manager or other Mexican managers. Except for open access information about 
the company such as annual balance sheets (which one can download from the company 
website), all other data, such as employees’ personal information, I did not collect or 
copy, per my promise to the HR manager. Besides the data I reviewed in the factory, I 
followed the doctrines of anthropological fieldwork and conducted participant 
observation-based research. As mentioned in the previous section, I was understood to 
be and introduced by the managers as a Taiwanese intern. Thus, I worked closely with 
both CMSC employees and temporary workers.  I felt the same muscle ache and joint 
soreness they did, and I experienced the same frustration and discontent from managers 
yelling at the workers. We worked side-by-side, with the only difference being that the 
workers made a wage and I worked for free. Several months after I completed my field 
research at CMSC, the general manager expressed his intention to hire me as an official 
employee. Considering that receiving pay from the research subject can cause 
unpredictable ethical issues, I thanked him for his kindness but declined the offer. 
When I stayed on the production line, I followed the same schedule as the other 
workers. Most of the interviews I conducted with my fellow workers were held in the 
factory’s cafeteria, in public. Each interview was no longer than thirty minutes. In these 
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interviews, I used open-ended questions to ask about their work experience with 
different employers and other important events they remembered that related to my 
study topics. After I gained their consent to interview them, I usually began by asking 
about their general work experience, such as how long they had worked for CMSC, 
whether they had ever worked for other maquiladoras before CMSC, etc.  Sometimes I 
began the interview by asking the interviewee to describe their typical daily schedule. I 
also held three focus group interviews. Most people who joined the focus groups were 
line workers in the assembly area. There was one focus group to which I invited three 
line leaders and asked them to share their experiences working for the previous Japanese 
company. I also asked them to compare that company to CMSC in aspects such as 
management style, work organization, and their personal feelings.  One focus group was 
held for repair workers and other technicians. This group interview focused on their 
work contract and related issues. We compared the types of contracts each of them had 
signed with CMSC and rumors they’d heard of other work contracts for their colleagues 
and at other maquiladoras. This was part of my effort to learn how CMSC gained 
flexibility in their human capital by manipulating employment contracts.  
Although the questions I asked each interviewee were different and depended on 
the topics we discussed, below are some sample questions that I consistently asked: 
 
1. How many years have you worked at the maquiladora?  
             ¿Cuántos años ha trabajado en la maquiladora? 
2. How many maquiladoras have you worked at?  
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             ¿En cuántas maquiladoras ha trabajado antes? 
3. Have you ever worked in another Taiwanese owned and operated maquiladora 
such as Mytek,  Lamingo, Foxconn, etc.?  
          ¿Usted ha trabajado en otras maquiladoras taiwaneses como Mytek, Lamingo, o 
Foxconn? 
4. Have you ever worked in a maquiladora owned by individuals from another 
country? 
            ¿Ha trabajado para maquiladoras que pertenecen a otros países? 
5. Can you recall your most impressive, annoying, or otherwise meaningful 
experience with a Taiwanese boss or manager?  
             ¿Usted se acuerda de una experiencia muy impresionante o difícil con los jefes y 
gerentes taiwaneses? 
6. Have you ever argued or heard a colleague argue with a manager? If so, what 
were they arguing about and when did this happen? What did you think about it?  
            ¿Usted ha discutido con los gerentes o ha escuchado compañeros discutiendo con 
gerentes? ¿Si ha pasado, de qué era la discusión y qué pasó? ¿Qué opina usted al 
respecto? 
7. Do you think there are any cultural differences between you and your Taiwanese 
managers? Can you give me some examples? 
             ¿ Usted piensa qué hay diferencias culturales entre los gerentes taiwaneses y 
usted? ¿Me podría dar algunos ejemplos? 
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8. Please compare the managerial style of your manager with managers of other 
cultures.  
             Por favor, compara el estilo de administración de su gerente con los gerentes de 
otras culturas. 
9. When you want to show dissatisfaction, what methods do you use and why? 
             Cuando usted desea mostrar su descontento, ¿cuáles son los métodos que 
utilizaría y por qué? 
  
To obtain the managers’ perspective, I interviewed all 13 of the supervisors who 
worked at the factory. Compared to the workers, the managers tended to have more 
flexible schedules; therefore, some interviews were as long as 60 or 90 minutes. There 
were 28 interviews recorded digitally, after obtaining consent from the interviewees. 
Other interviews were recorded via handwritten notes, per the request of the 
interviewees. During these interviews, I gained their consent first by describing the 
protocol required by our university. As with the line workers, I emphasized that all 
information would be kept secret and not shared with anyone in the factory. Most 
interviews were held in CMSC's cafeteria. This was an open area for workers, engineers, 
and managers to eat lunch and take breaks. There were 10 tables in the cafeteria; each sat 
approximately eight people.  Outside the cafeteria, there was a smoking area. Some 
interviews were conducted in that area, if my interviewee wanted to have a cigarette 
while being interviewed. All interviews were done at CMSC. Since I did not conduct 
interviews outside the plant, it is hard to tell if there is any different if I interviewed 
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workers outside their workplace, but it looked like workers complaint their work 
conditions or poorly paid to me during the interviews without hesitation. I expect the 
difference that caused by places to conduct interviews might not be very significant if 
there is any. During each interview, in the very beginning, I gained consent from 
interviewees orally. I did not use written consent because I did not want to leave any 
record to show who has agreed to participate in my study to prevent unexpected 
problems to undermine my interviewees' normal lives. I recorded the interviews with 
interviewees' permission and wrote notes during the interviews. Generally speaking, as 
long as I was not too tired because of the assembly work, I transcribed the notes to a 
more systemic way as field notes. 
I adopted semi-structured or open-ended methods when conducting all 
interviews. Most of the Mexican workers generously shared their personal information 
and stories with me. I only encountered difficulties when I asked Chinese engineers to 
share their opinions. In addition to the formal interviews, some useful information was 
collected during occasional chats that occurred during daily work time. When I felt the 
information obtained might be useful in my future writing, I asked the speaker to allow 
me to use it in my dissertation. In total, I conducted 79 interviews during my fieldwork. 
Within these 69 Mexicans interviewees, 13 of them were managers (gerente), all of the 
managers were men. There were 11 engineers or office staff (empleados),  3 of them 
were women. 45 interviewees belonged to the category of worker (trabajadores), 21 
among these 45 interviewees were female workers and 24 were male workers (see Table 
1). The number of interviewees, their ethnicities, and genders were as follows:   
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Ethnicity Male Female 
Taiwanese 2 1 
Mexican 30 39 
Japanese 1 0 
Chinese 5 1 
Table 1  Interviewees Divided by Ethnicity and Gender.  
 
Aside from two Taiwanese (one male and one female) and one Mexican woman 
who did not work at CMSC, the interviewees were all CMSC laborers or managers.  
Regarding age variations, the Taiwanese general manager of CMSC, Jackie Chan, was in 
his late 50s. Jackie Chan held an MBA from a Taiwanese university. Most of the 
Mexican managers were in their late 40s or early 50s. All had at least a bachelor’s 
degree. The ages of the Mexican engineers and workers ranged from 16 to the 60s. 
Workers' educational backgrounds differed; some were college students who came to 
CMSC during their summer vacations to pay for school. Others were already 
grandparents.   The ages of the Chinese support team were concentrated between 25 and 
40. All had finished college in China. The only Japanese individual I interviewed was 
65. He held a master degree from USC and lived in San Diego.  He retired during my 
time at CMSC.  
Although I had studied Spanish for three years before I began my field research 
at CMSC, I felt that my Spanish was insufficient. However, the nature of this fieldwork 
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site did not allow me to hire a translator. I spoke English or Spanish with all of the 
Mexican interviewees. Luckily, most of the Mexican managers and engineers were 
fluent in English, and we had few language problems when we communicated with one 
another. When I interviewed a worker, I always asked another worker who was a former 
undocumented laborer in the United States to help me with translation. They might not 
have had perfect English, but I confirmed my questions with them in several different 
ways to make sure the interviewee understood my intention. Therefore, while a language 
barrier did exist between my Mexican interviewees and myself, it was not impossible to 
overcome. But, it is undeniable that my Spanish ability sometimes prevented me from 
understanding some conversations or keywords during the interviews fully.   
The information that I collected from the CMSC interviews was composed 
primarily of ethnographic data. I also obtained data from mass media (e.g., the 
newspaper), social media (i.e., Facebook), and PTT (the largest BBS forum in Taiwan). 
These were used to understand social opinions regarding the Labor Reform Act 
proposed by the Taiwanese government in 2016. These data are mainly discussed in 
Chapter III, where I describe the work ethic common in Taiwan. In order to protect all 
interviewees, all the names, including all companies' and interviewees' names that 
appear in this dissertation are pseudonyms. 
With regards to field notes, after an interview I usually wrote down my 
observations and thoughts after I returned to the dormitory at the end of the day. 
However, at times it was impossible to do so because of the late hour. Sometimes, I was 
too tired to stay awake after nine hours of standing and working on the production line. 
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If that happened, I usually finished writing my field notes the next day. At times, I spent 
entire Saturday afternoons completing my writing. All field notes and diary entries were 
first written by hand, and then transcribed into typewritten form and stored on my 
laptop. I usually brought my notebook with me rather than leave it on my desk, and my 
computer was always secured by a password no one else knew. 
 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, my purpose was to provide essential background knowledge and 
all necessary information regarding this study and my fieldwork site. In describing how I 
conducted my fieldwork at CMSC, I highlighted how my personal features affected this 
research. I first introduced my fieldwork site and explained why I was allowed to study 
this Taiwanese owned and operated maquiladora. The gatekeeper of this study, Jackie 
Chan, CMSC’s general manager, was the individual who granted me permission to 
work. Before I arrived in Tijuana, I believed he did not fully understand the intention 
and purpose of this study but permitted me to conduct my fieldwork anyway. Once I 
arrived, I realized that citizenship might be key to my being allowed to serve as a 
wandering anthropology apprentice at CMSC for nine months. However, it was not 
merely because I am Taiwanese that this study was possible; there were other subtle but 
crucial elements behind Jackie Chan’s consideration, including his relationships with his 
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Chinese and Mexican employees. I believe these factors related to citizenship and 
nationality were why he permitted me to study and work at CMSC.   
After I described how I came to work at CMSC, I tried to delineate my initial 
impressions of the production line and how the workers understood Asians being a part 
of their ordinary lives. Because I began my study as an assembly line worker, later 
moved to quality control, and eventually serving as an industrial engineer, each position 
change or "promotion" affected my relationships with local workers, especially 
temporary employees who only stayed a short time at CMSC. As I described this 
process, I presented my positions at the fieldwork site and described how these roles 
affected my study. In the final section of this chapter, I discussed the methods I used and 
how they were employed to collect data from my fieldwork site.   
In sum, this chapter presented all researcher-related subjects pertinent to this 
study. In so doing, I believe this chapter provides fundamental knowledge regarding the 
data I use to support my argument in the following chapters. In the next chapter, I will 
discuss how Taiwanese people tend to share a common work ethic that developed from 
the economic boom that occurred in Taiwan between the 1970s and 1990s, and how they 
continue to adopt this work ethic in workplaces with different cultural backgrounds.  
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CHAPTER III  
“GONG DE” TAIWAN IN MEXICO 
 
In this chapter, I review the literature on maquiladoras and focus on a discussion 
of the primary cultural issues. Although previous scholars have provided us with an 
insightful framework and fruitful understanding of maquiladoras and their workers, there 
are a few analyses of the foreign cultural values of representatives of international 
corporations. Thus, I focused on cultural issues that surfaced during my stay at CMSC. 
My experiences there made me realized that Jackie Chan followed his previous work 
experience and training in Taiwan when designing his managerial style and business 
strategies. Notions he followed could be traced to the “Pure Labor” work ethic, so 
named by G.S. Shieh, an important Taiwanese sociologist. This “Pure Labor” work ethic 
refers to features of the Taiwanese attitude towards work and employment that allows 
Taiwanese enterprises to survive and compete in the global market.  
In Section 2, I provide a brief history of how this “Pure Labor” work ethic 
developed during a specific era in Taiwan, and how it remains an effective means of 
understanding the business and managerial styles of Taiwanese enterprises. In Section 3, 
I describe how Jackie Chan managed CMSC by following the guide of this “Pure Labor” 
work ethic. By describing his managerial philosophy, questions he asked me to help him 
resolve, and policies associated with the work environment and workers’ wellbeing, we 
can see how the “Pure Labor” work ethic affected how Jackie Chan managed CMSC, a 
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maquiladora that hired hundreds of Mexicans in Tijuana. Now, let me begin this 
literature review by providing some background knowledge necessary for this research.  
 
1. Literature Review 
 
1.1. Early Research on the Anthropology of Work 
 
Factory overtime has served as an essential topic in the development of social 
theory. Many important social theories that allow us to understand modern society have 
been developed within the context of the factory. For example, a research team from the 
Harvard School of Business Administration and funded by the National Academy of 
Sciences conducted now-famous research on Western Electric’s Hawthorne Works 
(Jordan, 2013, p. 10). Their study, begun in 1924, had the primary goal of examining the 
relationship between physical conditions (such as the brightness of a factory) and 
productivity. However, they found that it was difficult to come to a conclusion in this 
regard, because so many variables can affect productivity. From 1927 to 1932, Elton 
Mayo, a psychiatrist, and W. Lloyd Warner, an anthropologist, also examined the 
relationship between environmental conditions and productivity. They concluded that 
the environment was not a crucial variable related to productivity level, but human 
relationships were. Whether the light was bright or dim, the rest time long or short, even 
the total number of working hours were not significant variables increasing or 
decreasing productivity (Mayo, 1933). Instead, the presence of someone concerned 
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about the conditions in the workplace and willing to change them affected workers’ 
productivity more than did actual adjustments to the physical environment. This was one 
of the first explorations of industrial anthropology (i.e., the Anthropology of Work). The 
results of Mayo’s study have helped employers increase production efficiency.  
Kerr and Fisher later criticized Mayo for being unaware of the conflict of interest 
embedded in the factory (Kerr and Fisher, 1958). Mayo assumed that the factory, as a 
workplace, was a locus of harmony and spontaneous consent to industrial life (Burawoy, 
1979, pp. 231-233). For Kerr and Fisher, the workplace was instead an arena in which 
different economically rational individuals competed. Based on this assumption, 
Burawoy, an American sociologist, further explored the workplace. He conducted his 
fieldwork in a steel factory located in Chicago. His work was recorded in his book 
entitled Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under Monopoly 
Capitalism (Burawoy, 1982). Therein, he described how workers in the workplace have 
interests that differ from those of their employer. The more surplus that workers 
produce, the less profit they share. Burawoy argued that workers should not try to 
increase productivity because that was not in their interest. However, in reality his study 
showed that workers were willing to cooperate with managers to increase production.  
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Among workers, there is often an ongoing “making out game” (Burawoy, 
1979b). This making out game
12
  provides workers with an accumulated bonus. Workers 
also define their relationships with other workers through this game. The employment 
relationship, conflicts among workers and between workers and their managers, and 
even workers' everyday lives are all woven into this making out game, which is defined 
by the values recognized by everyone in the workplace (Burawoy, 1979b, p. 84).    
Workers’ involvement in the game helps to increase their productivity and their 
achievement of higher production goals for their employers. Burawoy argued that the 
reason why workers engaged in the game, an activity that might contradict their class 
interest, is that both game and job offer something more than simple economic work 
culture. By engaging in the game, workers establish friendships and a collective sense of 
one another. Each worker achieves social position through the game (Burawoy, 1979b).  
The game is meaningful for workers; it is a way for workers to earn bonuses. 
Furthermore, workers also define themselves and their relationships with other workers 
through the game. By working side by side with workers, Burawoy found that they 
frequently discussed the game, even during their break times. He concluded that the 
“making out” game helped workers define their social relationships, both inside and 
                                                 
12
Burawoy described the "making out game" as a crucial mechanism where workers consent to cooperate 
with managers and achieve a required production quantity. Workers at Allied, Burawoy's fieldwork site, 
received a base wage, but they could earn up to 140% of that wage as a bonus if they finished additional 
quantities of work. Experienced workers were able to produce such quantities easily, if the other workers 
were willing to cooperate with them. Meanwhile, managers tried to change quotas to maximize profit, 
according to workers' levels of speed and productivity. For their own good, workers needed to achieve a 
particular quantity and receive their 140% bonus, but at the same time keep their speed and productivity 
level. In this regard, workers created several strategies to gain the bonus but avoid managers changing the 
standard by which their productivity was measured. This entire process was described as the "making out 
game" by Burawoy.    
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outside the workplace (Burawoy, 1979). Burawoy’s study has become a model for most 
industrial anthropologists. His theoretical perspective influenced researchers studying 
the factory setting, including maquiladora researchers, since Burawoy and his 
predecessors conducted their fieldwork in the United States. Culture was not a prominent 
feature in his research because employer and employee shared similar cultural features, 
at least in a broad sense. Cultural factors were less of an issue in the early development 
of industrial anthropology, at least until transnational business became a phenomenon in 
the 1990s (Hamada, 1991; Tabata, 2000; Wang, 2002).   
Examining joint ventures between the US and Japanese enterprises operating in 
Japan in 1991, such as Nippon United, Hamada demonstrated that cultural differences 
affected the way that both parties, Japanese and American personnel alike, interpreted 
the information they received from the other party. As she stated: “In cross-cultural 
decision making, cultural strategies are needed to understand the basic objectives, 
management philosophy, value orientation, and communication codes that guide the 
other side’s behavior” (Hamada, 1991). In other words, when partners from both sides 
interact with one another, they depend on their cultural norms to guide them and 
interpret the other party’s reactions. This is often when misunderstandings occur. 
Hamada described such misunderstandings in various contexts such as in business 
meetings regarding plant construction design, production and sales strategies, and even 
personnel assignments. Sometimes misunderstanding emerged because each side would 
take something for granted and then assume that others would do the same. When their 
expectations were not met, frustration appeared on both sides. Hamada argued that both 
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sides showed signs of ethnocentrism and a certain degree of cultural insensitivity. 
Understanding others’ cultures is difficult. Thus, the issue must be approached openly 
and respectfully (Hamada, 1991). 
Hamada’s ethnography focused on the interaction between managers and 
management styles from both countries involved in Nippon United, a joint venture in 
which its partners shared equal power to decide the managerial strategy. In this setting, 
power was relatively equally distributed. Therefore, the goals and interests were the 
same for both the Japanese and American firms. Conflicts could be negotiated and 
solved on a win-win basis. In other situations, however, when power is not equally 
distributed among the cultural groups within a firm, interaction between the two makes 
for more complex differences in the goals and interests of each cultural group. 
Maquiladoras are an example of this. 
 
1.2. Maquiladora Studies 
 
Previous research on maquiladoras has shown that cultural factors are an 
important variable in the interaction between employer and employee (Choi and Kenney, 
1997; Fernadez-Kelly, 1983; Paik and Sohn, 1998; Salzinger, 2003). For example, in the 
1980s, Fernadez-Kelly discussed how an ideology of patriarchy impacted maquiladora 
workers’ incomes, since at that time most were women (Fernadez-Kelly, 1983). Mexican 
society traditionally regards women’s salaries as supplementary household income. Male 
members are the breadwinners, and women’s income is considered as the secondary 
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financial source. As Fernadez-Kelly showed, this traditional division of labor between 
genders was one of the primary reasons that maquiladora employers were able to pay 
their female employees lower salaries compared to their male counterparts. Cultural 
assumptions influenced not only female workers’ income levels, but also the managerial 
strategies employed. Scholarly research on maquiladoras has assumed that maquiladora 
managers hold stereotypes of Mexican women as submissive, easy to control, docile, and 
highly productive (Fernadez-Kelly, 1983; Salzinger, 2003; Sklair, 2010; Plankey-Videla, 
2012). These stereotypes affect managers, motivating them to search for specific types 
of employees and then hiring and managing them accordingly. 
Salzinger emphasized how critically a shared assumption about gender affected 
the image of the ideal worker that managers maintained. She also argued that we should 
not overlook the impact of what workers learn and how they are treated inside the 
workplace. Therefore, she reminded readers that cultural factors not only refer to 
elements outside the firm. Instead, discipline, training, and other interactions that take 
place inside the factory are part of the culture that affects workers. When companies 
from different countries bring their cultural norms to Mexico, the consequences of 
cultural interactions with the local population varies according to external and internal 
cultural forces (Choi and Kenney, 2017; Kamiyama, 1993; Kamiyama, 1994; Park and 
Sohn, 1998). This interaction is a dynamic process that occurs in the workplace on a 
daily basis.         
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Stephens and Charles approached culture issues in a different way. They pointed 
out that NAFTA
13
  reduced obstacles to international trade between the United States 
and Mexico, but the cultural boundaries between the two nations remained. Conflicts 
between business alliances on both sides of the border are almost unavoidable (Stephens 
and Charles, 1995). They discussed how cultural differences alone caused certain aspects 
to vary, such as the concept of time, work ethic, and other subtle behavioral differences, 
resulting in conflicts between US managers and Mexican workers. For example, 
Mexican workers value personal interactions between managers and themselves, 
something American managers usually fail to recognize (Stephens and Charles, 1995). 
The social distance between workers and managers is different in the United States and 
Mexico. When American managers operate a maquiladora in Mexico, they interact with 
local workers according to their original cultural norms and expect the workers to react 
accordingly. However, workers may react unexpectedly because they are guided by 
different cultural norms than those shared by American managers, and the result is 
conflict. 
It is reasonable to assume that conflict also occurs inside Asian-operated 
maquiladoras. Research related to labor relationships in such companies is limited. Little 
information exists that delineates the general picture of the social relationships inside 
Asian-operated maquiladoras. Some previous researchers have also expressed 
dissatisfaction and called for studies to correct this gap (Stephens and Charles, 1995).   
                                                 
13
 NAFTA: The North America Free Trade Agreement. The agreement came into force on January 1, 
1994, but was recently replaced by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement on September 30, 2018. 
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For example, Choi and Kenney stated that at the time they conducted their research in 
1992 (Choi and Kenney, 1997), there was not enough literature to support a general 
statement about the relationship between managers and workers inside Asian 
maquiladoras. That is still true today. Based on the limited sources from both workers 
and managers of Korean-owned maquiladoras at that time, Choi and Kenny argued that 
the impression that “Korean firms are not desirable investors” is incorrect. Korean 
investors provide employees more training programs and longer training times, and 
transfer more skills to local firms and workers compared to their Japanese counterparts 
(Choi and Kenney, 1997, pp. 19-20). However, they admitted that they did not have 
enough data to discuss the interactions among employees and employers inside Korean-
run maquiladoras.  
Paik and Sohn (1998) took a different approach to discussing the cultural 
interactions among Asian owners and local workers. They compared the similarities and 
differences between Korean Confucianism and the Mexican culture in South Korean-
operated maquiladoras. Both cultures emphasize collective solidarity, but there are 
certain differences. These differences create significant cultural conflict between Korean 
owners and their Mexican employees. For example, Paik and Sohn indicated that both 
cultures emphasize group harmony, but the content varies. For Korean people, group 
harmony is based on group honor (Paik and Sohn, 1998). Conversely, Mexican people 
also give group harmony a crucial role in their culture, but Mexican people tend to focus 
more on their personal contribution (Paik and Sohn, 1998). Paik and Sohn indicated that 
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even though both cultures emphasized the same concept, the ways in which they practice 
it in everyday life were different.  
In sum, researchers studying Asian maquiladoras have expressed awareness that 
cultural conflicts between Asian managers and Mexican workers are a critical 
operational issue. Most have called attention to this topic, but instead of approaching it 
directly by examining the interaction between managers and workers inside Asian 
maquiladoras, they have concentrated on cultural ideas such as the patriarchy, collective/ 
individual value, and abstract notions such as Confucianism, instead of how cultural 
differences are in play on the ground (Choi and Kenney, 1997; Fernadez-Kelly, 1983; 
Paik and Sohn, 1998; Salzinger, 2003; Trevisani, 2018).         
How to approach cultural differences in a maquiladora's everyday operation is a 
critical issue because cultural factors not only appear when people from different 
cultural backgrounds interact. One potential perspective to approaching this topic is the 
concept of the manager’s ideal worker. Sociologist Joan Acker proposed this concept in 
her studies conducted in the United States. She critiqued certain feminists who regarded 
the organization as a gender-neutral concept. Acker argued that the organization is not 
gender neutral. Gender is a fundamental element of any organization (Acker, 1990). She 
analyzed gender-embedded organization according to two aspects – jobs and hierarchies 
– arguing that a job is an abstract assignment. It can only be real when the abstract 
assignment is addressed by a real worker who is gender-defined. That is to say, when 
managers search for potential employees, they examine or imagine if applicants match 
the job requirements. At that point, gender-related features – and sometimes gender 
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stereotypes – are included in managers’ decisions regarding which candidates are the 
best fit for a position.  
To fit the model of the ideal worker from the perspective of the managers, 
workers must be full-time employees. Thus, only men can satisfy this ideal image since 
women have traditionally been assigned domestic work and childbearing tasks. From the 
perspective of managers, women cannot devote themselves entirely to a job because they 
are always multitasking. According to Acker, when there is a promotion opportunity or it 
is time for an annual evaluation, managers use the model of the ideal worker to evaluate 
their employees’ performance. Both managers and employees assume that the evaluation 
criteria are fair to all employees, though this is not the case because the ideal worker 
model is based on the image of a male worker. The hierarchy of the organization builds 
upon this image and women are automatically placed in a lower position in the hierarchy 
because their gender does not fit the ideal type. 
Acker provided a powerful tool for analyzing gender issues in working 
organizations, and many maquiladora researchers have adapted it. For example, 
Salzinger showed that there is a general gender idea of “maquiladora-grade worker” 
(Salzinger, 2003) in the headquarters of global enterprises. This “maquiladora-grade 
worker” refers to female, young, and docile employees. Salzinger argued that this 
particular group of workers had been feminized. Maquiladora-grade workers are of a 
specific type that managers try to recruit when global enterprises relocate their 
production bases from developed countries to developing/underdeveloped ones such 
Mexico. Maquiladora managers specifically search for workers who fit the image of 
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what she calls “feminine productivity.” By feminizing the labor force, maquiladora 
managers construct a gendered work environment and control their labor force 
accordingly.  Salzinger recognized that this adoption of the concept of the ideal worker 
effectively gendered maquiladoras’ hiring strategy. I believe that cultural factors are 
another aspect that can be explored through a similar framework. 
McKay approached the topics of management and labor control differently, 
discussing the organization of and labor control in four factories owned and operated by 
foreign enterprises in the Philippines. These enterprises were from Korea, Japan, the 
United States, and Europe.  McKay used these four cases to correct stereotypes 
associated with the high-tech industry. Most previous studies have assumed that because 
the high-tech industry requires more stability in production than do labor-intensive 
industries, high-tech companies provide more benefits and create positive incentives to 
attract workers to stay in the same position for longer periods of time (McKay, 2006a). 
These companies' intention, in turn, creates more so-called "good jobs," meaning that the 
jobs are more secure and provide more work-related benefits to workers (Kalleberg, 
2011). Compared to labor-intensive industries such as the apparel, garment, and 
electronics industries, jobs in the high-tech sector are better in many ways.  
McKay, however, argued that this assumption of dual industries is mistaken. He 
described how his four foreign-invested enterprises applied different managerial regimes 
in their factories, terming them the “despotic,” “purchasing,” “human resource work,” 
and “collectively negotiated” regimes. Each had particular features related to labor 
control. McKay wanted to highlight that although all four enterprises were in the high-
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tech industry, the managerial strategies varied; simply being in the high-tech industry 
was not a guarantee of a good job. Three of the four companies, all but the collectively 
negotiated regime, were anti-union and adopted strategies to prevent workers from 
gaining collective bargaining power. They started their labor-control process with the 
recruiting of particular workers. Storage Ltd., for example, intentionally searched for 
women workers from rural areas with less education and lower incomes.  Before hiring 
someone, Storage Ltd. requested all interviewees complete a survey, and if the company 
determined that the applicant sympathized with unionism, the interviewee was rejected. 
By hiring their preferred type of worker, they could offer lower salaries and still expect 
their employees to feel like their lives had been improved by working for the company. 
Therefore, they would be content with their working conditions. In this regard, Storage 
Ltd. could build up a cheap but stable labor force (McKay, 2004, 2006a).   
McKay implied that the reason why each company adopted different managerial 
regimes was related to their mother companies’ experiences in their original countries. 
For example, Discrete Manufacturing, the factory that adopted a collectively negotiated 
regime and allowed a union to operate on the shop floor, was a factory operated by a 
European enterprise. McKay suggested that this might be because the mother company 
was from a country with a well-developed tradition of unionism; thus, Discrete 
Manufacturing was more tolerant of union activity. McKay, therefore, touched on the 
issue of how cultural factors can affect overseas operations of transnational enterprises. 
However, he stopped there and instead emphasized how the role of the government of 
the host country, in this case the Philippines, should not be ignored. Evidence has shown 
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that local governments cooperate with foreign enterprises by providing infrastructure 
and assisting them with recruiting the workers the companies need. The state 
government may even provide troops to help foreign investors control their workers in 
the case of a strike (McKay, 2006a, 2006b). In other words, McKay admitted that 
elements of the transnational enterprise’s culture, such as their preferences regarding 
unions, might affect aspects of local management. However, this was not his primary 
concern and he did not explain in detail how cultural factors affect the daily operation 
and managerial decisions of these companies. Instead, he preferred to explain the various 
managerial strategies and labor-control regimes as outcomes of cooperation between 
foreign enterprises and the state government, rather than cultural factors represented by 
management as obtained from their mother countries. 
While it was not the focus of Salzinger or McKay’s work, the differences 
between managers and international enterprises from multiple backgrounds suggest that 
cultural factors do matter. In this context, the work ethic that Taiwanese managers bring 
to Mexico may be a critical cultural factor affecting the daily operation of the 
maquiladora addressed in this study: CMSC.     
 
2. Taiwanese Work Ethic 
 
In this section, I first explore the work ethic and cultural values popularly shared 
by the Taiwanese, especially after the economic boom of the 1970s. When the capitalist 
mode of production and market economy became primary, the work ethic called “Pure 
 73 
 
Labor” by Taiwanese sociologist G.S. Shieh (1997; 2003) was shaped, due to the 
resulting changes in living style and workplace experiences. This is what Bourdieu 
called habitus. Once people create a habitus, they tend to respond similarly to particular 
situations (Bourdieu, 1990; 2017). In subsection 2.1, I discuss the Taiwanese work ethic 
that people developed over time to manage their businesses and other enterprises.  
Since the 1970s, Taiwanese society has experienced significant changes in terms of 
politics and the economy, such as the termination of martial law in 1987 and the gradual 
shifting of the economic paradigm from a planned economy to one that is more neo-
liberalistic (Syong and Chen, 2001). The dominant industries in Taiwan changed from 
labor-intensive manufacturing to high-tech, capital-intensive companies (Chen, 2003). 
However, wages remained unchanged (see Figure 6). During the same period, 
employers’ notion of the ideal work ethic also did not change. In subsection 2.2, I 
discuss an ongoing debate in Taiwan. After decades of development, the concept of 
“Gong De Taiwan” proposed by the president of the Executive Yuan continues the same 
spirit and work ethic as “Pure Labor”. 
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Figure 6  Average Wage Growth Rate from 1985 to 2016
14
  
 
In subsection 2.3, I discuss how this work ethic developed in Taiwan and has 
become an important factor for researchers, as well as how Taiwanese managers in Latin 
                                                 
14
 Sources: Made the figure from the website of  Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and 
Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. 
http://statdb.dgbas.gov.tw/pxweb/igraph/MakeGraph.asp?gr_type=0&gr_width=900&gr_height=850&gr_
fontsize=12&menu=y&PLanguage=9&pxfile=NA8101A1A2019627493377_1p2.px&wonload=900&honl
oad=850&rotate=&gr_legend=false 
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America operate subsidiary companies. The cultural values carried by the agents of 
transnational enterprises should be as important as the local cultural factors in studies of 
subsidiary factories like maquiladoras. 
 
 
2.1 The “Pure Labor” Work Ethic 
 
Taiwan’s economic growth after the 1970s marked the first time that Taiwan 
experienced modern capitalism. To achieve this economic growth, the government of 
Taiwan adopted an export-oriented strategy as the main economic guideline. The 
government designated several areas as export-oriented industrial zones in or near to 
major cities (Kung, 1994; Hsiung, 1996; Cheng and Hsiung, 1993; Chang, 1996). With 
the economy booming, thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises sprang up in 
Taiwan. These companies tended to have only a few employees working in small 
factories. Generally speaking, during the busy season, these enterprises could not 
achieve their production goals with their own labor forces and facilities. Therefore, they 
began to rely on multiple subcontractors to help them meet their production 
requirements. These subcontractors were even smaller in scale (Pan and Chang, 2001).  
Most of these subcontractors were not factory owners; they were housewives. In 
order to develop the rural economy, the government promoted a “factories in the living 
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room”15  policy that encouraged housewives and other labor in rural areas to help local 
manufacturers by working for them at home. As a patriarchal society, male family 
members were employed in the formal economy. Elders and women were in charge of 
child care and other household work. Thus, housewives worked at home as 
subcontractors. The “factories in the living room” policy drew the rural population into 
the capitalist mode of production and allowed small and medium-sized enterprises to 
produce commodities in an extremely flexible manner and with minimum cost. These 
enterprises usually partnered with multiple subcontractors. After they received orders, 
they delivered raw material to the subcontractors. The subcontractors were then given a 
due date and short instructions or production guidelines. The agents showed up on the 
due date and picked up the finished goods. Since the subcontractors usually worked at 
home, their work process was not directly controlled and monitored by the enterprise. 
Therefore, all labor output was calculated on a piecework basis.  
The output calculation had several features that allowed smaller enterprises to 
maximize flexibility. For example, according to G.S. Shieh (1997), most piecework in 
Taiwan at that time was calculated after the order was finished. Ideally, agents would 
communicate the per-piece rate to subcontractors beforehand, but in reality, 
subcontractors did not learn the rate before they received a paycheck. This was in spite 
of the fact that when factory contractors distributed orders to several cooperating 
subcontractors, they calculated the approximate salaries they would pay. The standard 
                                                 
15
 This “factories in the living room” policy was similar to those putting-out production systems popular in 
Europe after the Industrial Revolution and at other times.   
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that the contractors followed was the average wage for manufacturing workers in their 
respective factories. Thus, contractors were able to keep their production expenditures to 
a minimum, but still respond to market demands in a timely manner.  
Unlike in other countries, the income that Taiwanese subcontractors received was 
not calculated at a per-piece rate. They received payment similar to a monthly salary. 
However, unlike formal employees at factories, these subcontractors only received 
money and no other work-related benefits. Both contractors and subcontractors 
calculated payment in a similar way, which resulted in the subcontractors’ income levels 
to be close to those of the factory workers. Although subcontractors sometimes 
complained that what they received did not correspond to the labor they put in, they 
understood and agreed with this arrangement because if they changed places with the 
contractors, they would do the same (Shieh, 1997). In this sense, consent existed 
between the contractors and subcontractors, and this consent became an important 
element of the “Pure Labor” work ethic.  Shieh argued that Taiwan experienced the 
modern capitalistic mode of production through this putting-out production and salary 
system. From here, Taiwan developed their unique understanding of labor and 
capitalism.  
This subcontracting system also allowed small and medium-sized enterprises in 
Taiwan the ability to compete in the global market, due to their flexibility and speed. 
This flexibility continues today. According to statistical data provided by the Taiwanese 
government, more than 95% of enterprises are of a small or medium size, employing 
more than nine million employees (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2017). Even though 
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the subcontracting system is now less popular than it was in the 1970s, the work ethic 
that developed still deeply affects most Taiwanese, including both employees and 
employers. Shieh argued that since the piecework wage system and 
contractor/subcontractor relationship were both popular in Taiwan during the 1970s, 
most workers experienced similar work and payment systems, from which the “Pure 
Labor” work ethic developed. In short, the ethic can be summarized as: “no work, no 
pay; you work, you get paid.” Both employers and employees tended to consider their 
employment relationship as something that could be understood and calculated only 
through money. Once the employment relationship is terminated, employers are free to 
use money to close the contract without any other additional costs, a process regulated 
by labor law in Taiwan. Even though the subcontract production system is less popular 
than it was in the 1970s, small and medium-sized enterprises still consider its speed and 
flexibility as reasons for them to continue to employ the process and compete in the 
global market.       
Shieh also identified another reason the majority of Taiwanese workers accepted 
the concept of “Pure Labor”. Although the Taiwanese government did have labor laws 
such as the Labor Standard Act and Occupational Safety and Health Act, in practice, the 
government enforced these laws unevenly. Taiwanese workers did not have a sufficient 
social safety net or other methods of protection if they faced an accident or illegal 
dismissal.  As a result, Taiwanese workers developed several strategies for protecting 
themselves. The most important method was to start a new business. A common path for 
workers seeking to start a new business in the 1970s was to work in a factory at the 
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beginning of their career. Once they learned specific skills in that industry, they would 
leave their original position and run their own factories. Starting a new business and 
becoming the boss allowed workers to leave the employment relationship, or at least 
change their position from employee to employer. In fact, many current employers and 
contractors were once employees and subcontractors. Consequently, most workers tend 
to consider the employment relationship and labor-related issues from the employer’s 
position, and thus the concept of “Pure Labor” became widely adopted in the 1970s.  
This is still true today, even though the economy has experienced a number of 
changes, especially with the growth of service and capital-intensive high-tech sectors. 
The subcontracting mode of production is rarely seen today. Despite these changes, the 
Taiwanese economy still relies heavily on long work hours and the low cost of human 
capital typical of the “Pure Labor” cultural notion. In fact, small and medium-sized 
enterprises are still the main employers in Taiwan’s domestic market. Even though they 
no longer adapt the subcontracting system to achieve a flexible production schedule and 
respond to market demand in a timely manner, flexibility and speed remain the most 
important features allowing small and medium-sized enterprises to stay in business and 
compete with larger transnational corporations.  
In sum, during the economic boom, the Taiwanese people developed the “Pure 
Labor” work ethic. This work ethic helped small and medium-sized enterprises in 
Taiwan gain flexibility and kept expenditures related to human capital at a minimum. It 
also affected the Taiwanese concept of work, which made the Taiwanese consider labor 
relations from the employer’s point of view, and tolerate some aspects of exploitation. 
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Even after the mode of production changed and labor-intensive industries shifted to 
more capital-intensive and service-type industries, the strategies they adapted to compete 
in the market remained the same. There is no evidence to indicate that Taiwanese 
workers have benefitted from industrial upgrades, since the average work hours in a year 
still reach 2,100, and the average income has stayed at the same level it was in the 
1990s
16
.  Therefore, the work ethic remains observable, but with different rhetoric and 
decoration. The most recent version is “Gong De Taiwan17.” 
 
2.2 “Gong De” Taiwan 
 
At the time of writing, the Premiere of the Executive Yuan announced the 
Reform Act of the labor law, which took effect in September of 2017. Intending to “give 
small and middle scale enterprises more flexibility in order to enhance their 
competitiveness,” the Premiere declared the goals of the reform as follows:  “to expand 
                                                 
16
 According to statistical data from the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan of Taiwan, the average monthly salary in 1995 was 39,505 NTD (approximately $1,317 
USD). In 2016, the average monthly salary was 46,605 NTD (approximately $1,553.50 USD). 
Considering the inflation of consumer prices over that period of time, the average salary barely remained 
on the same level. 
17
 Gong De is the English translation of 功德, two Mandarin characters that refer to a concept in Buddhism 
similar to merit.   In many Buddhist forums or blogs in Taiwan, “gong de” is a term that is usually 
compared to “fu de (福德).” Both “gong de” and “fu de” refer to doing something good to other people on 
a superficial and behavioral level. For example, devoting money to building a temple or feeding monks or 
nuns can be “gong de” or “fu de.” The major difference between the two is that while doing “gong de,” 
individuals shouldn’t think about being paid back or benefitting from their behavior. The motivation 
should be totally unselfish and they should ask for no return. Conversely, “fu de” refers to charity or other 
behavior that can benefit others, which is expected to result in benefits for the giver during her/his life, 
they cannot gain merit in the afterlife. All the “fu de” they accumulate is reserved for this life. It cannot be 
transferred to the afterlife. To sum up, doing “gong de” or making merit is a concept that originated in 
Buddhism that encourages people to devote themselves to helping others. More importantly, all charity 
should not offer any sense of reward.    
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the total amount of overtime from 46 hours to 54 hours per month; the quantity of 
overtime can be shifted to another month, but the maximum overtime in three months 
should be no more than 138 hours.” Other goals included “to abolish [the rule that in 
every] seven days [workers] should have one rest day … and replace it [with] two rest 
days in fourteen days;” “the rest time between each shift should be no less than eight 
hours [instead of 11 hours];” and “to reduce … overtime payment.” This reform acts 
resulted in much discussion in Taiwanese society. Labor researchers did not favor the 
Reform Act because they believed it might harm the workers’ health and wellbeing.  
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Figure 7  Gong De Yuan Flyer (Author unknown)
18
 
 
When the Premiere of the Executive Yuan gave a speech to care workers, he 
proposed the concept of “Merit Taiwan,” saying “long-term care work is tough and 
tedious and the salary is only slightly more than 30,000 NTD [approximately $1,000 
USD]. It is difficult to take good care of the elders, and the working conditions and 
environment might be rough and hard for you to endure. If you think this pay is not 
                                                 
18
 This is a flyer that appeared during the debate of the Labor Reform Act. The flyer is designed and 
distributed by a group of protestors called "TWoverwork," the author was unknown.   
Sources: 
https://www.facebook.com/TWoverwork/photos/a.156779881605083/156780391605032/?type=3&theater 
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enough, please consider yourself as doing gong de [merit-based service].”19  He later 
defined his concept of Gond De Taiwan: “Taiwan is a merit society; you are doing 
charity, and you should be proud of yourself.” In Mandarin, “Gong De Taiwan” is 
pronounced gong de Taiwan. The meaning of “gong de” is similar to “making merit,” a 
concept in Buddhism. The Premiere adopted the concept of merit directly from 
Buddhism; it is related to Buddhist soteriology, and is about giving away personal 
belongings, both physical and spiritual, for a greater good. Making merit refers to 
individual behaviors devoted to people. Motivated by a totally unselfish willingness, an 
individual contributes to something that can help others, relieving them from their 
suffering or entering their emptiness (Adamek, 2005).  
It is easy to see why when the Premiere used the term to encourage people 
working in the long-term care industry, devoting themselves to elders without asking for 
anything in return. However, the speech angered much of the public. Critics described 
him as a cold-blooded person who should be responsible for raising the minimum wage, 
but instead proposed charitable giving without receiving anything in return. Some 
protestors and pro-labor-right groups designed some flyers (see Figure 7) to sarcasm the 
Premiere Lai. Yet while the Premiere’s speech irritated the overworked and underpaid 
laborers in Taiwan, it is a reflection of the work ethic of “Pure Labor”. The Reform Act 
actually had the support of around half the population. Many business owners supported 
                                                 
19
 To be clear, the Premiere did not argue that care workers deserved low pay, long work hours, and 
emotional burden. In fact, he declared that the government would definitely do something to enhance 
long-term care workers’ average salaries. Meanwhile, he asked care workers to consider themselves as 
doing charity and making merit.   
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him. Some openly welcomed the changes the Premiere proposed. Others asked for even 
longer working hours and more flexibility in the work schedule.    
Soon after his announcement of the Reform Act, the Premiere emphasized that 
reform was necessary because under current labor law regulations, small and medium-
sized enterprises would not be able to survive. The act gained the support of business 
owners, no matter the size of the company. For example, Shen Hsiung Hsu, president of 
the Chinese National Federation Industries, recognized the Premiere’s proposal and 
predicted that this reform act would help enterprises gain the flexibility to arrange work 
schedules according to production demands (Li, 2017/10/31). Bo Feng Lin, the president 
of the Chinese National Association of Industries and Commerce, said the existing “evil” 
labor law should be reformed as soon as possible because most workers needed more 
money to support their families (Huang, 2017/12/05; Liberty Times, 2017/12/05). Under 
the current conditions, the government took away opportunities from workers who were 
willing to work overtime and gain more money. The Labor Reform Act would provide 
opportunities to workers to work more overtime. Thus, he stated that the government 
“finally” got on the right track to helping Taiwanese enterprises.    
Besides business owners, many ordinary employees also supported the act or 
kept silent about the reform. Supporters tended to believe that the act would provide 
small and medium-sized enterprises with the flexibility and speed needed for them to 
compete in the global market. They also believed that the act provided advantages to 
workers, people who needed to sell their labor to make a living.  Given this public 
support, the Premiere decided to speed up the process and tried to pass the act before the 
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Lunar New Year of 2018, despite the fact that around half the population was opposed to 
it (Yeh, 2018/01/17; Hsu, 2018/01/23). When parliament began the legislation process, 
unions and protestors demonstrated outside. However, the number of protestors was 
small, and parliament passed the Reform Act as expected on January 10, 2018. Soon 
after parliament finalized the legislation, the Premiere gave another speech to thank his 
“colleagues” who had worked so hard to pass the labor reform act, in accordance with 
the “people’s wish.” Now, “laborers can earn more, and the enterprises can gain … 
flexibility.” When the Premiere proposed Gong De (Merit) Taiwan, it was an indication 
of how the highest government officer perceived human labor.  He encouraged workers 
to consider themselves to be making merit if “they put more effort into their work than 
the return [the salary].”  He used this concept to describe the current working conditions 
such as low pay and long working hours. He tried to comfort workers who were poorly 
paid and frequently overworked with this rhetoric of merit. Because the core concept of 
making merit demanded that individuals be unselfish with regards to the benefit they 
provided to others, these individuals were effectively told not to pursue any return for 
their effort.  
This was not only the opinion of the Premiere. Local newspapers and other mass 
media from the time indicated that it was not uncommon for business people, 
corporation owners, and managers to share similar opinions. Some workers even shared 
this view, resulting in their denial that class conflict existed between managers and 
workers. A Taiwanese engineer working in a machine tool factory gave me her opinion 
of the employment relationship:   
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“Business owners compete with other owners for good business, and workers 
should do the same. They should compete with other workers for good jobs. The 
former sells service products and goods; the later sells one’s labor power. How 
could this lead to the conclusion of the opposition between workers and 
capitalists or … conflict between these two groups? It is hard for me to 
understand. Workers feel they are suffering and believe this is all capitalists’ 
fault, so they want to take advantage of the capitalists, and then … world peace 
will come. People who think in this way must have no startup experience or 
don’t change their occupations … enough.”  
 
This Taiwanese engineer was fully aware that employers and employees do not 
share the same interests, but she didn’t understand why these different interests would 
result in class conflict.  From her perspective, the employer and employee should be in 
harmony because one group provides job opportunities and the other needs them to make 
a living. She believed that workers should help themselves if they were unsatisfied with 
their current working conditions. Workers should change jobs until they found one that 
satisfied them. During our interview, she showed a clear position, arguing that when it 
came to the economic and labor markets, the best government was the one that regulated 
the least. Also, she assumed that in the labor market, workers were totally free to choose 
their occupations and needed to be responsible for their own choices, regardless of their 
abilities or access to information. Regarding the government’s role in labor-related 
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issues, this Taiwanese engineer believed that workers were free and the only thing that a 
government should do is remove regulations to provide flexibility. Because workers 
were free in the labor market, they could change their jobs if they didn’t like them. 
Therefore, the government should reduce regulations on labor and business to the 
minimum level, and that is why she supported the Labor Reform Act.     
Another example is a public comment I saw on a very popular forum in Taiwan, 
PTT
20
, in January 2018. The original conversation began with someone who was against 
the Labor Reform Act. The original poster argued that according to union law, the 
minimum number of workers required to form a union was 30. However, most small and 
medium-scale enterprises in Taiwan have less than 30 employees. Therefore, the 
unionization rate in Taiwan is approximately 7% of the labor force. Only a few workers 
are actually protected by unions. Even though the Labor Standards Act requires 
companies without unions to host a meeting between employer and employees once 
every three months, there is no punishment or fine for those companies that violate this 
law. Furthermore, such meetings, when held, are not effective in protecting workers’ 
rights. It is not uncommon to hear companies assign their “preferred” employees to be 
representatives at such meetings. In such circumstances, the poster argued, the Labor 
Reform Act would further undermine and weaken workers’ already-weak ability to 
                                                 
20
 PTT is the largest terminal-based bulletin board system (BBS) forum in Taiwan. It was established in 
1995 and now has over 1.5 million registered users and over 100,000 users online at any time. There are 
more than 20,000 boards that discuss different topics and over 20,000 articles and 500,000 comments are 
posted every day. 
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protect themselves because the act allowed these meetings to decide most issues, such as 
flexible work schedules and rest hours between shifts.  
This post attracted several supporters of the reform, motivating them to post their 
comments arguing that workers do have weapons to fight against unlawful employers 
and protect their rights. One supporter did not agree with the initial poster’s argument. 
She provided personal experience, describing her resignation from a previous job. Her 
employment contract required her to work for at least one year; if she resigned inside the 
first year, there was an approximate $17,000 USD fine. After half a year, she decided to 
resign but did not want to pay the fine; she explained that the working conditions were 
horrible. She began to collect information about the company’s unlawful practices and 
told the manager that she had the information on hand. Because she collected these data, 
she eventually resigned without any fine. Her description of her personal story is as 
follows:  
 
“Telling this story is not to say that I’m good, but I try to indicate that in my 
limited working experience, do workers have weapons to fight against 
employers? I believe actually they do, and these weapons are not limited [to 
the] Labor Standards Act. Workers should use these weapons to protect 
themselves, and this is their responsibility … not waiting for the labor 
inspectors to check the labor conditions. If you met a terrible boss and you 
[didn’t] want to quit, obviously that means you agree with the working 
conditions.” 
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From her comment, it is not difficult to see that she did not believe that the law 
should be enforced to protect workers; workers should be aware that they cannot rely on 
the government to protect their rights. They need to use whatever they can to protect 
their own rights. The thoughts behind this comment correspond to the research of Shieh, 
who argued that the government does not protect labor, so workers facing bad employers 
must find solutions to labor-related issues on their own.  
Thus, when comparing workers to those in other countries such as South Korea, 
Taiwanese employees lack a relative sense of class consciousness. Both employers and 
employees tend to operate from a capitalist point of view. As Shieh has argued, the 
government’s attitude may be responsible for the current situation; when it comes to 
labor-related issues, since workers lack protection and sufficient aid from the 
government; their only hope is to improve their condition by starting a business and 
becoming the boss. This structural feature may be responsible for the concept of “Pure 
Labor”, and the similar notion of Gong De Taiwan that is widely accepted by the 
Taiwanese. 
Take the world-famous and largest electronic device assembly manufacturer, 
Foxconn, as an example. Terry Gou, the CEO, has a typical perspective illustrating the 
work ethic of “Pure Labor” and Gong De Taiwan that underscores the typical Taiwanese 
style of management. “How yellow is your urine?” is one of the questions Gou regularly 
asks his employees in order to evaluate if they are working hard enough. This question 
also illustrates his dissatisfaction with his employees’ performance. The assumption is 
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that if Gou believes an employee is working hard, he will not have time to drink water; 
he will forget his own physical needs. Therefore, his urine will be yellow. Since the 
CEO of Foxconn has such strict means of measuring his employees’ performance, it is 
no surprise how Foxconn manages its production bases in China.   
From January to August, 2010, there were 17 workers who committed suicide in 
China. These suicides attracted the attention of the Western media and local scholars. A 
research team interviewed former Foxconn workers, including those who attempted 
suicide but failed to die. According to their testimony, Foxconn engages in military-style 
labor control across its multiple sites in China. Workers are not allowed to talk to one 
another during working hours. Restroom breaks must be approved by line leaders or 
supervisors. Because line workers’ salaries are barely enough to rent a room outside the 
industrial park, most workers live in low-quality dormitories provided by Foxconn. This 
means that their lives after work are also monitored by their employer. In fact, most 
workers indicated that they had no such thing as after-work lives, since most of their 
holidays were spent on the production line after their managers requested they work 
overtime.  
Foxconn is the largest electronics assembly enterprise in the world. Its biggest 
client is Apple. Almost all of Apple’s products are produced by Foxconn, whose 
production schedules are synchronized with Apple’s product release dates. Before such a 
date, most Foxconn workers experience high pressure and long working hours to meet 
Apple’s requirements for quality and quantity. As a result, workers experience fatigue 
and other negative psychological symptoms related to their work. Besides the strict 
 91 
 
discipline, order on the shop floor, and long working hours, Foxconn hires many student 
workers to fill their labor demands during the busy season and assure flexibility in their 
production. Under the heading of internships, Foxconn cooperates with local 
governments and vocational schools, requesting these institutions send their students to 
work at Foxconn. Thus, Foxconn receives thousands of cheap workers who are not 
protected by Chinese labor laws. Foxconn can easily send them back to school without 
paying them compensation when they are no longer needed (Chan and Ngai, 2010; Pun, 
Chan and Selden, 2015; Pun, Shen, Guo, Lu, Chan, and Selden, 2015; Pun, Lu, Guo, 
Chan, 2011). Some student workers have indicated that they had no choice but to follow 
orders to work at Foxconn. They conducted the same tasks as formal employees but 
received less pay. In this context, “hiring” student workers are a strategy Foxconn uses 
to reduce its production expenditures and achieve flexibility.  
As the largest and most famous Taiwanese enterprise, Foxconn’s management 
exhibits a strong Taiwanese work ethic that conforms to the notion of “Pure Labor” and 
Gong De Taiwan. While Foxconn attempts to elicit as much productivity as possible 
from its workers, it also seeks to keep worker-related expenditures to a minimum. This is 
a perfect illustration of the current Taiwanese work ethic. When I selected potential 
fieldwork sites, Foxconn was my first choice because the corporation has a maquiladora 
in Ciudad Juarez, and I could find current and previous Taiwanese employees in 
Houston’s Taiwanese community. Once, I met a previous Foxconn employee at a 
friend’s birthday party. My friend knew that I was eager to interview Foxconn 
employees so she introduced me. We had a friendly conversation at the beginning, but 
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after I explained that labor-related topics were my primary research interest, he became 
nervous and ended our conversation. After the party, I wanted to interview him to learn 
more about labor relations at Foxconn, but he never answered my calls or replied to any 
of my messages.   
In this section, I described the “Pure Labor” work ethic developed in Taiwan in 
the 1970s. The widely popular putting-out system and its unique payment method 
shaped workers’ experience of their work lives. The putting-out system allowed small 
and medium-sized enterprises to meet the quantity they needed to produce in a timely 
fashion. This system also helped enterprises control their production expenditures, 
keeping them at a minimum level and thus maximizing profits. The use of 
subcontractors disguised monthly salaries as a piecework system and accustomed 
Taiwanese people to the idea that employers would only pay for what they gained, and 
were not responsible for labor reproduction or employees’ wellbeing. Both Taiwanese 
employers and employees widely accepted this “Pure Labor” concept, which allowed 
Taiwanese enterprises to achieve flexibility and minimize production-related costs. 
“Pure Labor” continues to be observable in the managerial style employed in Taiwanese 
enterprises. Foxconn is one of the most prominent cases. As the world’s largest 
electronics assembly corporation, Foxconn creates profit by minimizing its expenditures 
on human capital while extracting maximum productivity from its workers. Though I 
have never entered a Foxconn-operated maquiladora, I found similar features at CMSC. 
In the following section, I will describe how this work ethic is shared by CMSC’s 
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general manager, Jackie Chan, and how it shapes his decision making and management 
style. 
 
3. The Art of Management 
 
In this section, I use the fieldwork data collected during my stay at CMSC to 
provide evidence that the cultural values introduced in maquiladoras by representatives 
from transnational companies play an important role in management. As discussed 
above, during my fieldwork, I mainly stayed at one maquiladora, CMSC, which was 
operated by a Taiwanese general manager, Jackie Chan. Most cases described in this 
section were collected from interviews with him and other managers (of various 
nationalities), and participant observations made on the shop floor. Besides my first-
hand experiences and interview data collected from CMSC personnel, I also met 
employees of another Taiwanese-operated maquiladora. Despite the fact that I did not 
visit that maquiladora personally, according to their descriptions, these two 
maquiladoras shared common features that I believe are the result of similar Taiwanese 
cultural values.  
This section contains two parts, one describing a discussion between Jackie Chan 
and myself about why CMSC is able to survive in the global television market when the 
previous Japanese corporation did not, and one in which I discuss labor-related issues 
such as how Jackie Chan’s managerial philosophy affected the operation of CMSC. 
Three stories are described that delineate how the culturally defined work ethic and 
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values that Jackie Chan developed during his previous work experience in Taiwan and 
China affected the way he dealt with labor-related issues inside CMSC. 
 
3.1. “Those Things that the Japanese Never Dare to Do”: Money Comes from Dangers  
 
It was not too long after I came to Tijuana and began my fieldwork at CMSC that 
I learned that another Japanese corporation had originally constructed and occupied the 
site. Based on this history, I was eager to understand why the Japanese corporation did 
not continue its operation, while the Chinese endeavor was able to do so, even though it 
was located in the same place and assembled the same kinds of products. One day, when 
we had lunch together, I asked Jackie Chan this question. We began a conversation:  
 
Hao-Yu (H): Since both the Japanese corporation and your company make 
televisions and monitors, why did your company want to purchase this factory 
when the previous corporation was considered unprofitable?” 
Jackie Chan (J): Take a guess. 
H: Hmmmm … I have no idea. Is it because your company adopted different 
strategies to operate here? I am totally an outsider of international business and 
marketing, so I really have no clue. 
J: Well, let’s put it this way. What do you think of the Japanese? 
H: Japanese? 
J: Yes. What do you think of them? 
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H: I will say that the Japanese people are polite, diligent, hardworking, and 
serious. 
J: Yeah, the Taiwanese are hard working too. You’re close. And? 
H: What do you mean I’m close? 
J: Ok. As you said, the Japanese people are serious, and they always follow the 
rules, right? 
H: I think so. 
J: That is the point. 
H: What do you mean? Can you be more specific? 
J: Ok. Like you said, the Japanese people are serious and they always follow the 
rules. Therefore, when they operate businesses here or anywhere else around the 
world, they obey the local laws. We Chinese
21,  we don’t do that. 
H: Wait, wait, wait. What do you mean you don’t do that? You mean, some 
operations here are illegal? 
J: I’m not saying that we do things illegally here, but there’s always … grey zone 
in the law, and we are good at it. 
H: Can you give me an example? 
J: Have you ever heard of NAFTA? 
                                                 
21
 Taiwanese business people who have worked in China for a long time tend to call themselves Chinese. 
In fact, due to the complicated relationship and historical entanglement between the regimes across the 
Taiwan strait, many Taiwanese people retain the Chinese identity because they were taught in school that 
they were Chinese. Until now, identity was the most debated issue in the political arena. For Jackie Chan, 
Mexican managers were reminded not to call him Chinese, or he would be annoyed. In our conversation, 
though, he constantly called himself both Taiwanese and Chinese. Identity, for him, was interchangeable 
and replaceable. There was no conflict with being Taiwanese and Chinese at the same time.   
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H: Yes, the North America Free Trade Agreement. I know it. 
J: So inside NAFTA, there are many regulations. For example, the percentage of 
imported parts for assembling televisions is strictly regulated by NAFTA. I forget 
what the exact percentage is. Let’s say it is 75% percent of raw materials must be 
imported from the United States to Mexico. And what percentage of assembly must 
be finished inside the United States? For the Japanese, they usually strictly follow 
the regulations. That percentage is that percentage. There is no arrangement for 
this. But for our Chinese business people, it’s all about if you have guts or not. 
Obviously, it is way cheaper to produce the raw materials we need in China rather 
than in the United States, so we use some strategies to obey the regulation on the 
one hand but still import as many raw materials from China as possible on the 
other hand. 
H: How do you do that? 
J: Like I said, we need to import raw materials from the United States, right? So, 
we import those goods from China and ship them to California. We have a 
registered company there in order to import the necessary goods. After the 
customs clearance, the goods are exported from the US to Tijuana. Now these raw 
materials are not from China, but from the United States. Moreover, NAFTA offers 
a tax discount for both imported raw materials from the United States to Mexico 
and finished products from Mexico to the United States. Thus, we still follow the 
rules and everything is legal, but this arrangement helps us to save a tremendous 
amount of money to produce in the United States. We need to pay the overseas 
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shipping fee, but it is worth it and way cheaper than producing those things in the 
United States. Besides, the facility is the same. You know we have very efficient 
and huge factories in China, right? We can finish most of the process there, and 
then ship the partially completed products here to finish the final process. But 
Japanese people will never do that. If NAFTA says they need to import raw 
materials from the United States, they will build a factory somewhere in the United 
States to produce those materials. Japanese people are more cautious, and they 
will follow local commercial, trade, and labor laws. Therefore, they usually have 
much higher production costs than we have. This is why we can create profit but 
the previous Japanese corporation couldn’t. You mentioned that you are interested 
in culture. This is a cultural difference between the Japanese and Chinese. 
 
From his description, the cultural difference lays in the willingness to obey local 
laws, or at least the level at which laws should be obeyed. He explained why CMSC was 
able to create profit by finding loopholes in the law. During our conversation, he did not 
show any sign that such behavior was not inappropriate, nor was he uncomfortable 
telling an outsider about it. In other words, even though we might already understand 
that each corporation has its own culture, regardless of what that culture is, it plays an 
important role in influencing managerial strategies and the ability to compete in the 
global market. Furthermore, for Jackie Chan, finding legal loopholes in laws is one 
example of the Taiwanese enterprise he worked for creating advantages for itself in the 
market.  
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Jackie Chan provided a vivid image of how Taiwanese enterprises gain flexibility 
for their businesses. This flexibility not only refers to a flexible production schedule and 
labor arrangement, but also their willingness to take advantage of legal loopholes. That 
is to say, while Jackie Chan managed CMSC, a maquiladora in Tijuana, Mexico, his 
business strategies revealed that the ability to be flexible in any possible aspect was a 
core concern of his decision making process. According to Jackie, his family in Taiwan 
owned a small size factory from the time that the putting-out system was popular in 
Taiwan, and therefore, he was deeply immersed in the Taiwanese work environment 
from his early age. In this context, pursuing flexibility in production and human capital 
expenditures showed how Jackie Chan was influenced by the “Pure Labor” work ethic 
that he developed from previous work experience in Taiwan. 
 
 
3.2  “Why Don’t They Work Overtime?” 
 
Before I began my fieldwork at CMSC, I had never had a chance to take a close 
look at a factory. I did have a relative who owned a very small factory that made 
electronic products for contractors back in the 1980s, but I was too young to understand 
how it was operated. CMSC was my first experience with the actual work life on the 
assembly line. The first couple of days after I arrived at CMSC, I did not have a chance 
to meet the general manager, Jackie Chan. He was in Taiwan for a family emergency. I 
began my work on the assembly line several days before he returned to Tijuana. After he 
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was back at work, I arranged for the first interview at the earliest convenient time. In 
fact, this was his lunch break and not leisure time.  
In the first interview, I offered a simple summary of the issues that I wanted to 
discuss with him. There were four topics I hoped I could touch upon at that time, though 
we never really finished with all four topics. First, I hoped to learn more about his 
personal history. Before I arrived, we had only exchanged a couple of emails and two 
phone calls. I barely knew him, his background, and the reason why he chose his career 
and eventually ended up in Tijuana. Second, I tried to make sense of my recent 
experience as an assembly line worker. My body hurt almost every afternoon after two 
o’clock, and I could tell that most of the workers felt the same way. Therefore, I was 
curious about whether this pressure of production had any specific purpose or 
philosophy behind it.  
As the third topic, I wanted to see what criteria Jackie Chan used to evaluate his 
workers. In her book Gender in Production: Making Workers in Mexico’s Global 
Factories, Salzinger provided several case studies of maquiladoras, indicating that each 
manager had their own image of the ideal worker. These different images may come 
from personal preference, cultural and educational backgrounds, and more importantly, 
their ideas about typical Mexican workers (Salzinger, 2003). Therefore, I wanted to ask 
Jackie Chan what criteria he used to choose workers. Moreover, despite the fact that I 
was beginning my study, I literally knew almost nothing about the factory. However, I 
was eager to understand his experiences managing a maquiladora in Mexico and the 
history of this maquiladora. These comprised the fourth set of questions. Therefore, our 
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first interview was focused on these topics. There we began a conversation that 
eventually went far beyond my expectations.  
In the first interview with Jackie Chan, I began by briefly introducing myself. 
Then, we started our conversation about the ideal worker.  I expected to hear something 
profound, or a simple image described that was formulated after delicate calculation and 
meditation. Instead, Jackie Chan gave me a cliché in Mandarin, as follows:  
 
“All Chinese22  bosses are the same. Everyone wants their horses to run fast, but 
no one wants to feed their horses. Of course, you know this is impossible, but how 
to make horses eat the least but run the fastest? That is the art of management.”  
 
The original version in Mandarin is “You want horses that run fast, but you don’t 
want them to eat.” This phrase is a metaphor showing it is impossible to get a good 
outcome without any effort. The closest English proverb is: “If you pay peanuts, you get 
monkeys.” Regardless of its original meaning, Jackie Chan used it to describe how one 
should manage a factory properly. After he told me this, I thought it was cliché and did 
not treat the comment seriously. However, as the interview continued, I began to realize 
that he was serious about what he called the “art of management.” It wasn’t until I spent 
time on the shop floor that I realized how this philosophy was applied in daily practice.  
                                                 
22
 The word "Chinese” has different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. The KMT 
government taught the Taiwanese people that first they are Chinese and then they are Taiwanese. 
However, here, Chinese refers to citizens of the Republic of China. In other contexts, Chinese can also 
refer to citizens of the People’s Republic of China, or to people who culturally define themselves as 
Chinese. The word “Chinese” as used by Jackie Chan refers to bosses in the two Chinas.   
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After I spent several months on the assembly line, I began to know more people 
both on the line and in the office. I started to make sense of how Jackie Chan’s 
managerial philosophy motivated the daily operation of CMSC. During the break time, 
workers barely had a chance to sit on a bench but only could sit on the ground or stood 
against the wall to rest (as Figure 8 shows). For example, almost all of the facilities for 
workers were old and poorly maintained. The number of restrooms was insufficient for 
all of the workers on one line to use them during break time, especially for women 
workers. Most spent their ten-minute afternoon break waiting in a long line for the 
restroom.  The situation was similar in the food court. The factory’s food court and 
cafeteria could hold 100 people at a time. Since the cafeteria was not large enough, 
workers needed to take shifts to rest and have lunch. The insufficient facilities required 
that workers wait in long lines, sometimes two-thirds of their allotted rest time. There 
were two vending machines that sold cookies and sodas. Because many of the workers 
brought their breakfast and lunch to work, the factory had six microwaves for them to 
reheat their food. This, also, was not enough for the number of workers who wanted to 
use them.  Many Mexican senior managers who used to work for the Japanese company 
told me that they had several times suggested to Jackie Chan, the general manager, that 
he improve the facilities, but the answer was always no.  
The factory’s meal plan is another example. At the beginning of my stay, 
employees had to pay for their food, including breakfast and lunch. Approximately three 
months later, the company began to pay for employees’ lunches. The human resources 
manager told me that the policy change was due to the fact that recently they had had 
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some difficulty in hiring people. Therefore, they decided to increase the benefits they 
offered. One month later, once the factory had a stable labor force for the busy season, 
management changed the policy again. The company paid half the price of the meal, and 
employees paid the rest. This policy lasted until the day I left the factory and returned to 
Texas.  
 
Figure 8 A CMSC Worker During a Break. 
 
 
There were many temporary workers in the factory during the busy season, and 
they traveled from one maquiladora to another. When I shared lunch and gossip with 
them, they told me about the food courts and meal plans at other factories. Most workers 
were not satisfied with the meal plan and food served at CMSC, as compared to other 
maquiladoras at which they had worked. One temporary worker told me that a famous 
Korean electronics factory located in the same area usually had two main dishes offered 
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and several different sides. At CMSC, however, there was only one main dish and two 
sides; there was no choice. Furthermore, the menu remained the same for months, unlike 
at other companies that provided different menus almost every month.   
The previous Japanese company also treated their employees better, according to a 
Mexican senior manager at CMSC. The factory paid for the meal plan in full. Also, 
unlike CMSC, the Japanese company hired a chef and staff to operate the cafeteria. The 
same senior managers told me that the Japanese manager always encouraged the chef to 
improve the quality of the food. Therefore, the chef enthusiastically found fine foods and 
other sources to prepare in the food court. At CMSC, the staff who served the food were 
contract workers. The factory did not hire a chef. In fact, at breakfast, the factory asked a 
street vendor to sell burritos and juice in the food court. They came into the factory with 
a cooler full of burritos. Though different types of burritos were offered, the overall 
menu never changed. During lunch time, staff from the contracted food service company 
would bring the food to the service desks. Generally speaking, since they usually knew 
the number of workers in the factory the day before they arrived, the quantity of food 
was sufficient. However, I once conducted an oral survey of random workers,
23
  both 
CMSC employees and temporary workers. They considered the food served in the food 
court to be “mal” (not good), or “maso menos” (so so). None considered the food good.  
                                                 
23
 Because I could not tell if the Mexican cuisine was good or bad when I was at CMSC, during the lunch 
break, I asked almost every worker I met how they felt about the food at CMSC. Since I constantly 
worked with different workers and shared a table with them during the lunch break, I had the chance to 
conduct an oral survey and collect their opinions about the food. 
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The harsh and tiresome work schedule, insufficient facilities for workers, and meal 
plan were three aspects of CMSC’s daily operation that revealed Jackie Chan’s 
managerial philosophy. The factory provided for the workers’ basic needs but put 
minimum effort into improving the work environment and quality of the facilities, as 
compared to other maquiladoras in the Tijuana area. This illustrates how deeply Jackie 
Chan’s managerial philosophy penetrated into every aspect of daily operation. By 
providing minimum facilities and necessities to workers but attempting to extract the 
most productivity from them, we can see how the Taiwanese “Pure Labor” work ethic 
affected the production arrangement at CMSC.  
Besides expressing this managerial philosophy, during my stay, Jackie Chan 
constantly asked me to do him favors. At that time, the factory often experienced high 
turnover and absentee rates in the Mexican personnel. Jackie Chan asked me to 
determine the reason for this. He also asked me to help answer the question: “Why won’t 
the workers work overtime?” I remember one day after the morning meeting of 
managers, he walked to my desk and asked me this question again. “Hao-Yu, could you 
help me to find out the reason why they don’t want to work overtime? It is so weird … 
they earn so little but still refuse to work overtime. Please help me to find the answer, 
OK?” 
To me, the high absentee and turnover rates were obvious and easy to explain. 
CMSC paid its employees the second lowest weekly salary of 100 maquiladoras that 
took part in a survey, according to a Mexican senior manager. It did not provide 
transportation, and the meal plan was notorious in the Tijuana area. All of these features 
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affected workers’ willingness to be at work and their happiness while there. In this 
sense, it was not too difficult to answer the question about high absenteeism and 
turnover, and many Mexican managers had already told Jackie Chan the answer and 
solution, but he took no action to solve it. His second question caught my attention 
because it was different from my impressions; therefore, after he asked me, I went to the 
human resources office and checked with the HR staff, confirming the actual situation 
regarding overtime. I had the opposite impression regarding this matter. I frequently saw 
line leaders asking people to work overtime and collecting the signed consent forms. 
Line leaders usually began around noon, inquiring with workers if they wanted to work 
overtime. Line leaders would approach each worker and ask: “Tiempo extra? Tiempo 
extra;” several minutes later, they would collect the consent forms from the workers who 
had agreed to work overtime.   
The HR staff confirmed my impression. Most workers were willing to participate 
in overtime work. Even though they were only willing to participate in the first hour of 
overtime, most days the factory was able to find enough hands to operate at least one 
assembly line. Later, I told Jackie Chan about the information I found in the HR office, 
and that I was not sure what kind of answer he wanted from me. Workers did participate 
in overtime.  He told me why he asked me that question. After he did so, I realized that 
he had the impression that Mexican workers did not like to work overtime because he 
compared Mexican workers to the Chinese and Taiwanese workers he used to manage. 
According to his personal experience, before he came to Mexico and managed this 
maquiladora, he used to work in both China and Taiwan. He told me that from his 
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previous experience, he believed that Chinese workers were more docile and easier to 
discipline than Mexicans. Chinese workers were willing to follow the rules and orders, 
no matter what kind of attitude the managers had. Jackie Chan said, “They are always 
ready and willing to work overtime.”  
Then I asked him what the ideal worker was like. He didn’t reply directly, but 
when he asked me to answer his question about overtime, his idea of the ideal worker 
emerged from his comparison between Chinese and Mexican employees. He compared 
workers from both countries but used Chinese workers as the standard to judge and 
measure the Mexican workers he managed. Also, when Jackie Chan explained why he 
asked this overtime question, he told me that he thought all of the workers did not earn 
enough, so they should reasonably like to work more to gain more income. At least, that 
was the case in China, so he did not understand why Mexican workers were reluctant to 
work overtime.  
According to Mexican managers at CMSC who had visited the factory that 
Outstanding Technology operated in China, the discipline and order there was harsh and 
rigorous. Vino, one of the senior managers who had also worked for the Japanese 
enterprise for twelve years, had spent another seven years with CMSC at the time of his 
interview. He had traveled to Japan for his previous work, and China to receive 
advanced training and learn about the operation of the two factories. He described his 
first impression when he visited the factory in China: 
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“You know, Hao-Yu, after they renegotiated the employment contract with us, they 
sent us to the headquarters and factory in China. I spent months there. You know 
what? They let us visit their production base, and the first thing I learned there 
was that workers were not allowed to talk for the entire day. Even if their stations 
did not have raw materials to assemble, all those workers could do was stand up 
and wait. The management there was like the military. It might be more effective 
but this military style management could not work here.” 
 
In another case, Enrique, a line leader for CMSC, began his career working for the 
Japanese, before CMSC purchased all of the facilities. His experience was similar to 
what Vino described. When I asked him about his personal experience and career 
trajectory working for the Japanese and Chinese, he described his training in China:  
 
Hao-Yu (H): How long have you worked for this company?  
Enrique (E): I worked for this company from the very beginning, till now. It has 
already been nine years.  
H: So what did you do before this job? 
E: The same one. I worked for the Japanese here in the same factory; now, it is 
already 16 years that I worked here.  
H: Wow, that was such a long time. So could you tell me if you think there are any 
differences between Japanese and Chinese bosses?  
E: They are very different. Did you know, I have gone to both Japan and China? 
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H: Of course I didn’t know. So, tell me. How was it?  
E: I went to both countries for training. I spent two months in Japan, and I forget 
… about three weeks in China.  
H: So you did you receive similar training in these two countries?  
E: Not really. When I went to Japan, we took many classes and practiced in the 
Japanese factory for several weeks. In the Chinese factory – oh my god, they really 
have a huge factory – there are so many workers there. Thousands of workers 
there, and they have many automatic machines that we don’t have here. When we 
were in China, we also took some courses, but we did not practice in the factory. 
We just visited the factory and took a tour. The factory there was so huge and so 
different.  
H: What do you mean by so different?  
E: Workers there could not talk. They just sat there and worked all day long. I did 
not like that kind of environment. Their bosses and line leaders were yelling all the 
time. The air was so intense and nervous. I was glad that I did not need to work 
there.   
 
I was not able to ask Enrique to compare the factories of the different corporations 
at which he had worked. He only discussed the Chinese one but mentioned that the 
atmosphere was more intense in the Chinese factory than at CMSC. The comments from 
Enrique and Vino supported Jackie Chan’s description of Chinese workers and 
management in Chinese factories. It also confirmed how Jackie Chan’s previous work 
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experience shaped his notion of the ideal worker and affected the way he interpreted the 
situation he encountered at CMSC in Tijuana.  
Vino and Enrique described how workers at the Chinese factory faced more 
rigorous discipline and order on the shop floor than did employees at CMSC. Each 
morning, the line leader or production manager got every worker together and gave a 
short speech and delivered the daily production goal. Because the short meeting occurred 
before the regular work hours, workers needed to arrive at work before their start times. 
During work time, workers were not allowed to talk to one another. Even talking to 
production assistants or logistics people was prohibited. If a worker ran out of the 
production material they needed, the only thing they could do was raise their hand and 
wait for the production assistant or line leader. A similar situation occurred when 
workers encountered production problems. They could not call for help but instead had 
to stand up and wait.  On the shop floor at CMSC, the atmosphere tended to be more 
relaxed. Workers could talk to each other at any time. In fact, CMSC actually prohibited 
workers from talking to each other on the assembly line, but that rule was ignored. Both 
line leaders and production managers tacitly consented to workers chatting with one 
another during work, so long as the talking did not affect productivity. Despite that, there 
were still conflicts and quarrels between line leaders and workers, but only occasionally. 
During my time on the assembly line, I felt that the atmosphere was not intense or overly 
serious.  
Furthermore, Chinese engineers who came to Tijuana to provide temporary 
support also told me that in their factories in China, line leaders there enjoyed more 
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authority. According to their testimony, line leaders were usually in charge of a team, 
and each team would form a production unit. Line leaders could order their team 
members to work overtime without their consent. Chinese line leaders had many 
strategies for “encouraging” workers to participate. From the Chinese engineers’ 
description, most line leaders were experts at applying peer pressure. They could 
manipulate team members to encourage other workers to work overtime, or sometimes 
they simply yelled at those who did not want to work overtime to force them. In such 
circumstances, it was not surprising to learn that Jackie Chan wanted me to determine 
why Mexican workers were reluctant to work overtime. Chinese works really did not 
have a choice regarding whether or not to work overtime, but Mexican workers did 
because labor laws protected workers’ right to decide for themselves.  
Despite the fact that Jackie Chan considered military-style management to be the 
ideal way of managing CMSC, this never actually occurred. There was a gap between 
his ideal and the reality, and the gap was caused by Mexican workers’ straightforward 
reaction to harsh management techniques. Both Mexican managers and line leaders 
believed that making workers happy while working was crucial to achieving the 
necessary quantity of production. These factors were responsible for the gap between 
Jackie Chan’s ideas and the reality that occurred on the shop floor.      
Another event also underscored how Jackie Chan understood his workers and how 
he tried to implement his managerial philosophy to improve productivity. I was working 
as a repairman, confident with the skill that I learned from other experienced workers. I 
thought I might stay in this position until the end of my fieldwork. The general manager 
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walked into the production area and talked to the production manager. After he was 
done, he called me to approach him. I left the work to a temporary repairman and 
followed him to sit on a bench. When I asked what I could do for him, he gestured to me 
to sit down and watch the line flow. The line flowed smoothly that day, and we kept 
watching. Half a minute later, he told me the reason he wanted to talk to me. He wanted 
me to watch the line flow was because he wanted to “promote” me to be an industrial 
engineer.  
That was the first time I heard the term “industrial engineer.” I had no clue what 
the meaning was, not to mention what kind of work an industrial engineer might 
perform. I told him I did not know what an industrial engineer did, so he explained it to 
me. According to Jackie Chan, industrial engineers help the factory balance the line, 
which means that each production station should spend almost an equal amount of time 
as the others performing the task assigned to them. If the line is not balanced, then no 
matter how experienced a worker is, the line will not run smoothly. Therefore, making 
sure the line flows smoothly is the most important task for any industrial engineer.  
To achieve that goal, an industrial engineer should not only constantly stay on the 
line and count the time for each stop, but also one needs to observe the spatial 
arrangement of each station. Moreover, the body movements of workers should be an 
aspect that an industrial engineer should study.  
From then on, I was assigned to be an industrial engineer (IE) and learned from 
Jackie Chan how to do the job properly. From our conversations, I began to learn his 
purpose in assigning me to work in this department. He wanted me to help the IE 
 112 
 
manager improve productivity because the IE department lacked workers. I learned there 
are multiple ways of improving productivity. For example, each assembly station needed 
space and a table upon which to place the raw material. The arrangement of these spaces 
and tables was critical to line flow. If the workers felt it was inconvenient to reach for 
the materials they needed, that would slow down production. Therefore, the IE needed to 
arrange spaces and tables appropriately. Another possibility for increasing productivity 
is the total number of stations. The logistics route of the packing department is another 
element crucial to improving productivity, increasing or decreasing stops to find the best 
and most efficient production line. If the packing area cannot accommodate the goods 
waiting to be packed or the completed products cannot be sent to the warehouse on time, 
the entire line slows down.     
For Jackie Chan, the most important task of an industrial engineer was extracting 
more productivity from the workers. Industrial engineers performed their jobs by 
changing workers’ body movements or the assembly procedure. They needed to be 
experts; knowing the special tricks of each assembly station and helping workers find the 
most comfortable and fastest ways of performing their tasks. For Jackie Chan, improving 
productivity meant improving the workers and not the working conditions. His 
Taylorism-based philosophy was that work efficiency was gained by the proper 
discipline of workers’ body movements.  Changing the setting of the work station and 
adjusting workers’ body movements were the most efficient and cheapest ways of 
enhancing productivity without increasing cost.  This Taylorism-like notion of body 
control reflected both Jackie Chan’s personal managerial philosophy and the cultural 
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values that he shared with other Taiwanese managers. He wanted to extract maximum 
productivity from workers without improving their working condition or making them 
happier and thus willing to work harder.  
Jackie Chan applied his philosophy throughout his factory. Though the workers 
may not have been aware of this, I could see their reactions to his managerial style. 
When I asked workers how they felt about working at CMSC, they told me they were 
not happy. They complained about the low salary, dirty and insufficient restrooms, 
expensive lunches, broken vending machines, and the manager’s attitude. Based on their 
opinions, I asked the Mexican managers their thoughts on the circumstances, and most 
told me that they fully acknowledged how bad it was but could do nothing about it.  
One Mexican manager told me that after the factory changed from Japanese 
ownership to being run by Outstanding Technology; he suggested that the general 
manager increase workers’ salaries in order to keep experienced employees at the 
factory. However, the general manager did not listen to him. Later, he suggested that the 
factory could use funds from the recycling to improve the food court and other facilities, 
money that accumulated from selling the paper boxes that contained the raw material 
shipped from China to Tijuana. This would make the workers more comfortable and 
happier. The general manager turned down his proposal without any explanation. He 
described his experience as follows: 
  
Generally speaking, when I proposed any human-related improvements to the 
general manager, I felt he was not interested in them. I suggested several [things] 
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to him, but he declined all of them, and eventually he stopped asking me to join the 
morning meeting.  
 
More than one Mexican manager shared similar stories with me, and in fact, the 
workers did feel unhappy about their working conditions and environment. Their 
testimony indicated that there existed a consistent policy applied by Jackie Chan that 
reflected the Taiwanese notion of “Pure Labor”. He silently turned down human-related 
improvement proposals, showing that he did not consider improving working conditions 
or providing more work-related benefits as ways of giving workers an incentive to work 
harder. This corresponds to the “Pure Labor” work ethic in that with the putting-out 
system in which both contractors and subcontractors agreed that the payment a 
subcontractor received was based only on their labor outcome. Other work-related 
benefits such as paid vacations, sick leave, maternity leave, and pensions were not 
offered. This “Pure Labor” notion of work-related benefits is why Jackie Chan was 
reluctant to improve working conditions and increase work benefits even if it were to 
result in enhancing the productivity of workers. He would rather use his Taylorism-
based method instead.  
The last thing that I want to describe in this section is an event that occurred on the 
last day of my fieldwork. I believe all anthropologists and anthropology apprentices 
share a common concern for reciprocity with their informants, and I am no exception. In 
my case, reciprocity is complicated because at CMSC, workers and managers did not 
share a common interest. Therefore, finding a proper way to return favors was difficult 
 115 
 
for me during my time in Tijuana. I finally found a solution and decided to share it with 
Jackie Chan and Ying Shan, his special assistant. On the last day before I departed from 
Tijuana to return to Texas, I arranged a short meeting with them. Because I already 
learned that it would be useless to suggest to them that they improve productivity and 
enhance workers’ happiness by increasing salaries, I decided to suggest something 
different that they might consider more “affordable” and helpful.  
When I was working as an ordinary worker with Mexican colleagues, I realized 
that Coca Cola was unique to their diet as Figure 9 shown in the right; Mexican people 
consumed the most Coca Cola company beverage products in the world. Generally 
speaking, Mexican people love to have a bottle of Coke with their meals. It was the same 
for the Mexican workers at CMSC. During lunchtime, most workers were willing to pay 
twelve pesos extra to buy a bottle of Coke.  
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Figure 9  Coca Cola Per Capita Consumption
24
 
 
 
Considering that the workers’ incomes were so low, 60 pesos per week for Coca 
Cola would be a burden for some. In contrast, to have a Coca Cola fountain serving free 
Coke to workers might make them feel happier while working at CMSC. Moreover, 
since workers share information with potential employees, a Coca Cola fountain would 
be an attractive feature for the company, improving its reputation in Tijuana’s labor 
market. The fountain and drinks would not cost the company much, even if they allowed 
the workers to drink the beverage for free.    In this sense, I believed that the purchase of 
a Coca Cola fountain machine to serve free Coke to CMSC’s workers would be an 
                                                 
24
 Original data from: https://www.coca-colacompany.com/cs/tccc-yir2012/pdf/2012-per-capita-
consumption.pdf 
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affordable solution, improving the working conditions for workers and thus decreasing 
the turnover and absentee rates by making them feel happier. At least they would feel 
like the company had improved the food but not diet. Therefore, I tried to persuade 
Jackie Chan that purchasing a Coca Cola fountain would be a very wise investment. 
After I proposed this idea, both Jackie Chan and Ying Shan told me they would consider 
it. However, at the time of writing, according to informants who still work at CMSC, the 
fountain is still absent from the food court.  
The events described above delineate how a Taiwanese general manager 
operated a maquiladora in Mexico. Jackie Chan, the general manager of CMSC, brought 
his work ethic and cultural values to Tijuana and operated the firm accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I first described how cultural factors, especially those of 
representatives of international corporations, have long been neglected in maquiladora 
research. Most scholars have focused on how capitalism and international corporations 
interact with local cultures, such as in Ong‘s (2010) discussion of how Malaysian 
workers responded to modern industrialization and global capitalism through the local 
culture (Ong, 2010), or Tiano’s (1994) study of how local patriarchal ideology was used 
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in maquiladoras to discipline young female workers in Mexico. Other scholars have 
taken different paths in their study of maquiladoras, but the cultural elements of global 
corporations went unexamined.  
In this context, I attempted to incorporate the cultural elements that 
representatives of international enterprises brought to their production sites in other 
countries and examine how these cultural elements affect maquiladora management. To 
do so, I described the work ethic developed during the Taiwanese economic boom. 
Taiwanese sociologist G.S. Shieh called this work ethic “Pure Labor”, a notion 
originating in the putting-out system and its unique piecework rate of payment to 
subcontractors that created an environment that allowed Taiwanese enterprises flexibility 
in their production and labor-related expenditures.  This ability to be flexible remains 
critical to Taiwanese enterprises, especially those small and medium in size, if they are 
to compete in and survive the current competition in the global market. For Taiwanese 
workers, this “Pure Labor” work ethic affects the way they conceptualize the 
employment relationship and labor.  
The “Pure Labor” work ethic developed at a time when the state did not enforce 
labor laws and most Taiwanese felt that workers were on their own in terms of 
protecting themselves against employers. This motivated the Taiwanese people to start 
their own businesses and become employers or managers. This trend made the “Pure 
Labor” work ethic more popular and commonly shared among the Taiwanese. As a 
cultural value, the “Pure Labor” concept became deeply embedded in the business and 
management decision making process. I used CMSC and its general manager, Jackie 
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Chan, to demonstrate how this work ethic affected Taiwanese enterprises operated and 
managed in other countries  
Jackie Chan, as a Taiwanese man born to a family that to this day operates a tiny 
factory in a peripheral part of Taipei City, was the general manager of CMSC from the 
first day Outstanding Technology purchased the facilities from a famous Japanese 
corporation. He grew up in an era that saw Taiwan experience an economic boom and 
was deeply affected by the “Pure Labor” work ethic. In the section of this research 
entitled "The Art of Management," I described his managerial philosophy and how he 
applied it to CMSC’s daily operations. By providing the second-lowest salaries out of 
100 maquiladoras operated in the Tijuana area and minimum work-related benefits, as 
well as using temporary workers to fill most of the production line shifts during the busy 
season, CMSC was able to control its labor costs. By requesting that employees 
regularly work overtime, CMSC was able to extract the most productivity from its 
workers as possible. This production arrangement reflected the "You work and you get 
paid, no work, no pay" logic common among the Taiwanese, an important part of the 
“Pure Labor” work ethic. 
Other elements that illustrated Jackie's Chan’s management style and related 
beliefs included his question about why his workers were unwilling to work overtime 
and his ideas regarding what industrial engineers should do. Moreover, using temporary 
workers allowed CMSC to be flexible when responding to market needs in different 
seasons. This labor arrangement was similar to the putting-out system, always keeping 
workers such that they are easy to call to work during the busy season but also easy to 
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dismiss when the busy season is over. In this context, we can see how the “Pure Labor” 
work ethic, a work ethic that originated in Taiwan, now deeply affects the daily 
operation of maquiladoras in Mexico and US border cities. Jackie Chan believed that 
adopting strategies like these marked the difference between CMSC and the factory’s 
previous Japanese owners and allowed CMSC to survive the severe competition in the 
television and monitor industry. 
How did the Mexican employees experience and respond to a production 
arrangement guided by the “Pure Labor” work ethic? And how did they understand and 
interpret their work experience at CMSC, as compared to other maquiladoras? The 
answers to these questions will provide a different perspective from which to observe 
how the cultural aspects of representatives of international enterprises affect local 
workers' work and lives. I will address these questions in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV  
WE ARE LIKE PARTS OF A MACHINE 
 
Figure 10 A Glance of CMSC  
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1. Exotic Experiences Inside the Firm 
 
Previous maquiladora studies have described one issue that remains unchanged 
by other factors: foreign enterprises come and go, but the Mexican people remain. After 
the Mexican government launched the Border Industrialization Program in 1965, the 
Mexican people began providing a stable and inexpensive labor force, fulfilling the 
demands of foreign enterprises relocating their production houses to border cities. In the 
last half-century, both Mexico and the United States have experienced a number of 
economic fluctuations. Border cities have also undergone waves of development and 
economic regression. The same factory might shift ownership several times. Yet 
regardless of economic shifts and changes in ownership, a significant portion of the 
Mexican population continues to find jobs in maquiladoras. How these workers 
experience employers of different nationalities and cultural backgrounds is a key interest 
for researchers seeking to understand the daily lives of those inside maquiladoras.  
For example, CMSC’s workers experience different cultures in their everyday 
lives on the shop floor. As mentioned in the previous chapter, CMSC used to be owned 
and operated by a Japanese corporation. That Japanese corporation had, over the course 
of its ownership, managed the factory for a longer period of time than had the current 
Taiwanese owner, CMSC, at the time of writing. Some of the Mexican line workers and 
managers had worked for the Japanese corporation for more than a decade before they 
became CMSC employees. Other CMSC employees had never worked for the Japanese 
employer, but before coming to CMSC, they worked for other maquiladoras owned and 
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operated by other transnational corporations. Moreover, because the turnover rate is high 
and maquiladoras have recently increased their use of temporary workers, employees 
regularly migrate from one maquiladora to another. Each corporation has a different 
managerial system and cultural background.  
In this chapter, I discuss Mexican employees’ experiences with foreign 
ownership and employers during their daily work lives.  Generally speaking, inside a 
maquiladora, Mexican employees, including managers and engineers but not line 
workers, often occupy mid- to high-level managerial positions. People in these positions 
might experience foreign ownership differently from Mexican line workers. In CMSC’s 
case, managers and mid-level local engineers had more opportunities to interact and 
cooperate with the Taiwanese general manager and Chinese engineers. Line workers 
rarely had the chance to meet the Chinese engineers, not to mention the Taiwanese 
general manager.  
Lacking opportunities to personally interact with foreigners at the factory did not 
prevent line workers from experiencing cultural differences in relation to their employers. 
The managerial style and strategies for labor control deeply penetrated workers’ daily 
lives. As discussed in Chapter III, every day Jackie Chan’s work ethic and cultural 
values deeply affected his decision-making and managerial policies for the shop floor. 
Line workers’ experiences with foreign ownership naturally came from the orders they 
received on the shop floor, disciplinary actions they encountered, benefits they received 
from the factory, and policies regarding labor control. Mexican managers, line leaders, 
and assembly workers all felt themselves to be disposable parts of a larger machine. In 
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this chapter, I describe what it meant for my subjects to work at a Taiwanese owned and 
operated maquiladora and explain why the Mexican employees felt undervalued. 
Reasons include feeling like outsiders in their workplace, wage reductions after the 
change in ownership, and feelings of alienation caused by long hours and workloads. I 
will elaborate further in the sections that follow. 
In Section 1, I discuss how Mexican managers and engineers experienced the 
Taiwanese style of management. For these individuals, lacking work autonomy and not 
being fully authorized to make decisions according to their professional knowledge were 
common experiences while working at CMSC. Some of these experiences were 
outcomes of the “Pure Labor” work ethic that the general manager, Jackie Chan, relied 
upon to manage CMSC.  Unlike the Mexican managers and engineers who had more 
opportunities to interact with the Taiwanese general manager and other Chinese 
colleagues, most line workers had few chances to meet their Asians counterparts. This is 
not to say that their jobs were not affected by the Taiwanese style of management, but 
compared to the Mexican managers and engineers, most line workers experienced 
cultural differences indirectly. In Section 2, I describe how CMSC employees 
experienced the Taiwanese style of management. 
In addition, for Mexican managers, engineers, and employees, another group of 
workers regularly appears on the shop floor. They are temporary workers who come 
from different temp agencies and work for CMSC for a short time. The number of 
workers that CMSC hires can only operate one production line for one shift. But during 
the busy seasons, usually from June to November or early December, CMSC typically 
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operates at full capacity with two shifts. Under such circumstance, it requires 
approximate 1000 workers for two shifts, and 900 of them are temporary workers.   
In section 3, I will discuss how these temporary workers become means for 
CMSC to conduct its labor control strategies. The booming outsourcing service in 
Tijuana provides maquiladoras a way to control their workers more efficiently when 
compared to maquiladoras located elsewhere (Cravey, 1998; McKay, 2006; Salzinger, 
2003; Tiano, 1994). Furthermore, using a significant number of temporary workers is 
conforms to the “Pure Labor” work ethic which Jackie follows as his managerial 
philosophy.   
 
 
1.1. “They Said We Are a Team”—Feeling like an Outsider in Their Own Factory 
 
The facility that CMSC operates originally belonged to a Japanese corporation. 
On the day the Japanese transferred ownership to the current Taiwanese enterprise, most 
office staff and managers signed new work contracts with their new employer. One 
Mexican senior manager whose last name is Lopez told me that he was shocked 
ownership changed in 2009.  
 
I remember that it was an ordinary day. Our general manager came in 
with a serious face. He told us that [the Japanese corporation] just sold the 
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factory to another big enterprise. The representatives would come tomorrow, 
and we could decide if we wanted to work in this place and continue with them. 
  
According to this senior manager, there was no notice given to the employees 
before the Japanese employer sold the factory. Most of the Mexican employees, 
regardless of their position, felt uncertain upon hearing the news. The next day, the 
Taiwanese/Chinese enterprise sent a group of agents to the factory. They interviewed all 
of the employees and decided to hire most of them. Some were promoted to better 
positions, while others left the company permanently. The same senior manager said to 
me:  
 
The good thing is, the Japanese general manager helped us keep our 
seniority,
25
  and therefore we still have our seniority with this Chinese 
enterprise. But when I signed a new work contract with them, I realized that 
while I still do the same thing in the same position, my salary was cut to two-
thirds of my original contract. 
 
Most Mexican workers and managers experienced similar situations that day. 
They performed the same tasks, but their income dramatically dropped after they 
changed employers. That was the first impression they had of the new 
                                                 
25
 Despite this employees recollection, only a few high-ranking managers kept their seniority after being 
rehired by CMSC. 
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Taiwanese/Chinese enterprise. Most Mexican employees, despite their discontent with 
this arrangement, had no choice but to accept it because they still needed to have a stable 
job to support their families. When the Taiwanese/Chinese enterprise purchased the 
factory in 2009, a financial crisis had just passed, and the economies of both the United 
States and Mexico continued to suffer. Rodriguez
26
, a senior technician, told me that 
from 2009 to 2011, it was very difficult to find a steady job in Tijuana. Once someone 
found a job, regardless of salary or benefits, they tended to remain in the position. Not 
only did most workers and managers accept new work contracts and become employees 
of CMSC, but for the first couple of years after 2009, the turnover rate was low.  Almost 
all of the Mexican employees who restarted their careers with CMSC told me that they 
experienced a series of cultural shocks that day. For example, Lopez’s first job was as a 
computer engineer for the previous Japanese maquiladora, and at the time of writing he 
is head manager of his department. He told me that one thing that made him 
uncomfortable was the attitude of the new general manager, Jackie Chan, and his special 
assistant, Yin Shan. Lopez described his interactions with them: 
 
I am not sure if that was because the Chinese work that way or they 
were just used to it. I remember the first couple of years; they were always in a 
hurry and were yelling at everybody. You could hear the yelling in the pathway, 
in the office, in the meeting room, it was everywhere. I told Jackie Chan several 
times that Mexican people, especially men, can’t be treated like that because we 
                                                 
26
 All the Mexican last names that using in this dissertation are pseudonym. 
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have machismo. We don’t want to be insulted. I told him if I made a mistake in 
my tasks, you could directly point out the mistake. It is OK. You don’t need to 
be polite, and you can be straight, but you don’t yell at me. 
 
Pablo, the first human resources manager I met during my time at CMSC, told 
me a similar story during our interview. I asked him to describe to me the most 
unforgettable memory he had of his job. Before CMSC, he used to work for several 
maquiladoras operated by people from different countries such as Japan, the United 
States, and Taiwan.  
  
I believe that the Chinese, excuse me, the Taiwanese, are very tough 
because you yell a lot. Yeah, now my boss in Taiwan, my big boss … wow … he 
is very tough. Since the first day, he asked me a question and when I didn't 
answer, he started yelling at me. It's was ‘wow, what is this?’ Yeah, but that's 
the way you do things. The Japanese are also very tough, but towards Japanese 
people. When they talk to us, another world. They can be very tough to the 
Japanese people. They can be [unintelligible] but with us, ‘come on, you have 
to do it. Come on, help me.’ And if you are failing, of course, you will receive a 
condemnation. You look for it. 
 
Here, Pablo explained that both Japanese and Taiwanese managers could be 
tough when requiring Mexican managers to carry out orders, but the attitude when 
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deploying orders and interacting with Mexican employees was very different between 
managers from the two countries. According to Pablo, when interacting with other 
Japanese, Japanese managers tended to be more rigorous and stricter, but when 
communicating with Mexican employees, Japanese managers tended to be friendly and 
polite. Conversely, Taiwanese managers tended to use a harsh tone when interacting 
with Mexicans. When they were unsatisfied with the production progress, they tended to 
show their anger directly. Yelling was a common practice that happened frequently in 
the first couple of years after 2009. Like Pablo, most Mexican managers did not like this 
behavior. When I interviewed managers about their feelings regarding working for 
CMSC, most Mexican managers and workers alike mentioned that the Taiwanese and 
Chinese managers were angry and yelled all the time. “El gerente está enojado de Nuevo! 
[The manager is angry again!]” This is a phrase I frequently heard on the shop floor.  
Some misunderstanding may have existed between the Mexican employees and 
their overseas managers. Both the Taiwanese general manager and Chinese support team 
only spoke to each other in Mandarin; they were not fluent in either Spanish or English. 
Most Mexican employees were not able to distinguish the emotions embedded within 
conversations. Coincidently, the Mandarin most Chinese support team members used is 
delivered in a harsh in tone. Sometime, then, when they spoke loudly, the Mexican 
employees thought they were yelling. Even given this cultural difference, Chinese and 
Taiwanese managers and crew indeed tended to yell and use other aggressive emotional 
expressions with the Mexican employees during work hours, which the latter considered 
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to be unreasonably angry and undeserved. This undermined the relationship between the 
Mexican employees and their Asian managers.  
In contrast to their interaction with Taiwanese and Chinese managers, I observed 
that when Mexican workers talked to their Mexican managers and coworkers, they 
tended to be relaxed in tone, and always made jokes with one another. During the nine 
months of my fieldwork, I only encountered one quarrel between an assembly line 
worker and line leader. A senior assembly worker had a jacket tied around her waist, but 
her line leader wanted her to put the jacket away for safety reasons. At first the worker 
refused, and then wanted to put the jacket behind her station on a shelf with a computer. 
The line leader prohibited her from doing that, so the conflict grew. The quarrel did not 
last for long, though, and after a short time, they stared at each other for about thirty 
seconds. Then, both returned to work like nothing had happened. Beyond this incident, I 
never saw Mexican workers fight with one another on the shop floor. High and mid-level 
Mexican managers talked to their younger colleagues and fellow workers in a polite way. 
Although the ages of the line workers varied, when older Mexican managers walked 
onto the shop floor, they tended to interact with workers as a friendly father might. Some 
senior line leaders adopted similar strategies to make the young female workers more 
cooperative. When senior managers and line leaders interacted with men, they tended to 
act according to their age.   
As an anthropology apprentice born and raised in an Asian country, it was not 
uncommon to see people with authority or power express their anger directly to their 
junior colleagues and employees. I asked some of the Mexican managers why they 
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rarely expressed negative emotions or anger towards people. Their answers were all 
highly similar. When they interacted with their colleagues and other workers on the shop 
floor, they were guided by shared principles. These principles were established through 
age and gender. For example, as Jose and I discussed about the machismo issue, he told 
me when they interacted with Mexican men, they tended to be polite because the 
machismo culture makes Mexican men less tolerant to insult. Therefore, when talking to 
Mexican men, it is always better to have a friendly attitude. Even jokes should be made 
in a careful way. Once Mexican men feel insulted, they tend to fight back. I asked a new 
engineer how he interpreted machismo and how to interact with the Mexican people. 
Our conversation is outlined below. 
 
Hao-Yu (H): Could you tell me how to interact properly with the Mexican 
people? I have heard that machismo is something very important to some 
Mexican men. How do you define that?  
Jose (J): It is like … how to say it? It is like a man should act like a man. This 
goes back to history. Are you familiar with our history?  
H: Sort of. I know a little.  
J: You know we had a revolution?  
H: Yes, of course.  
J: So at that time, if a man had been insulted by others, they would have had a 
fight. It could be a fist fight, sometimes they used knives or guns. It could be 
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very bloody. It is like, you need to defend your own reputation and make people 
respect your name.  
H: OK, I understand, but like in everyday life I hear people make fun of each 
other. Some of these jokes might be annoying, right? Like there was one time, 
you know my Spanish is not good enough to make joke, but I forgot this for 
some reason. One day we were making fun of Escobar. You know him? He is a 
line leader. Because he is quite small, there was a worker who wanted me to 
call him “el bicho verde [the green bug],” I did not know the meaning of those 
words on that time, but I still said it. After I said that, Escobar gave me a weird 
face, you know? Like he was a bit angry, but like …  
J: You’re fine, because you are foreign. You don’t know this. Escobar won’t do 
anything to you. No worry. Haha. But if … another Mexican man says the same 
thing that you said to him? I’m not so sure what would happen next. You know, 
usually, we [Mexican men] are like, if you make fun of us, the first time we are 
ok. We won’t say anything. We will consider it just a joke. But if you keep 
saying things, then eventually we will be unhappy about it and will fight back 
because we will consider this an insult. So, we will definitely fight back. That is 
machismo.  
 
I will not explore the concept of machismo any further, since there is a 
significant body of literature on the topic (Arciniega et al., 2008; Lugo, 1990; Mirandé, 
2018; Najera, 2008; Segrest and Darla, 2003; Peña, 1991; Peña, 2006; Villegas and 
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Carlos, 2010). Jose’s words indicate that when the Mexican employees interacted with 
one another, they followed certain rules and acted accordingly. Sometimes the local 
employees showed more tolerance to foreigners because at times the foreigners were 
unfamiliar with these rules. However, this is not to say that the uncomfortable feelings 
would disappear.  Even if Mexican men showed more tolerance towards foreigners, if 
the situation occurred frequently, it was highly possible that they would feel insulted. 
Therefore, when Mexican managers interacted with workers and other Mexican staff, 
they acted according to their shared cultural norms. Conversely, when Mexican workers 
encountered their Taiwanese or Chinese managers or colleagues and saw them yelling, 
they considered these actions inappropriate.  
Another possible reason for this tension is a linguistic one. Mandarin may sound 
like yelling to someone unfamiliar with the language. Therefore, there is a chance that 
the Mexican workers misunderstood normal talking as yelling when they encountered 
their Chinese managers and colleagues. For example, Bella was a Mexican employee 
who worked for the logistics department. She was responsible for constructing a 
database of raw materials. Since the number of each item to be assembled needed to 
correspond to one at headquarters, she worked closely with Chiung Mang, a Chinese 
support team member who arrived in Tijuana three days before myself.  Bella had 
worked at CMSC for years and was very knowledgeable about the materials database, 
but she could not read any Mandarin. Therefore, she needed to confirm all of the 
materials numbers with Chiung Mang. Bella was good at her job, but Chiun Mang was 
unfamiliar with the materials database. He was in charge of a different task before he 
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came to Tijuana. He frequently showed his frustration, especially if he could not 
complete some element of his work. When he expressed this frustration, he spoke 
Mandarin. I never saw Chiung Mang explain what was happening or how he was feeling 
to Bella, even though they were co-workers. As a result, Bella constantly felt confused 
by Chiung Mang’s emotions because she could not understand Mandarin. Often when 
Chiung Mang would mutter, Bella would ask me if he was angry. However, most times 
Chiung Mang was frustrated but not angry.  Yet while there were both attitudinal and 
linguistic explanations for why the Mexican employees constantly felt that their 
Taiwanese or Chinese managers or engineers were argumentative and insulting, the 
result is that the Mexican employees felt that they were not being treated respectfully, or 
even as human beings. The Mexican employees felt strongly that they were disposable to 
their foreign managers. Wage deductions, long work hours, and both cultural and 
linguistic unfamiliarity made the Mexican employees feel disconnected from their 
foreign bosses.  
Yet despite these difficulties, most Mexican managers and engineers were quite 
fair in judging their experiences and interactions with their Taiwanese and Chinese 
counterparts. For example, when they told me about their bad experiences, they usually 
would add that the Taiwanese and Chinese managers “had learned and things were 
getting better now.” I saw Jackie Chan show his temperament many times in meetings, 
but according to some senior Mexican managers, he was already behaving more 
acceptably and had improved from days past.  The senior Mexican managers believed 
that both the Chinese and Taiwanese staff at CMSC would learn how to interact properly 
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with the Mexican people, and eventually the situation would improve. Nevertheless, the 
Mexican workers felt that they were instruments for the sake of the owner’s profits. For 
instance, take the following case.   
I was transferred to the IE department. I saw Ying Shan walk into the Electrical 
Engineering (EE) department, which was located near where I was. He wanted to talk to 
the head EE manager, Carlos. Ying Shan spoke with Carlos in a polite way and always 
had a smile on his face. When he talked, he always started with “ayudame, por favor 
[Help me, please].” I witnessed this scene. Later, when I told another Mexican manager, 
Vino, about what I saw that day, he admitted that it had taken a couple of years for the 
Taiwanese and Chinese staff to learn how to interact with the Mexican employees in a 
polite manner. Suddenly, though, he commented as follows:  
 
Now Ying Shan always asks for help with a smiling face. He was very 
bossy in the past. But you know that even if they [Ying Shan and Jackie Chan] 
always say that we are a team, honestly I do not feel that way. To be a team, all 
of the team members should support each other, right? But they do not act like 
that. Most times, they stay in their small chamber. Only when they need some 
documents or reports do they come to the big office and ask people to help them, 
without a doubt. It is alright for me. I mean, we are colleagues and they are 
coming from headquarters, and supposedly we should help without a doubt. But 
I think this should be a reciprocal relationship, right? I mean, every time when 
they come to ask for something, we need to postpone the work on hand to help 
 136 
 
them finish what they need. But when we need something and go to them, they 
never respond to our requests. They say we are a team, but most Mexican 
people do not feel the same way. We are more like a part of a machine than a 
team. 
 
For Vino, being part of a team required that certain conditions be satisfied. 
People cannot automatically form a true team simply by repeating slogans. For Vino, the 
first principle is that the relationship should be reciprocal. Vino believed that when the 
local staff needed support from headquarters or their representatives in Tijuana, their 
requests should at least be heard and answered in some way. Instead, quite often their 
requests were neglected or directly denied. According to Vino, they did receive some 
support from headquarters, but the support was not helpful due to the language barrier. 
For example, representatives and support team members could not fully comprehend 
what kind of help was needed.    
One of my personal experiences at CMSC also illustrates the problem the 
Mexican employees described. CMSC’s parent corporation is Outstanding Technology 
(OT). As one of the largest television original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
27
, OT 
has more than a dozen factories around the world. Because the corporation already 
operates globally, it is reasonable to assume that some important documents related to 
production, quality control, and management policies have been translated into the 
                                                 
27
 OEM stands for original equipment manufacturers. This is a type of business model which companies 
do not have their own brands, and they produce products for other famous brands. 
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languages used at the operation sites. However, for reasons unknown this is not the case. 
On most ordinary days, if I was not on the line working and chatting with workers, I sat 
in the office and helped departments translate the documents they needed.  The types of 
documents ranged from safety checklists and reports to quality control requirements for 
ISO 9001, standard operating procedures for specific television models, and repair 
guides. All of the documents were sent from headquarters in simplified Mandarin, 
without any or only a minimum of English translation. None of these documents had 
been translated into Spanish.  
Though most of the Mexican managers spoke fluent English, they did not 
understand spoken or written Mandarin. A senior manager told me that in their first year, 
CMSC did host Mandarin classes once a week, but the classes did not last a single year; 
everyone was too busy to attend. Therefore, when Mexican employees requested help 
from headquarters, they received documents written in Mandarin. Obviously, these were 
not helpful. Some Mexican managers told me that they tried to translate documents 
using Google’s translator, but the outcomes were usually disappointing and often 
incomprehensible. Sometimes, Mexican managers would ask the Chinese support team 
to help them translate documents, but the outcomes there were also disappointing, since 
the Chinese support team spoke only limited English. Even worse, when headquarters 
would respond, both Jackie Chan and the department heads in China expected the 
Mexican employees to follow the orders, even though without proper translation that 
was nearly impossible. Thus, the communication gap between headquarters and the local 
Mexican site was significant. Yet, the language barrier was neglected by CMSC. The 
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previous Japanese corporation employed a professional translator, who helped the 
general manager translate his orders to the Mexican employees, as well as any 
documents written in Japanese. According to a senior Mexican employee, the translator 
was important, helping the operation run smoothly. However, the translator retired the 
same day most of the employees signed new work contracts with CMSC. After that, no 
individual was assigned translation tasks. I asked a Taiwanese friend who worked at 
another maquiladora in Tijuana, who confirmed that he, too, had never heard of a 
Taiwanese-operated maquiladora hiring a professional translator. 
Refusing to hire a professional translator matched Jackie Chan's managerial 
philosophy.  As long as he believed that the communication between him and his 
Mexican managers was sufficient, hiring a translator would be an unnecessary cost for 
CMSC. A significant feature of the “Pure Labor” work ethic is doing whatever could be 
done to cut production-related costs, while simultaneously extracting the maximum 
output. In this context, precise communication was not a priority in daily operation; the 
volume of production output was.  During my stay, I was invited to join some of the 
managers’ meetings. Normally, English and Mandarin were spoken. Jackie Chan talked 
to the Mexican employees in English but used Mandarin with the Chinese. Sometimes, 
the Mexican managers were able to understand what Jackie Chan requested, but often 
after the meeting was over, they would ask me what he had said. Moreover, when 
management held international meetings with personnel at headquarters, Mandarin was 
the main language used to discuss issues in Mexico. None of the Mexican managers 
could understand Mandarin; therefore, when they were asked to join these meetings, the 
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only thing they could do was sit passively in the meeting room. I was invited to several 
technical meetings by Jackie Chan so I could translate for the Mexican managers. 
However, I could not join other meetings such as the high-ranking managers’ regular 
meetings. The Mexican managers told me that they felt it was meaningless for them to 
join these meetings, because they could understand nothing of what was being said. 
Some felt unseen and disrespected, like they were invisible.    
The Taiwanese general manager and some of his Asian crew believed that they 
had sufficient language ability to communicate with their Mexican employees. I asked 
Jackie Chan this question. He told me that from his experience and years in Tijuana, he 
believed that his Mexican employees were able to follow his orders regardless of the 
language barrier. Therefore, there was no need to hire a professional translator. Besides, 
the company did not have the money to hire one. He also told me why the Mexican 
managers were required to attend meetings where they did not understand the language 
being spoken. This was because sometimes headquarters needed information that he 
could not provide. Then, he could ask the managers to provide it immediately. Therefore, 
it was necessary for them to sit there, just in case he needed their help. Most Mexican 
managers and engineers struggled to find efficient ways of communicating with their 
foreign colleagues. Since CMSC’s corporate structure tended to restrict local engineers 
and managers, denying them the autonomy to make decisions on their own, Mexican 
employees needed to rely on the Chinese support team and engineers in China to solve 
problems in Tijuana. Under such circumstances, fluent and efficient communication was 
key to making daily production run smoothly. Unfortunately, most Mexican managers 
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and engineers experienced considerable difficulties in this area because of the language 
barrier. 
Besides the language barrier, Mexican employees described other obstacles to 
accomplishing their daily tasks. Sometimes, these obstacles were derived from the 
different business habits practiced by the two countries. For example, in the West it is 
not uncommon for each company to have its own credit card, in case something needs to 
be purchased for business use. Necessary purchasing can thus be completed efficiently, 
through the use of this corporate credit card. This is a common practice in both the 
United States and Mexico among numerous companies and other institutions.  However, 
this is not the case in either Taiwan or China. Despite the financial regulations in these 
countries being significantly different from one another, one common feature is that 
credit cards are not popular, either for individuals or companies. For business 
transactions in Taiwan, companies prefer to use checks or cash instead of credit cards. 
The situation is similar in China; most business transactions occur through banks or 
third-party payments.
28
 Accordingly, Jackie Chan never allowed the financial 
department of CMSC to have a company-owned credit card. Although the factory could 
still purchase goods and services through checks or cash, this cost extra time and money. 
Moreover, it is becoming more and more common to purchase services online. Usually, 
websites do not accept personal checks, or at best, the company would have a long wait 
until the check-based transaction could be completed.  
                                                 
28
 Chinese people have other ways to pay their bills beyond cash and checks. Many companies provide 
third-party payments, allowing users to pay for goods and services through their mobile phones. 
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One night, after CMSC had won a special production project from a world-
famous Japanese corporation, the quality control department encountered a severe issue. 
Even the most experienced engineer had no idea how to solve it. They called the quality 
control department in China for emergency assistance. In order to allow the Chinese 
engineers to test the televisions overseas, CMSC needed to purchase an online VPN 
service,
29
  bypassing the Chinese internet firewall and bridging the connection between 
China and Tijuana. Since the issue was critical and all of the production plans were 
necessarily delayed, the head of the quality control department, Venustiano, wanted to 
purchase the service and solve the issue as soon as possible. However, the factory did 
not have its own credit card. Therefore, they could not purchase the online service 
directly. Eventually, Venustiano asked a colleague who had a relative living in the 
United States (and thus a credit card from a US bank) to complete the transaction for 
him.  
Here, I would like to discuss Venustiano’s career experiences as a means of 
illustrating the difficulties that Mexican employees face when working for different 
multinational enterprises. Like other Mexican senior managers at CMSC, Venustiano 
began his career with the previous Japanese owners of the factory. The day he signed his 
work contract with CMSC, he was promoted to head of the quality control department. 
                                                 
29
 VPN is an abbreviation for Virtual Private Network. It is a tunnel between a personal device and the 
internet. Some VPN services allow users to change their location and IP address to disguise their original 
location. Because the Chinese government has created an internet firewall to block connections between 
Chinese domains and other areas, Chinese internet users are prevented from directly connecting to 
domains outside the firewall. In this case, the Chinese engineers could not directly connect to CMSC's 
server because of the firewall. They needed to use a VPN service to disguise their IP address and pretend 
they were not connecting from China. 
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He has remained in that position until the time of writing. Since he had spent more than 
a decade with the Japanese corporation, he had received basic quality control training 
and knowledge. Once the Taiwanese corporation purchased the factory, they brought in 
an entirely different managerial style. He was on the front lines of this change because 
CMSC’s ideas about quality control were quite different from the previous Japanese 
company.  
Japanese products are famous for their high quality, stability, and trustworthiness. 
To gain such a reputation requires tremendous effort in quality control throughout the 
entire production process. According to Venustiano, quality control should not begin 
after the assembly line completes the product. It should begin with the raw materials. 
Ideally, when each container arrives at the factory, quality control engineers check the 
materials inside before agreeing to sign the acceptance form. “This is a regular check for 
the Japanese. All materials should be checked before we allow them to come in. 
Otherwise, unqualified materials will be sent back to the place from where it came.” 
Venustiano went on to say, “However, the thing is quite different here.”  
 
At the Japanese company, we used to have enough time to check all the 
materials that came in from overseas. But now, the practice is different. Since 
everything is in a hurry, we don’t have time to check all the incoming 
components. Now we can only do random sampling. Because we no longer have 
a warehouse as before that contains all the incoming items, [materials are] put 
on the production line one or two days after they arrive. In this situation, we 
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don’t have that much time to check everything in the containers. For the 
Japanese, quality is a priority. It's very important. For Chinese or Taiwanese, I 
think it is volume. The production volume is more important, and not so much 
the quality. They can allow some quality issues, but Japanese people are very 
different. They don't allow any quality issues. 
 
The Taiwanese corporation created profit by being the original equipment 
manufacturer for other companies. This business model requires factories to rapidly 
respond to customers’ demands, providing the service they need. Production requires 
flexibility and must be fast enough to satisfy the customer’s request. Accordingly, 
CMSC did not reserve as much space as the previous Japanese corporation did, because 
it was unnecessary. Incoming materials did not stay in the warehouse for more than two 
weeks.  This flexible and fast production strategy created more pressure for the quality 
control department because they had less time to inspect incoming materials.  
After the Taiwanese corporation took over the factory, they kept most of the 
employees in their original positions. Venustiano and his colleagues, however, 
discovered that their situation had changed.  Under the Japanese management, they tried 
to follow consistent rules when inspecting materials and finished goods. Once the 
company changed hands, the rules got worse. For Venustiano, this situation changed his 
work dramatically. In the past, it was very clear how he was to decide if the finished 
product could be shipped out to the market or not. Once the change occurred and quality 
grew neglected, sometimes he needed to make decisions under time pressure or other 
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factors, shipping out goods that might contain quality issues. Therefore, for him, the risk 
to both CMSC and his personal career increased compared to when he worked for the 
Japanese company.  Besides the higher potential risk, Venustiano also found that to work 
at CMSC, flexibility and production had to be prioritized over quality. He told me that 
since quality control was not the priority, when the factory needed to ship out a final 
product, the final quality inspection was often cut short. Insufficient time to perform 
regular inspections but still being responsible for the quality of the finished product 
greatly increased Venustiano’s work-related stress, especially when he stamped 
documents certifying that the finished products met quality standards. 
The difficulties that Venustiano encountered are related to the “Pure Labor” work 
ethic that Jackie Chan implemented in daily operation. For example, “Pure Labor” 
developed from an environment in which both workers and employers were focused on 
quantity. As discussed in Chapter III, although the system was not actually Purely based 
on piecework, quantity was an essential factor in evaluating workers' productivity and 
thus determining their salary. In such circumstances, subcontractors held volume to be 
the primary goal; quality was not a critical factor in this type of production arrangement. 
This feature of the “Pure Labor” work ethic created many dilemmas for Venustiano 
because high-ranking Taiwanese and Chinese managers both at CMSC and headquarters 
in China valued quantity over quality. 
Another issue also seriously influenced Venustiano’s daily operation. The 
Taiwanese owners had a policy of annually reducing their budget for human capital. I 
interviewed Fang and Venustiano during a lunch break. Fang, a temporary support team 
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member who came to CMSC to assist with a special project, was in charge of integrating 
all of the quality control departments in all of the production sites around the world. 
According to her, the corporation annually laid off a considerable percentage of 
employees in her department in China, and had done so regularly for the past several 
years. Venustiano also mentioned that reduction in personnel was a serious problem for 
his quality control team. Losing people on this team meant that the quality control 
department lacked sufficient inspectors to check both the raw materials and finished 
goods. Sometimes experienced workers also left the factory of their own accord. When 
that happened, Venustiano needed to spend time training replacements. However, due to 
the fact that their department was short-handed for conducting regular inspections, it was 
difficult for senior inspectors to spend time training new employees; this created a 
vicious cycle for the quality control department.  
The insufficient time to conduct inspections and cutting of personnel were two 
main factors creating a significant impact on Venustiano’s work. Besides the interviews 
I conducted with Venustiano and Fang, I also helped Fang to understand operations on 
the shop floor, serving as her translator, and attended a short meeting of the Chinese 
support team. From these experiences, I concluded that Fang, the engineer in charge of 
company-wide quality control, held a viewpoint similar to that of Venustiano. On an 
individual level, there may be little difference between people in charge of the same task, 
regardless their nationalities or cultural backgrounds. However, collectively, the 
Taiwanese corporation prioritized speed and volume of production, and put quality 
second. Cultural values such as work ethic were also relevant to the company’s human 
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resources policy. I asked Pablo, the manager of human resources, about the company’s 
policy of reducing personnel in quality control. Pablo confirmed that headquarters did 
have this policy, but the percentage and number of employees to be cut was adjustable. 
This policy of downsizing was a part of reducing “unnecessary” expenditures and 
maximizing profit logic, which corresponded to the cultural values discussed above. In 
this case, the labor force that supplied the quality control department was considered an 
“unnecessary” expenditure.  
When the Taiwanese corporation purchased the factory and operated it as CMSC, 
most of the original employees experienced a serious change in their work environment. 
The first thing most senior managers discovered was that the interaction between people 
from different cultural groups dramatically changed. Japanese managers were described 
as rigorous like their Taiwanese and Chinese counterparts, but Japanese managers 
tended to be more polite and treated their Mexican colleagues like real working partners. 
Most Mexican managers enjoyed greater autonomy when doing their jobs. Shoudai, the 
only Japanese manager who used to work for the previous corporation and chose to stay 
at CMSC, described his long-term observations on the day of his retirement. For Shoudai, 
cultural difference was not only evident in daily interactions or managerial style, but also 
in the structure of the organization. At CMSC, each department head reported to both the 
general manager and corresponding department head at headquarters. This structural 
design restricted the autonomy of each department to conduct their own policies and 
complete their tasks. In fact, most managers tended to think they had no autonomy, since 
all of the final decisions were made either by Jackie Chan or someone at headquarters. 
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Since Shoudai began his career with the previous Japanese company, he had worked 
with several Japanese general managers in the past. He told me that when comparing the 
two companies, the most prominent differences were organizational structure and the 
role of the general manager.  
According to Shoudai, the organizational structure influenced the role of the 
general manager. From the beginning, CMSC’s organizational structure was designed 
such that headquarters could directly control most of the decision-making process. 
Besides routine reports, these restrictions also affected the budget and procedures for 
spending money. Shoudai described operation of the previous Japanese company as 
relatively simple in terms of both organizational structure and daily operation. This was 
possible because the Japanese corporation was huge in scale and had many production 
units around the world. The general manager of each production unit had full authority 
to operate in their own way. The mother corporation only checked the annual production 
outcomes and coordinated global production volume. Otherwise, all schedules and 
policies inside a production unit were determined by the general manager.  In Tijuana, 
the Japanese general manager was in charge of managing the entire operation of the 
maquiladora, without intervention from headquarters.  
Theoretically, the Taiwanese corporation allowed their general manager to do the 
same thing. Each year, CMSC provided a budget for headquarters to approve. After the 
budget was approved, CMSC could operate by its own direction. In reality, though, each 
expense needed to be approved not only by Jackie Chan, but also by headquarters in 
China. That meant that the role of the general manager at CMSC was ambiguous. 
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According to Shoudai, when it came to money and expenditures, Jackie Chan was not 
fully authorized to make decisions. However, when there was problem, Jackie Chan was 
considered responsible. In such a structure, when a crisis occurred, the Japanese and 
Taiwanese general managers behaved differently. For Japanese managers, the first step 
was to call an emergency meeting of all managers to describe the situation and 
collectively find a solution. Although the general manager would eventually want to find 
the person responsible for the error and possibly punish them, generally this was not a 
priority for crisis management. The priority was to solve the problem, and not punish the 
person who caused it. Moreover, when an individual was clearly not suitable for a 
specific position and performed their tasks badly, in the Japanese company, the 
individual might be moved to another position more suitable to their ability. Firing an 
employee was the last option for the Japanese general manager, according to Shoudai.  
By contrast, when a crisis occurred at CMSC, the first order of business was to 
determine who was responsible for the error. After the general manager identified them, 
there would be an “anger releasing” session. Once that session was over, the case was 
closed for the general manager whether or not the problem had been solved. Any 
mistake could potentially cost an individual their job at CMSC; the criteria for firing an 
employee were unclear for most Mexican employees.  In contrast to the Japanese 
company, I was unable to obtain any statistical data from CMSC during the nine months 
of my field study. The turnover rate was not only high on the shop floor, but also for 
office staff, engineers, and mangers. I witnessed two of seven department heads be fired 
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by Jackie Chan; for normal engineers and lower-level managers, the turnover rate was 
even higher. 
Any of the Mexican employees at CMSC could find themselves leaving the 
company soon after a short meeting with either the general manager or HR staff. This 
situation created an unstable atmosphere in the main office. Some mid- and low-level 
managers and engineers told me that because their jobs were not secure, they had begun 
looking for work elsewhere the day they were hired. If they could find a better position, 
they would quit CMSC without hesitation. When hiring new engineers and managers, 
CMSC often exploited a loophole in the labor laws to avoid offering seniority and other 
benefits that should be a part of the work contract. This practice created substantial 
uncertainty among managers and engineers who quickly had second thoughts about 
working for CMSC once they found out their work contracts were not what they 
expected. 
In sum, most managers, engineers, and office staff felt that changing from the 
Japanese to the Taiwanese company meant that they could expect harsher interactions 
with members of the other cultural group. They also faced greater insecurity about their 
future careers. Moreover, despite most senior managers being long-time professionals in 
the television industry, they lost the autonomy to make decisions regarding how best to 
do their jobs. Lacking this decision-making ability made them feel alienated. Also, 
cutting personnel from each department meant that the employees remaining at CMSC 
shared heavier workloads. All of these factors made the Mexican employees, including 
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managers and office staff, feel as if they were disposable in their Taiwanese and Chinese 
managers’ eyes.  
In this section, I discussed Mexican managers' initial impressions of the 
Taiwanese managerial style. I also compared the Taiwanese and Japanese styles of 
management. From the Mexican managers' stories, it is clear that although the work 
content remained the same after the maquiladora was purchased by OT from the 
Japanese corporation, the Mexican managers experienced a very different managerial 
style under Jackie Chan's leadership. His management style was affected by the “Pure 
Labor” work ethic and required production quantities, as well as pressure to reduce cost. 
The “Pure Labor” work ethic also affected communication among the Taiwanese, 
Chinese, and Mexican colleagues. As a result, the Mexican managers shared a feeling of 
being left out by their Taiwanese superiors, and a lack of autonomy when doing their 
work for CMSC. Some of the senior managers who had begun their careers in this 
maquiladora even felt that they had become outsiders in their own workplace.  
Since the Mexican managers had more opportunities to interact with their Asian 
colleagues and superiors, they had more direct experiences with and feelings about this 
exotic work ethic. The “Pure Labor” work ethic affected the line workers as well, but in 
different ways. The line workers had fewer opportunities to directly interact with high-
ranking Taiwanese and Chinese managers. Therefore, their experience with the “Pure 
Labor” work ethic centered on the production arrangement and other work-related 
conditions. These are discussed in the following section.  
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1.2. “Here, We Work More Like Parts of a Machine.” 
 
Generally speaking, due to the fact that the Taiwanese general manager and his 
Chinese support team had limited English abilities and none spoke any Spanish, there 
was a language barrier that prevented them from interacting with most of the Mexican 
employees. Most of the individuals working on the production line or in the warehouse 
or logistics departments rarely met their Asian bosses. In fact, most of the line workers 
did not fully understand for whom they actually worked. One of my personal 
experiences illustrates this.  
In the first month after my arrival, I spent most of my time on the assembly line 
with other CMSC employees. During this time, I became acquainted with most of the 
individuals working near my station. One day, a line quality control inspector, Molina, 
and her colleagues stared at me for a while and then discussed something amongst 
themselves. They then looked at me again. This was repeated several times before they 
talked to me, during a period when the line had been stopped. Molina snuck over to me 
and asked me many surprising questions, beginning with: 
 
Molina (M): Are you a son of the boss [Jackie Chan]? 
Hao-Yu (H): No, of course I’m not. Do I look like him? 
M: How about Ying Shan? He is Jackie Chan’s son, right? 
H: No, he is not.  
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M: Then, that little Chinese. What is his name? 
H: Do you mean Gin Quan? 
M: Yes. 
H: No, he is not. None of them are Jackie Chan’s son or daughter. Why do you 
ask? 
M: I thought you were all relatives, and Jackie Chan was your father or an 
elder in your family. 
 
At the time she asked me these questions, she had already worked at CMSC for 
eight months. Considering the high turnover rate, eight months was not a short time for a 
line inspector. However, from our conversation, it became clear that she knew very little 
about her employer. She thought that she was working for a family company, where all 
of the Chinese managers were relatives who came from China. In fact, she was not alone 
in this thinking. In my experience, most line workers had only a minimum understanding 
of their employer. In their daily lives, most of the managers with which they interacted 
were Mexicans. In this regard, CMSC was similar to other maquiladoras in the area. 
Most Mexican employees, especially line workers, inspectors, and logistics deliverers, 
knew they were working for foreigners. However, they rarely had a chance to interact 
with these foreign bosses. All of their activities were supervised by Mexican managers 
or staff.  
However, this is not to say that life at CMSC was not affected by the “Pure Labor” 
work ethic. One of the most prominent features illustrating this is related to work 
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contracts. The Labor Reform Act, passed in 2014, offered more flexibility to 
transnational enterprises willing to manage maquiladoras, especially in terms of hiring 
and firing workers. The Act allowed employers to use a number of different contract 
forms when hiring employees. Critics of this law believe that it unreasonably favors 
employers and undermines employees, though it does continue to provide some 
minimum protection.  For example, when hiring a new employee, an employer can offer 
them a three-month contract for training or definite employment. If necessary, this 
temporary contract can be extended to six months. However, once the contract exceeds 
180 days, if the employer does not notify the trainee that they are not eligible for the 
position, the employment contract automatically becomes indefinite. This new regulation 
provides more flexibility to employers seeking to offer opportunities for workers 
because they have time to decide if the individual should become a permanent employee. 
Compared to the previous labor laws, this new regulation allows employers to dismiss 
workers without cost in the first three months of their employment. Even after three 
months, employers are able to fire employees with less additional compensation.            
Mexican labor law provides employers with flexibility but significantly 
undermines job security for employees. Federal labor law still protects employees with 
an indefinite employment contract after three months of temporary employment, but in 
places like CMSC, employers seek even more flexibility and ways of avoiding extra 
expenditures, practices that could be considered illegal. For instance, Gustavo, a new 
manager in the production department who had worked for several international brands 
such as Sharp and Samsung, joined CMSC during the busy season of 2016. Jackie Chan 
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asked him to solve the high defect rate in the production process and improve the 
efficiency of the repair department. Since I was a repair worker at that time, I spent a lot 
of time working with him. He was very experienced in many aspects, and thus became 
one of the most important informants I met during my fieldwork.  
Unfortunately, he did not stay in CMSC for long. One day, I was eating my 
breakfast with Jose, another new research and design manager. He intentionally lowered 
his voice and told me that Gustavo resigned that morning because he was not satisfied 
with his employment contract or Jackie Chan’s attitude.  I asked Jose what really 
happened that morning. To my surprise, I learned something that the human resources 
department would never tell me.  According to Jose, Gustavo left CMSC because that 
was the day he could renew his employment contract. Gustavo expected to sign an 
indefinite contract because in the past three months, he had significantly improved 
CMSC’s repair efficiency and decreased their defect rate. Even if the outcome might not 
seem outstanding to his Taiwanese boss, the result was a decent one. Thus, he expected 
an official employment contract from CMSC.  However, when he stepped into the HR 
manager’s office, the manager asked him to resign. Then they would give him another 
temporary contract that would become effective the following day. Gustavo was angry 
and decided to quit, but without publicly revealing his anger.  
After I learned this, I asked about the employment status of other Mexican 
engineers and managers. It turned out that it was standard for most mid- and low-level 
managers and engineers to have several periodic employment contracts before they were 
given an indefinite one. Although they knew this practice was illegal, two reasons 
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prevented them from protesting. First, most employees realized that they could file 
complaints with the labor department or sue the company. However, such complaints 
and lawsuits required at least six months of waiting, and during this period they could 
not find another job because they needed to retain an employment relationship with the 
company. Employees who filed a complaint or lawsuit might be denied income for at 
least a half year. Not everyone could afford such a wait, since employees needed to 
support themselves and their families. 
Second, even if an individual was willing to file a complaint or lawsuit and wait 
for half a year or more for the results, the problem didn’t end, even if they won. Having 
filed a complaint or lawsuit undermined one’s future career, making it difficult to find 
another job in the Tijuana area. Two HR managers I met at CMSC denied that there was 
a blacklist at CMSC or elsewhere. However, Pablo, the HR manager, mentioned that in 
Tijuana there was an annual human resource managers’ conference. Most HR managers 
attended the conference and exchanged information about employees during the meeting. 
Besides the conference, the HR staff also told me that since in the Tijuana area only a 
few universities offered human resource-related degrees, almost all current human 
resources managers employed by maquiladoras knew each other from their time at 
university.  Such a network made background checks on potential employees easier, and 
Pablo did not hide the fact that when he did such a background check, he would “look at 
the worker’s resume and make a phone call to the worker’s previous employer to see if 
anything had gone wrong with this guy.” Despite the fact that Pablo never admitted to 
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keeping a blacklist, it would not be difficult to prevent troublemakers from finding 
subsequent work. 
The employment relationships that existed among Mexican skilled workers, 
engineers, managers, and laborers could be further divided between “official” CMSC 
employees and temporary workers. The total number of CMSC employees was 
approximately 170. This number, however, would only staff approximately 1.5 
production lines. Yet CMSC had four production lines, meaning that the official number 
of CMSC employees could not meet production needs during the busy season. Since 
Jackie Chan was reluctant to hire more workers, CMSC relied heavily on temporary 
workers to operate the lines. During the busy season, CMSC hired more than 800 
temporary workers to meet their labor demand. A significant number of temporary 
workers on the shop floor was a managerial strategy guided by the “Pure Labor” work 
ethic, and will be discussed separately in following section.  
CMSC workers rarely interacted with their foreign managers. Most interacted 
directly with Mexican managers and engineers.  When foreigners did appear, it was for 
one of two reasons.  First, they might be visitors coming to see the production lines. 
Second, production progress was delayed and foreign managers were sent to correct the 
delay. In the first situation, there was no opportunity for the Mexican workers to interact 
with foreign guests. Usually, the workers were aware that there might by visitors that 
day because they would be asked to concentrate on their tasks and show greater 
discipline than on ordinary days. However, they rarely knew who the visitors were or 
why they were visiting the factory. Generally speaking, information transmission 
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excluded most line workers. All of the information line workers received was either 
from a Mexican manager’s official announcement or rumors from Mexican engineers 
with desks in the main office. In the second situation, when a serious problem had 
occurred or production was slow, Chinese engineers and managers would come to the 
shop floor to correct the situation. During this process, the Mexican workers could 
expect yelling or at best, emotionless faces. This was why most Mexican workers 
developed the impression that Asian managers were always angry. 
For Mexican workers, it was rare to see an Asian manager walk into the 
production area. When they did, it was not uncommon for the Asian manager to wear a 
“poker face” or be openly angry about the production progress. Therefore, Mexican 
workers developed means to avoid or resist direct encounters with Asian managers and 
engineers. When encountering angry mangers, these workers used the “weapons of the 
weak
30” (Scott, 2008) to manipulate the situation.   For example, Mateo was a young 
technician who also worked as a repairman on the shop floor. We spent a couple of 
months working at the same station. Before I came to CMSC, I had no knowledge of 
electronics. In the very beginning of my “repairman” career, Mateo was the one who 
taught me and demonstrated all of the skills I needed to fix the various televisions and 
monitors. Even later, after I had acquired the necessary skills, we spent time working 
together at the same station because the turnover rate was high. This was the busy season 
                                                 
30
 The weapons of the weak is a theory proposed by James Scott. Scott argued that for people who lived in 
the button of a society, the caused and consequence to openly resist the authority might be too vast and 
unaffordable. In this context, people showed their discontent through some subtle ways such as slow down 
the work requested by the authority, stealing, or incorporated. 
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and just after CMSC had received an important order from a famous Japanese brand; 
Jackie Chan wanted his best operators and repair technicians to work on that assembly 
line. Therefore, Mateo and I worked there to make sure the repair quality was above 
average.   
One day, possibly because the raw materials had not received a proper inspection, 
a faulty part caused more than 100 televisions to have issues that could only be resolved 
by replacing the part. However, because there were no extra replacements in the 
warehouse, all of the defective sets were placed on wheel carts at the repair stations. On 
ordinary days, production managers would tolerate this practice because there was no 
place to store faulty sets. This, however, was not an ordinary day. Representatives of the 
famous Japanese brand were visiting CMSC that afternoon. Thus, Jackie Chan was 
nervous and sent Ying Shan to inspect the production line and make sure that everything 
was the way it should be.  When Ying Shan came to the repair station, he found the 
defective sets. Since he did not know that the sets required a new part, he ordered Mateo 
to fix them immediately. At first, Mateo tried to explain why the sets were stored there 
temporarily, but Ying Shan ignored him. In response, Mateo ignored the order and 
focused on other work.  A few minutes later, Ying Shan came back to the repair station 
and saw that the sets were still there. He used a sharp tone to tell Mateo to fix the 
televisions immediately. Mateo was confused and unhappy about Ying Shan’s 
unreasonable request.  
The next time Ying Shan approached; he was obviously angry and raised his 
voice to repeat the same order.  This time, Mateo decided to respond, but in his own way. 
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Because Jackie Chan wanted to leave the Japanese guests with a good impression, that 
day only one line was operating. All of CMSC’s workers were on that line, waiting for 
the guests to come. All other production lines were empty and no one was checking 
those areas. Mateo decided to push the carts with the defective TVs to the other lines to 
keep them from being seen by the Japanese guests and Ying Shan. This decision had 
ripple effects later on. Each line produced a different model, and the televisions waiting 
to be fixed usually stayed on the same line until they were repaired. After Mateo moved 
these sets to another line, other repair technicians were confused, likely overlooking 
them for quite a while. For the factory, these sets would remain in their inventory, but 
they were difficult to physically find. However, that was not Mateo’s concern at that 
moment. In this case, Mateo chose not to encounter Ying Shan openly, and instead made 
the defective TVs “disappear.”  
In relating this story, I want to point out that in ordinary operation, Mexican 
workers had their own tactics for managing their relationships with foreign managers. 
They were not totally submissive or without will. Despite each shop floor area being 
assigned for a specific purpose, workers could utilize these spaces in their own ways. In 
reality, the Mexican workers may not have recognized how the “Pure Labor” work ethic 
caused their job dissatisfaction because it penetrated their work schedule, production 
goals, flexibility, and all other aspects of their daily lives at CMSC. Mateo's story 
illustrates how the Mexican workers experienced obstacles created by language and 
cultural barriers. His case also indicates that when the Mexican workers encountered 
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unreasonable requests, they developed a series of methods to resist those requests and 
escape critical consequences.  
As a manager, Vino encountered a number of workers who damaged production 
machines, pushed the stop button to force the assembly line to stop, or intentionally 
slowed down production to show their discontent with their jobs. However, Vino also 
indicated that as long as these events were not discovered by Jackie Chan or the other 
Chinese managers or engineers, they (i.e., Mexican managers) would keep silent, at least 
if no severe damage occurred. Besides these tactics, workers also showed their 
discontent by resigning or being serially absent from work. However, I did not hear any 
Mexican managers, line leaders, or senior workers discuss a strike or walk-out. 
Therefore, I speculate that most resistance was subtle and on an individual level. 
One critical reason that workers were unsatisfied with their jobs at CMSC was 
their wages. Most Mexican workers complained that their salaries were insufficient to 
cover the cost of living in Tijuana. For years, maquiladoras have been notorious for 
paying employees minimum wage or below. CMSC followed this tradition. According to 
a survey of 100 maquiladoras in the Tijuana area, CMSC’s salaries were the second 
lowest. I learned of this survey from a Mexican manager. The workers did not share this 
knowledge with him; they had their own ways of collecting information. They knew 
their salaries were lower than those offered at other maquiladoras. Accordingly, almost 
all of the workers I interviewed told me that they were poorly paid, or that their earnings 
were not enough to cover the cost of living. Indeed, 3,800 pesos a month was 
approximately $200 US dollars during my time in Mexico. According to an online 
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database, the monthly average cost of living in Tijuana for a family was, on average, 
approximately 7,700 pesos (https://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/in/Tijuana). Thus, 
workers at CMSC earned far less than the average cost of living in the area.  
Low salaries
31
  might explain why CMSC had difficulties hiring new workers 
and had to rely heavily on temporary employees. Using temporary workers deepened the 
feeling of exploitation among CMSC employees because often they would discover that 
their salaries were lower than those of the temporary employees, at least in terms of 
wages. Assembly workers who worked at CMSC earned 900 pesos a week, but 
temporary workers who did the same job earned 1,100 pesos a week. Quality control 
workers earned 50 pesos more than CMSC's assembly workers, but temporary quality 
control workers earned 1,200 pesos a week.
32
 Although employees were aware that they 
earned less than most other Tijuana workers, there was a significant number willing to 
stay at CMSC. There were two main reasons for this acceptance. First was age. Many 
CMSC employees were in their late 40s or 50s.  Workers in this age range face greater 
difficulties changing jobs. Most workers on the assembly line and in the logistics and 
packing areas fell into this category. Second, some employees on the assembly line and 
in quality control were young adults between the ages of 18 and 30. For these youth, 
lacking an advanced education was reason enough to remain at the factory. It was not 
uncommon to see some of these workers attend school after resigning from CMSC. Both 
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 This information was provided by a Mexican manager who told me that the survey was conducted by a 
local association of maquiladoras. 
32
 I confirmed this information with Pablo, who told me that workers ignored social security and other 
work-related benefits paid by CMSC. Such benefits were not paid to outsourced workers. A number of 
outsourced workers agreed with Pablo's comments, but CMSC employees did not consider those benefits 
to be a part of their salary. 
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groups of workers, old and young, occupied inferior positions in the local job market. 
Though their specific reasons for remaining might have differed, most workers, 
especially the young, were keenly aware that their lack of a sufficient education blocked 
their way to better jobs. Several Mexican managers told me they had asked Jackie Chan 
to increase line workers’ salaries, but he always remained silent or answered that the 
topic required further evaluation.
33
   
In addition to aggressive managers and low wages, the work environment and 
job-related welfare also affected CMSC’s workers. As discussed in Chapter |III, because 
CMSC was reluctant to improve worker-related facilities such as the cafeteria and 
restrooms, the work environment was a constant source of complaint. After I returned to 
Taiwan and began writing my dissertation, a friend from CMSC sent me a message 
through Facebook; the news was bad. Luna, my teacher on the assembly line who helped 
me from my first day and until I could handle my tasks on my own, had died due to 
multiple organ failure caused by a urinary tract infection. Urinary tract infections were 
common among the female workers who spent long hours on the line and did not have 
enough time to drink water or use the restroom. Female workers like Luna who held 
                                                 
33
 Fernandez-Kelly explained the generally low salaries at maquiladoras by arguing that they preferred to 
hire female employees. One main advantage to hiring women was that it allowed maquiladoras to pay less 
than they would to male workers. Because Mexican society is patriarchal, it assumes that men rather than 
women are the main breadwinners in each household. Following this assumption, even when women join 
the regular labor force and become the main breadwinners (such as when men are unemployed or 
underemployed), women’s incomes are still considered supplementary.  Maquiladoras managers use this 
as an excuse to provide insufficient salaries to female workers (Fernández-Kelly, 1983).  
    Later researchers such as Salzinger have argued that the situation has gradually changed since 
Fernandez-Kelly conducted her fieldwork in the early 1970s. Saliznger explained that the gender 
component changed in the maquiladora industry. However, the salaries have remained low because even 
though men have joined the workforce and maquiladora managers no longer resist hiring male employees, 
the entire maquiladora workforce had been feminized. That is to say, regardless of workers’ sex, they are 
treated like females; thus, their salaries have remained at the supplemental level (Salzinger, 2003). 
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important positions requiring experience and delicate hands (such as those who placed 
glass panels in position in the dust-free room) were at even greater risk of developing 
urinary tract-related diseases.  While such workers are generally categorized as unskilled, 
in reality, many tasks on the assembly line required tremendous skill and concentration 
if the line is to move smoothly. Luna’s station in the dust-free room was crucial to the 
entire assembly process. The panel is the most important and expensive part of a 
television, and also the most vulnerable. It is thin but large in size. Any scratch or crack 
will automatically render it useless. Therefore, workers in charge of panel installation 
are essential when the line is moving. This means that they have less time to rest 
compared to other workers.         
Luna’s role in assembling the TVs resulted in her having less rest time than did 
the other workers, even those working on the same line. Moreover, the facilities, 
including water fountains and restrooms, were insufficient for all of the workers to use 
during break times. Luna developed a urinary tract infection because she regularly 
stayed in the same position; the disease is extremely difficult to cure. By the time she 
went to the hospital, it was already too late and the infection took her life. In addition to 
Luna’s sad case, I observed that most senior workers took one or two weeks off, unpaid. 
At first, I assumed they were traveling on vacation with their families. I realized, though, 
that they had chosen to stay home. Their actions matched maquiladora researchers’ 
descriptions. Assembly work is extremely boring and tiresome (Cravey, 1998; Denman, 
2006; Moure‐Eraso, Rafael, Wilcox, Punnett, MacDonald, and Levenstein, 1997; Miller, 
2001; Salzinger, 2003; Wright, 2001; Cedillo, Leonor, Siobán, Roberto, and Monroy, 
 164 
 
1997), even for young women (and more recently, men). Workers cannot continually 
work without taking breaks because the fatigue that accumulates daily will eventually 
seriously undermine their health.  
 
With the introduction of flat screen TVs in 2002, some of these issues have 
changed. It is safer and less chemically hazardous for workers assembling LED or LCD 
televisions than it was for those producing cathode ray tube (CRT) televisions. However, 
even with this improvement, medical care continues to be insufficient. CMSC had only 
one nurse who took care of all factory employees. Occasionally, a medical team with a 
doctor would come to vaccinate workers against the flu, but that was the only time a 
doctor would step through the factory gate.  Otherwise, a single nurse with limited 
supplies was all that was made available. The long work hours, tedious work content, 
and insufficient medical support all caused the workers to feel like their work conditions 
were poor, and that they would leave CMSC if they had other choices. These conditions 
are examples of how the “Pure Labor” work ethic affected Mexican workers’ 
experiences at CMSC.  
Besides these aspects, the pre-work training offered also illustrates how the “Pure 
Labor” managerial style affected production. The Taiwanese management only invested 
in human capital at the absolute minimum level. Before they stepped onto the shop floor, 
both CMSC employees and temporary workers needed to go through pre-work training 
to familiarize them with the environment, working conditions, job description, safety 
codes, and other work-related information. In other maquiladoras, this process usually 
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took at least a full day; some even spent a week or up to a month training new 
employees. This was not the case at CMSC. All new recruits received one hour of 
training, which was conducted by the production assistant. The content in this training 
included an introduction to the company, safety codes, and general information about the 
organization. After the hour of training, workers stepped out of the meeting room near 
the cafeteria and walked to the shop floor. If the temporary workers were not operating a 
line independently, they usually remained close to a worker at the same station so they 
could see how to perform their tasks. This is the only work-related training they received 
at CMSC. 
I worked as an industrial engineer for several months. During that period, I 
measured the time that experienced and temporary workers spent at the same task. The 
difference between these groups was considerable. Temporary workers sometimes 
required double or even triple the time an experienced worker would need to finish the 
same task. The defect rate was also higher for lines operated by temporary workers than 
by regular CMSC’s employees. Therefore, the production manager usually assigned 
some experienced workers to serve as temporary line leaders on lines operated by 
temporary workers, in order to keep the operation from stalling.  For outsiders, this 
might have appeared like a good way for workers to climb the internal job ladder. 
However, such a promotion was only temporary. Workers who had been promoted to 
line leader received two hundred extra pesos a week during the busy season, but their 
salaries would return to normal as soon as the busy season ended. 
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One Mexican industrial engineer complained about this arrangement to me. He 
believed that if the company really wanted to train workers to be line leaders, then those 
chosen workers should receive regular training during the normal season; even though 
these workers were all experienced in their tasks, line leaders actually required more 
than just experience. They needed to perform more tasks and pay attention to more 
details than simply an experienced worker would. Moreover, they needed some basic 
leadership skills. Otherwise, no one would listen to them. The engineer’s opinion 
corresponded with that of the new human resources manager, Roberto, who replaced 
Pablo after he retired. In his second month as HR manager, I arranged an interview with 
him. During that interview, he described his future plans for how to motivate workers. 
Although the factory needed to reduce human capital expenditures, he would offer the 
line leaders’ salary to some experienced workers, even during the normal season. Since 
they would receive better salaries than normal workers, they also needed to spend extra 
time receiving training. Roberto believed that this arrangement would motivate workers 
to work harder and take on more responsibilities.  However, his plan was never 
implemented because Jackie Chan did not approve it.      
Not every experienced worker who received such a “promotion” was happy 
about it. Although being a line leader meant temporarily higher pay, it also meant more 
overtime, regardless of their shift. Though this meant they would receive higher 
paychecks, most workers expressed how difficult the overtime was, especially for those 
working the night shift.  According to Mexican labor law, employees have the right to 
decide if they want to work overtime. Employers cannot punish those who decline. At 
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CMSC, when workers refused to participate in overtime, they did not receive direct 
punishment. However, if they quit their job and later wanted to return (as was very 
common), this previous refusal might prevent them from being rehired. Mateo, an 
experienced repair worker, encountered this situation after he quit his job to go on his 
honeymoon. Afterward, he started working at a different nearby maquiladora but 
eventually wanted to return to CMSC because he did not like the task that was assigned 
to him in another maquiladora. When he did, it was at a time when CMSC had just lost 
several repair technicians. Presumably, they would have welcomed his return. Actually, 
though, he paid several visits to the factory gate to meet production managers and beg 
them to rehire him. I helped him ask the production managers and other repair 
technicians what exactly prevented his return. Eventually Mateo returned to his original 
position, but without his seniority. The reason they blocked him was that after he quit, 
his leader commented that Mateo was uncooperative with regards to working overtime. 
It is clear that even though Mexican labor law gives workers the right to decide if they 
want to work overtime, in reality, if they choose not to, irrespective of the reason, it may 
affect their future opportunities.   
Mot CMSC workers realized that even though the labor laws protected their right 
to refuse overtime, they were not protected from the company taking revenge. Because 
of their previous record, they might not be able to return to CMSC if they quit. 
Combined with other factors such as low wages, the below-average meal plan, and 
facilities insufficient to meet workers’ basic needs, workers generally had a negative 
experience working for CMSC. Some more minor features also underscored workers’ 
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negative experience. For example, most Mexicans are fans of local soccer or baseball 
teams and are passionate about the professional leagues. During the season, many 
workers are absent from work on game days or the day after. This causes problems with 
absenteeism during the season, delaying the production schedule. Therefore, in order to 
decrease potential absentees, some maquiladoras provide a live stream of the games on 
the shop floor. Others might even stop the line during games, and restart it after the 
game is completed. For managers, allowing workers to watch the game during work 
hours helps secure enough workers coming to work and staying sober the days of and 
after games. Factories might lose a couple of hours of productivity, but this practice 
secures the workers coming to work and minimizes the uncertainty that otherwise 
companies these games. CMSC had no policy to resolve this issue.          
Besides external games, some maquiladoras have regular recreation activities at 
their factories. Workers can join basketball, baseball, soccer, or volleyball teams 
sponsored by the factory and practice the sports they enjoy. Moreover, some 
maquiladoras regularly host parties and provide free food at such events.  CMSC did 
have a basketball court behind the production facility, but when I was there, it was being 
used as a temporary warehouse to store pallets. I never saw a ballgame played at CMSC 
and no company-funded team
34
 existed. Furthermore, during my time there, CMSC held 
                                                 
34
 According to Lopez, a senior Mexican manager who also worked for the previous Japanese company, 
when the Japanese company operated this maquiladora, there was a company-funded baseball team. The 
company provided all of the gear and uniforms for each team member. This baseball team was dismissed 
on the same day the maquiladora changed ownership. 
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one taco party, to celebrate Mother's Day. I asked workers who had worked at CMSC for 
years, and they could not recall any other party in the past three years.  
All of these recreational activities promote workers’ happiness and make them 
more willing to stay in their current jobs. When I conducted my fieldwork, there were 
plenty of jobs for the local labor force, and workers had more opportunities and choices 
than in years past. Since more and more employers and transnational enterprises are 
operating in Tijuana, maquiladoras must compete with one another for workers. In this 
context, the jobs offered by CMSC do not attract the ideal workers they want, but rather 
only those left behind by the local labor market. However, this arrangement matches 
Jackie Chan's managerial philosophy and the “Pure Labor” work ethic. It would be an 
extra cost for the company to fund a sports team and maintain the related facilities (such 
as a basketball court). Besides, allowing workers to play sports might potentially 
decrease their overtime. These factors would prevent the company from extracting 
maximum productivity from its workers. 
Workers experience a variety of working conditions and employment 
relationships at maquiladoras. CMSC’s employees felt that they were part of a machine. 
This feeling was shared widely by line workers and Mexican managers. Workers spent 
at least ten hours a day at CMSC with insufficient facilities for resting, and were ordered 
to complete a vast quantity of production as a part of their daily routine. CMSC 
employees experienced the “Pure Labor” work ethic directly through their fatigue and 
deep feelings of being parts of a machine. Jackie Chan's managerial philosophy was to 
"run the horse fast, and feed the horse the least." CMSC's workers felt that they had been 
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mechanized and were not treated like human beings. Although CMSC's employees 
might not be able to identify the specific factors causing their negative experiences, it is 
clear that they were deeply affected by the “Pure Labor” work ethic. 
 
 
1.3. “Somos Trabajadores Nómadas”—Temporary Workers in CMSC 
 
One of the most prominent phenomena occurring in Tijuana’s maquiladoras in 
recent years is that factories no longer hire enough employees to achieve their 
production goals. Instead, they hire temporary workers (trabajandor de soluciones). 
Currently, it is not uncommon to see people wearing different uniforms walking out 
from the same maquiladora at 5 p.m. each evening. For companies, hiring temporary 
workers is already a common practice in the Tijuana area. For workers, being temporary 
is now almost an unavoidable first step in joining the local job market. After the 
Mexican government changed regulations on hiring and firing practices and lost its 
control of employment contracts, temp agencies become a new and energetic industry in 
Tijuana. Temp agencies have changed the hiring process in maquiladoras, as well as 
workers’ career trajectory and their ability to shift from one plant to another. 
After the Mexican government passed their labor law reform act in 2014, the 
scene changed significantly. Government agents claimed that this reform would help to 
boost Mexico’s GDP and create more jobs. After the reform passed, companies gained 
more flexibility in how they handled their human capital and production schedule. In 
 171 
 
Tijuana, temp agencies grew rapidly after 2014, and became an important element of the 
local labor market. This new player significantly changed the local labor market in many 
respects. When I began my fieldwork in Tijuana in May of 2016, many maquiladoras 
were hiring a significant number of temporary workers. It was common to see many 
temporary workers who wear different uniform vests (as shown in Figure 11) walked out 
from maquiladoras at 5 p.m. This was a relatively new practice in Tijuana.  
The 2014 labor reform act made this practice possible. Two of the most 
important adjustments are as follows. 
  
1. The Mexican government loosened its regulations on the hiring and firing 
process. This allowed companies to fire its underperforming employees in a short 
period of time and with reduced compensation. 
2. The Act also introduced a three-month training trial for companies to test if 
employees would be able to perform well in their assigned tasks. If an employee’s 
performance did not meet expectations, the company could fire them without any 
compensation. 
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Figure 11 A Birthday Party in Cafeteria, workers wear different uniform indicates 
they come from different temp agencies.  
 
The purpose of the labor reform act is to allow companies more flexibility in 
their hiring and firing of workers, and in general with how they manage human resources. 
After three years, though the results of the reform remain unclear, the act has clearly 
opened the door for maquiladoras to hire more temporary workers and gain a greater 
level of flexibility in terms of labor management. Temp agencies have become an 
integral part of Tijuana’s job market, taking over certain tasks that used to be conducted 
by individual HR departments at local maquiladoras. For example, in the past, 
companies were responsible for recruiting their own employees; now, the temp agencies 
have taken over this task. HR departments no longer need to go out to the street early in 
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the morning, set up a tent and use a bullhorn to announce their recruiting details to the 
neighborhood, hoping people will leave their homes and take the jobs. All maquiladoras 
now need to do is make a phone call to the temp agency and tell the agent how many 
workers they need and on what date. Then, when the day comes the temp agency 
delivers the workers directly to the maquiladora’s front gate.  
One HR manager , Pablo, described this change as follows: 
 
“Right now it is very difficult for me to hire people [on] my own 
because almost all employees are looking through the outsourcing 
[companies]
35
 for [a] job. They are not walking on the street and looking for [a] 
job. They are looking at the temp agencies, sometimes on the internet maybe, 
and then they go to them and say, ‘hey, I want a job. Ok, come in. What do you 
want to do? I want to work at XXX company. How much you want to work? I 
want to work for 2000 pesos. Something like this… (Interview transcript, 
2016/06/24).” 
 
Pablo also told me that temp agencies save them a lot of time on recruiting tasks 
that would otherwise be outside in the burning hot sun of summer. Now they can 
concentrate on internal affairs like making the production line more efficient. He 
mentioned that the temp agencies share not only the burden of recruiting tasks, but other 
                                                 
35
 Pablo always used the word: "outsourced workers," and "temp agencies" to refer to those temporary 
workers and temp agencies. 
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responsibilities, as well. For example, by hiring temporary workers, maquiladoras can 
avoid paying social security, pensions, and other benefits to workers. Factories only pay 
the temp agencies for their services. All other costs are paid by the temp agencies 
themselves. Since almost all maquiladoras have busy seasons and slow seasons, there is 
a huge delta in their labor requirements. In the past, maquiladoras had to hire and fire 
workers and incur the related cost, but now they can avoid the extra expenditures 
associated with laying off workers, simply by outsourcing. In this regard, maquiladoras 
gain more flexibility in managing their labor, with minimum cost.  
Besides the flexibility that maquiladoras gain by hiring temporary workers, 
factories are also able to reduce other responsibilities related to labor, such as personal 
safety and compensation in case of an accident. In the past, the factory was directly 
responsible for each employee’s safety on the shop floor. Although factory managers 
still put a good deal of effort into keeping the shop floor safe for work, if there is an 
accident and the temporary employee is injured, the factory has no direct responsibility 
since he or she is not a factory employee. The injured worker is employed by the temp 
agency. Therefore, all of their social security, work insurance and other compensation (if 
any) come from the temp agency, and not the maquiladora where the employee was 
injured.  
The changes to the labor market in Tijuana are not subtle. Temp agencies are 
now even more pervasive as brokers in the job market. Almost all workers need to rely 
on temp agencies to find jobs when they first join the labor market. In this regard, these 
companies affect both workers and their potential employers.   Some workers believe 
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that there is a positive side to outsourcing. For example, several young workers told me 
that they liked this type of work setting, since outsourcing provides them with the 
opportunity to explore different options when trying to determine what kind of job they 
would prefer, before settling down in a specific industry or position. However, most 
young workers I interviewed said that eventually they’d want a stable, permanent job 
after they’d had some time to explore.        
Outsourcing is often the first job for freshly graduated young women and men. It 
is also a way for students to find short-term, part-time work during summer vacations 
and earn money to pay for school. For them, the unstable, short-term, and consistently 
migrant nature of temporary work is preferable; job security is less of a concern. Being 
an temporary worker and holding a temporary position does not bother them. These 
workers occupy a much better niche in the local labor market, because of their age and 
education. They still have options, or at least they believe they do.  
Other workers, ones who cannot occupy this elevated niche in the local labor 
market, interpret outsourcing differently. Workers in this group tend to have more work 
experience and be in the later stages of their careers. These aged workers have usually 
held better positions in other companies in the near past. They left those jobs for various 
reasons, but soon after, when they returned to the local labor market, they realized they 
would no longer be able to occupy positions similar to those they once held. Temporary 
work is the only work left that they can find. For workers occupying inferior positions in 
the job market, the only reason to take an temporary job is because they need to make a 
living. Some older workers demonstrate their willingness to find a permanent position in 
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whatever company they’ve found temporary work, but only a few accomplish that goal. 
Regardless of their age, temporary workers understand their circumstances when it 
comes to looking for more stable jobs with better benefits. A permanent position would 
be a gift. Most temporary workers go from job to job for years. They are nomadic people 
living in border cities.  
When the temporary workers became a vital source for maquiladoras to fill labor 
demand, temp agencies and temporary workers were not only changed the local labor 
market but also provided a new means to maquiladora managers to manage the shop 
floor more easily when compared to the past. According to the older workers and HR 
staff, temp agencies did exist before the labor reform act, but in the past, most 
maquiladoras only hired temporary workers to do peripheral jobs such as cleaning tasks. 
Now, an temporary worker can do most jobs inside a maquiladora, just like an official 
employee. This was a significant change because it also changed the way of shop floor 
management. Also in the past, maquiladora managers needed to carefully oversee their 
shop floors by themselves. Although strategies might vary, the goal remained the same: 
prevent workers from organizing and disrupting production.  
For example, Peña described how some managers used “loyal” workers to 
penetrate the existing informal groups inside their firms, in order to collect first-hand 
information and prevent any potential conflict or strike (Peña, 1997). However, Pena 
also mentioned that each maquiladora manager might vary in their attitude towards 
informal groups and implement different strategies to manage their employer-employee 
relationships. It is no doubt that keeping worker discontent below a certain level and the 
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production line consistently operating are two major tasks for maquiladora managers. In 
the past, they could only rely on themselves and their staff to accomplish these goals. 
Currently, temp agencies are able to assist maquiladora managers with 
overseeing the shop floor. When a temp agency sends workers into a maquiladora, they 
usually send several staff (depending on the number of workers sent) to help manage 
work inside. Besides recording the attendance of the temporary workers, temp agencies 
often assign an temporary worker to serve as a line leader. Since the temporary line 
leader is not a factory employee, he or she might not be equipped with sufficient 
knowledge and experience to supervise production. Therefore, their role on the 
production line is usually to help the “real” line leader communicate with and look after 
the temporary workers. Moreover, the temporary line leader is also in charge of 
monitoring production progress and the temporary workers’ productivity. Usually, any 
“problematic” workers are reassigned to other tasks for the day’s remaining work hours, 
and removed from the factory the following work day.  
For example, when I was assigned as an assembly worker, one day a group of 
temporary workers came onto the shop floor. Some joined the same line I was on. One 
senior CMSC worker, Luisa, needed to leave work early that day. Soon after the 
temporary workers joined, the line leader assigned a young woman to watch Luisa 
perform her task and took over the work when Luisa left the factory. Luisa’s station was 
not an easy one. Depending on the model we made, Luisa needed to attach two or three 
information sheets and barcode onto the back shell of each television set. Each 
information sheet had a different serial number on it, and the serial number needed to 
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match every other one on each information sheet. Therefore, despite there only being 
one step to Luisa’s work on the line, line preparation consumed a lot of time and made 
this station a very stressful one for any inexperienced worker because if they failed to 
match the serial number, this set of TV would not be recognized by the shop floor 
system and would not be able to trace. That is to say, once the no-match occurred, the 
entire line would stop until the proper serial number has been found.  
When Luisa took her afternoon off and left the factory, the young and 
inexperienced female temporary worker took over her station. She actually did very well 
and it only took her a short time to develop her own way of catching up the speed of the 
production line. Unfortunately, she had serious cramps and went to the factory nurse. 
The nurse allowed her to rest a short time in the nursing room. Her long absence from 
the line drew the attention of the line leader and CMSC employees.  The line leader even 
sent some logistics workers to search for her. After she came back from the nursing 
room and explained why she was absent, nobody blamed her or treated her badly. The 
line still ran as usual and the workers acted normally, but I never saw this young woman 
again after that day.  
A couple of days later, I went to ask the line leader what happened with that 
temporary worker. “We don’t want her to work in here,” was the answer he gave me.  It 
was clear that when the maquiladora managers were not satisfied with an temporary 
worker’s performance, they could directly dismiss him or her, without any consequences. 
If the company fired an temporary worker, they did not need to compensate them in any 
way. The maquiladora managers simply contacted the onsite outsourcing staff and the 
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worker immediately disappeared from the factory, or soon thereafter.  Thus, when 
temporary workers started to do the same tasks with other maquiladora employees, their 
existence in the shop floor became a means for maquiladora managers to keep the shop 
floor in order. 
It is not news that since the first day of the Border Industrialization Project, 
maquiladora workers have been treated as a disposable labor force. Most researchers 
have noted that the turnover rate is high in most maquiladoras (English, Wilke, Williams, 
and Ibarreche 1989; Rivera, Rosa, and Tovar, 2007; Maertz, Stevens, and Campion, 
2003; Miller, Janice, Hom, and Gomez-Mejia, 2001).  In fact, some studies have shown 
that maquiladora managers tend to use the high turnover rate to keep production 
expenditures low, since workers who leave their jobs voluntarily automatically lose their 
seniority (Fernández-Kelly, 1983; Kopinak. 1997).  In the past, a job at a maquiladora 
meant a stable income (if not a better one, when compared to the informal and service 
sectors) and good work-related benefits such as social security and health insurance. 
Therefore, maquiladora managers are not afraid to fire workers since they can always 
find someone else to fill the empty spot (Carrillo and Santibañez, 2001; Rodriguez, 
1988). Conversely, because assembly tasks are repetitive, most assembly workers find 
them tiresome and very physically demanding; therefore, even the youngest workers 
cannot last for long in such jobs. Workers need time to rest before returning to work. 
However, if they resign, they lose their seniority. If later they return to the same 
company, most will not reinstate their seniority. Because of practices like this, workers 
feel they are a disposable labor force. Outsourcing work may intensify this disposable 
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feeling and feature because it is more unstable than other types of employment.  
Moreover, since the temporary workers performed the same tasks as regular employees 
of maquiladoras, the disposable feature of temporary workers became a means for 
maquiladora managers to manage both their own employees and temporary workers in 
an easier way. In the individual level, now managers can dismiss an "unwanted" 
temporary worker without any compensation to the worker. This allowed managers to 
fire temporary workers without less hesitation. Meanwhile, knowing that many 
temporary workers were waiting for jobs outside the firm that allowed managers to put 
more pressure on their employees to cooperate with managers. 
From the collective level, since temporary workers are often nomadic, migrating 
from one factory to another. An individual might stay in a factory for weeks or months 
for a specific production project. Once that project is finished, however, the temporary 
worker will move to another company and start over again. Since the number of workers 
required by each factory is different, temporary workers often have totally different 
colleagues or team members in each factory. In such circumstances, individual workers 
not only need to adapt to new work environments, line-leaders, and managers, they also 
need to get to know their new colleagues in a very short period of time. The nomadic 
nature of temporary work prevents workers from establishing relationships with most of 
the people they encounter in the workplace, not to mention that it is almost impossible 
for them to organize any type of collective bargaining power or association. In other 
words, the nature of outsourcing diminishes the possibility of any kind of collective 
effort.    
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It is almost impossible for temporary workers to form any type of organization 
that works for their collective wellbeing. It is also nearly as difficult for them to wield 
what James Scott called the “weapons of the weak” (Scott, 2008) or what is termed a 
“subaltern struggle” in Peña’s book Terror of the Machine (Peña, 1997). There was one 
thing in common of these two theories: if they wanted to be successful in their efforts, 
they needed to persuade other workers to join the fight. At the very least, other workers 
needed to be convinced not to reveal any information to management. 
As a repair technician during the busy season, I worked on a line composed of 
workers from a company called HDR. They were hired to support a special project from 
another TV assembly maquiladora. The workers were of both genders and various ages, 
and, education levels. Some were from the local neighborhood, but others were from as 
far away as Oaxaca. I asked them if they knew each other before they worked at CMSC, 
and most told me they had met each other for the first time on the day they began work 
at CMSC.   
One day, after I finished some paperwork the GM had requested, I walked to the 
production line prepared to begin my repair work. The atmosphere on the line, however, 
was slightly different from normal. Generally, people would chat with one another 
without trying to hide it. They would make good-natured fun of each other or discuss 
chicken recipes while their hands performed nonstop assembly work. The general 
manager didn’t approve of workers chatting during work. However, here in Tijuana, 
people constantly spoke with one another while working.  
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Because workers chatted regularly, this day, when I walked onto the production 
line and no one was speaking, I knew that something was unusual. People were quiet. 
More precisely, they were talking but not at a normal volume. They were whispering. I 
asked my friend David, who worked as a repairman at the same station, what was going 
on. He told me that the temp agency had not deposited their salaries into their bank 
accounts (“no tenemos el dinero en la tarjeta”). People were angry and the line workers 
were discussing how if the money was not deposited into their accounts by the afternoon, 
they might organize a walk out. He then told me that he was not positive that if the 
money was not deposited, people were really going to walk out; this was only the third 
day he had worked there and he knew no one. How could he know if he could trust them? 
Our conversation stopped there because the manager appeared. After lunch, the money 
was deposited into their accounts, so the walkout never happened. However, David’s 
comment shows that even when people share information, the lack of an informal 
network and rapport with other temporary workers makes it difficult to escalate efforts to 
solve problems. This event indicated how difficult for temporary workers to protect their 
rights collectively. Hiring temporary workers allowed maquiladoras to control shop floor 
easily.  
This event indicated how difficult for temporary workers to protect their rights 
collectively. Hiring temporary workers allowed maquiladoras to control shop floor easily. 
For CMSC, labor control was not the exclusive advantage to hire temporary workers. 
Hiring temporary workers matched Jackie's managerial philosophy. First, during the 
busy seasons, hiring temporary workers allowed CMSC to reduce its expenditure of 
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production cost because it helped CMSC to transfer the work-related cost such as social 
security, seniority, and disbursement fee to the temp agencies. More importantly, this 
arrangement allowed the maquiladora customers such as CMSC was able to adjust its 
number of workers without any extra cost while pursuing flexibility of labor. 
Second, it was no doubt that experienced workers could provide faster assembly 
speed and better product quality that temporary workers could not achieve. Sophisticated 
workers could help the company to control the defective rate at a reasonable level. 
Ideally, this could help CMSC to reduce its production cost as well. However, as I 
discussed above, product quality was not the priority for CMSC; the quantity was. 
Besides, because Outstanding Technology was a global corporation and CMSC used 
many raw materials from other factories which belonged to the same corporation. This 
arrangement could help CMSC to lower its production cost and to reduce the defective 
rate by blaming other factories produced problematic parts for CMSC to assembly. 
Therefore, CMSC was able to modify its annual production statement without improved 
the production process and product quality.  
In sum, although hiring temporary workers might affect product quality and 
increased the defective rate, but since these features were manageable and were not the 
priorities items for CMSC. Temporary workers could provide CMSC the advantages of 
the flexibility of labor between the slow and busy seasons. It also allowed CMSC to 
transfer labor-related expenditure and portions of shop floor management to temp 
agencies. In this regard, temporary workers could provide CMSC the advantages that 
matched Jackie's managerial philosophy and corresponded to “Pure Labor” work ethic.     
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2. Conclusion 
 
Overall, in this chapter, I discussed how Mexican employees experienced the 
Taiwanese style of management. I separated the discussion into three categories of 
employee: Mexican managers/engineers, line workers, and temporary workers. These 
three categories of employees experienced the Taiwanese style of management 
differently. For managers and engineers, they have more opportunities to interact with 
Taiwanese general managers and other Chinese support team members. In their daily 
interactions, Mexican managers and engineers felt the employment relation, and the 
working condition has been changed significantly after the day that Outstanding 
Technology purchased the facility. They encountered longer working hours and less 
work autonomy when they still conducted the same tasks as they were in the previous 
Japanese corporation.  
For line workers, because they did not have many chances to meet Jackie Chan 
or other Chinese support team members, their experience among the Taiwanese style of 
management came from the production arrangement daily.  They were facing endless 
overtime work, long working hours, low pay, and insufficient facilities for them to rest. 
Under such working condition, line workers tended to feel they were just a part of a 
machine. Workers have been highly instrumentalized. Their experience was originated 
from the guide of the “Pure Labor” work ethic which emphasized to extract maximized 
productivity with minimum capital input toward human resources.  
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Hiring temporary workers to match the labor demand during the busy seasons 
could be seen as a consequence of the Taiwanese style management that pursued the 
flexibility of human capital and labor force. Although I also indicated that hiring 
inexperienced workers like temporary ones might create many problems such as unstable 
product quality and increased the defective rate. But without doubt, temporary workers 
provided a means for CMSC to adjust its labor input accordingly without extra 
expenditure. Temporary workers also became a tool, for maquiladoras to control their 
workers and maintained a good order in the shop floor with less effort. All these 
advantages that came with hiring temporary workers were matched to the Taiwanese 
style of management. From these Mexican employees' experience, we can see how the 
“Pure Labor” work ethic penetrated the daily operation of CMSC and profoundly 
affected the way that local workers experience their work lives. 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSION 
 
The primary question this dissertation tries answers is how the cultural roots of 
foreign managers of maquiladoras affect the local labor process.  
Previous studies have described corporations with the ability to set up multiple 
bases around the world as symbols and agents of capitalism. These corporations are 
driven by profit and thus are willing to pursue their niches by relocating production 
bases to international locations. Previous research has described these agents of 
globalization as a group of elites who share a similar class, educational background, and 
interest. Regardless of their ethnicity or nationality, their characteristics and values are 
the same. They are the executors of and. decision makers for transnational enterprises 
around the world, benefitting from globalization and exploiting the possible advantages 
by their ability to travel at will.  
The profile of these global elites is similar to the Chinese elites described by 
Aihwa Ong (1999). They can travel easily to multiple locations around the world. Their 
family structures and arrangements are deeply affected by globalization. Ong argued that 
it was not uncommon to see the father of a family working in a developing nation while 
his entire family was settled in another location, a developed country. These Chinese 
elites and their families might only reunite a few times a year and then only for a limited 
duration. Ong reminded readers that this type of family life might not be recognized as 
traditionally Confucian (1999). Thus, Ong placed culture and globalization on two sides 
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of a single scale, believing that cultural practices respond to challenges created by 
globalization. People must adjust their cultural behaviors and family arrangements to fit 
into this world where time and space are compressed (Harvey,1989).   
Considering that culture is something that exists locally and responds to 
challenges from the forces of globalization, Ong’s (1999) approach toward the 
relationship between culture and globalization shares Wallerstein and his followers’ 
basic viewpoint. However, including Ong’s earlier study based on a Malaysian factory, 
many scholars who have examined export-oriented factories have generally focused on 
how the culture of the host country interacts or cooperates with transnational enterprises. 
This type of interaction is the spirit of resistance used by women workers to battle the 
exploitative capitalistic mode of production described in Ong’s book. This also harkens 
back to the many maquiladora studies mentioned above. Scholars such as Salzinger, 
Tiano, and Plankey-Videla have discussed how local cultural factors such as a 
patriarchal ideology have been manipulated or cooperated with managerial strategies and 
processes of labor control (Plankey-Videla, 2012; Salzinger, 2003; Tiano, 1994).  
This approach follows the legacy of Eric Wolf who emphasized that local culture 
should not be considered vulnerable when it encounters the forces of globalization. Each 
culture has its own way of recognizing and cooperating with capitalism, and eventually 
gives capitalism a place in the original system. Regardless how local culture responds to 
the arrival of capitalism, whether people resists or cooperates, the point is that following 
this intellectual tradition, local culture has been given the subjectivity and agency 
necessary to interact with external forces such as capitalism and globalization. However, 
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when scholars focus on local culture and imagine that culture might have its own agency 
and dynamic, they overlook that so-called globalization is not a homogenous force and 
can instead be diverse; the term globalization means an era in which people, goods, and 
ideas can travel and affect markets around the world in very short periods of time. All of 
this has cultural roots. That is to say, even if one considers globalization to be a force 
that penetrates every corner of the globe, it still needs people to carry out the actions it 
inspires.  
Agents of globalization come from different countries and immerse themselves 
in different cultures. For these business elites, before they depart to another location and 
begin a new journey, they often already have years or decades of work experience at the 
headquarters of a transnational enterprise. These agents experience different life and 
work trajectories, and eventually develop a variety of work ethics and values. Once each 
begins managing a production base or a maquiladora and representing their mother 
enterprise in another country, their previous work experience and ethics affect their 
management style and decision-making process.  
In this work, I explored how cultural factors affect transnational enterprises’ 
operation and managerial strategies in Mexico and Asia. I also analyzed how local 
employees experience cultural differences introduced by representatives of transnational 
enterprises. By conducting fieldwork in a maquiladora managed by a Taiwanese 
enterprise and located in Tijuana, I illustrated how the cultures of those in important 
positions and possessing the most resources and power affect the labor process.   
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To illustrate this idea, I began by describing Jackie Chan's managerial philosophy 
and its cultural roots. Looking back at Chan’s work experience, we can see that his 
managerial philosophy is not uncommon and instead is actually widely shared among 
many Taiwanese business personnel. Researchers like G.S. Shieh have described how 
through the export industry, the Taiwanese experienced a substantial economic boom, 
embracing the capitalist mode of production through factory work and putting-out 
piecework at home. This work mode and wage system shaped the Taiwanese people’s 
experience of capitalism and developed what Shieh called a “Pure Labor” work ethic. 
This “Pure Labor” work ethic emphasized several features such as flexibility, minimized 
production cost by cutting labor-related expenditure and pursued maximized profits by 
extracting as much productivity as possible at the same time. Furthermore, because the 
“Pure Labor” work ethic has emerged from the putting-out system that was popular in 
Taiwan during the 1970s and the 1980s, this work ethic put the volume as a more 
important goal than the quality of the product. Decades later, there resulted clear changes 
in Taiwanese society in a variety of social, political, cultural, and economic aspects. 
However, a recent speech from Premiere Executive Yuan and debates about the labor 
reform act suggest that the Taiwanese work ethic remains the same. The discourse of 
“Gong De Taiwan” suggests that despite the changing rhetoric, the main concepts 
remain unchanged. In general, Jackie Chan's managerial philosophy is similar, 
emphasizing that the best management practice is to minimize the expenditure of human 
resources and maximize employees’ work hours and productivity. In practice, a general 
manager should be willing to save every penny that could be spent on workers, so long 
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as the factory still can find enough labor to fill the production line. Chan’s managerial 
philosophy of providing only a minimal infrastructure and few work-related benefits to 
workers and keeping the number of employees to a minimum has penetrated to all 
aspects of the labor process and operation of CMSC. Thus, this Taiwanese cultural 
element deeply affects every Mexican worker and manager in CMSC.   
Chapter IV discussed the experiences of these Mexican employees. Before 
Outstanding Technology purchased the maquiladora about a decade ago, the factory was 
operated and managed by a Japanese corporation. Many senior Mexican workers and 
managers had experience working for a Japanese company. Besides different work 
experiences at this particular enterprise, employees and temporary workers might also 
have worked for other maquiladoras before coming to CMSC. In such circumstances, 
almost all workers have comparable work experiences with employers from different 
countries. Based on this, I argue that the Taiwanese style of management makes both 
Mexican workers and managers feel like they have been highly instrumentalized and 
mechanized. Many senior workers mentioned that the first day after transferring their 
management rights, they were already experiencing culture shock. They performed the 
same tasks as before, but their salaries were cut in half. Besides this unhappy change, 
they also experienced conflicts in terms of work ethic and the prioritization of tasks and 
goals, and with interactions with their foreign colleagues. The conflict that Mexican 
employees experienced between their worked for CMSC and Japanese company was 
evolved from the managerial strategies which guided by different work ethics, and 
therefore, has cultural values involved in the scene. This strong feeling of 
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instrumentalization suggests that cultural factors deeply affect local workers' work 
experiences in maquiladoras.   
After the Mexican parliament passed the Labor Reform Act at the end of 2014, 
the law allowed employers more flexibility in hiring and firing their employees. It also 
relinquishes control over the use of temporary workers. In response, CMSC began using 
temporary employees to satisfy its labor demand during the busy season. This strategy 
allowed CMSC to adjust its labor force and decrease the number of official employees. 
The booming outsourcing industry has now become a part of the local labor market in 
Tijuana, affecting recruiting practices, labor market conditions, and more importantly, 
the method of labor control. These rapidly changing circumstances must also alter our 
understanding of the labor process in the maquiladora. 
Compared to the past, in the Tijuana area, temp agencies have now become 
something akin to human resource brokers. Their appearance has changed the 
management practices and hiring strategies commonly seen in maquiladoras. It has also 
altered the environment of the local labor market. Being an temporary worker might be a 
first step for people who need work. Temp agencies provide maquiladoras with an easy 
way to hire workers, and a more individualized, faster, and cheaper means of labor 
control. Thus, they have become an important part of the labor market and the effects 
they have both inside and outside of maquiladoras require further attention and analysis. 
It should also be noted that even though outsourcing has become a method 
available to maquiladoras needing to adjust their labor demand and productivity, and 
even a means to conduct labor control, each maquiladora has a different attitude 
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regarding how to use temporary workers. Some might use this type of worker as the 
primary labor force during the busy season, as was the case with CMSC. Others might 
only use temporary workers to fill a small number of positions on their production lines. 
In this dissertation, I only focused on one Taiwanese owned and operated maquiladora 
and showed how temporary workers became a way for maquiladora managers to conduct 
their labor control policies. But how the outsourcing industry affects the labor market 
and the labor process in other maquiladoras remains unclear. To understand this new 
industry and how the temporary workers are used by maquiladoras managed by 
representatives from other foreign countries requires more studies and scholarly efforts 
in the future.  Outsourcing is a strategy that fits perfectly into the general manager Jackie 
Chan’s managerial philosophy. Despite the fact that using a high percentage of 
temporary workers might mean that product quality is unstable and the defect rate high, 
so long as these shortcomings can be controlled or kept to a manageable level and the 
production goals are achieved, the company will continue to follow this strategy and the 
high defective rate will be tolerated. In other words, decisions regarding how many 
temporary workers to use and how to use them follow the cultural guidelines that the 
general manager belief.  
I would like to conclude this dissertation by addressing two topics. From a 
theoretical perspective, this study has delineated the cultural elements affecting the 
managerial practices of a maquiladora. Though we can fairly assume that most 
transnational enterprises share similar goals such as maximizing profits and expanding 
market share, when pursuing these goals, different companies might take entirely 
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different approaches. In this regard, besides those strategies built upon the assumption of 
“Homo Economicus” and what has been called “professional” behavior, various cultural 
backgrounds might also play an important part in this process. This study has focused on 
the work-related cultural elements introduced by representatives of transnational 
enterprises that highlight the work ethic and habitus accumulated from previous work 
experience; these may deeply affect these representatives when they make decisions 
regarding production bases in other countries.  
The second topic of this dissertation is that once we understand the role that 
foreign managers’ cultural characteristics play in the daily operation of maquiladoras, 
we will be better able to trace the different patterns in maquiladora management and 
operation. Previous researchers have tended to categorize the different managerial styles 
of individual characters. For example, Salzinger pointed out that aspects of a manager’s 
personal background such as their education level, nationality, and career path and 
trajectory all affect their perspective on and knowledge of what Salzinger calls 
“maquiladora grade workers.” These characteristics also affect managers’ notion of the 
“productive feminine” and how they discipline and shape their workers (Salzinger, 
2003). Salzinger described this phenomenon and argued that managerial styles are 
affected by personal features; however, my research suggests that besides these personal 
features, elements such as cultural tendency and habitus which developed from the 
previous work experience might also affect managerial style. The testimonials I 
collected from workers with experience in multiple factories suggest that managers and 
other representatives of transnational enterprises have different styles of interaction with 
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local colleagues and workers, a variety of managerial styles, and numerous priorities and 
production goals. The discussion of Foxconn in Chapter III also suggests that managerial 
style tends to be consistent among enterprises from the same country, but it is very 
different when comparing enterprises from other countries. This might be related to the 
representatives of enterprises from the same country shared common work experience 
and similar career trajectory in their mother country, and they developed a similar work 
ethic from these common grounds.  Hence, adding the cultural aspects of maquiladora 
managers into the analytical framework enriches our understanding of labor process in 
such enterprises, and facilitates our understanding of the decision-making process and 
other aspects of maquiladora operation and management. 
On the empirical level, I also addressed the importance of temporary workers. 
Temporary workers are not only used by maquiladoras to adjust their labor demand to 
meet the needs of different business seasons, but also comprise a new method of labor 
control. Compared to other labor-control strategies discussed in previous research, 
outsourcing is more direct but also a more insidious, brutal, individualized approach to 
controlling the labor force. Using temporary workers as a method of labor control 
minimizes the possibility of workers acting collectively. Unlike peripheral human 
resource work that molecularizes individual workers and manages worker discontent at a 
personal level to keep a good atmosphere and generate incentives to improve 
productivity which McKay discussed in his book(McKay, 2006I), using temporary 
workers allows the labor-control process to operate on a city-wide scale, and not only in 
a single maquiladora. By using temporary workers, maquiladoras can dismiss “unwanted” 
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workers in a very short time without any consequences or additional compensation. 
Workers dismissed from one maquiladora can easily transfer to another. In such 
circumstances, workers find it difficult to organize with their colleagues. Any of their 
demands can be considered a problem on the shop floor. In this regard, temporary 
workers are significantly more vulnerable than workers without a union’s protection.  
In sum, in this era of globalization, business elites are able to travel to almost 
every corner of the world to generate profit for transnational enterprises. Regardless of 
how similar their training and how many characteristics they share, each still has their 
own cultural roots. It is this cultural variation that makes globalization a non-
homogenous force that undermines local culture. Even though foreign forces influence 
local culture, globalization is better understood as a cultural encounter similar to what I 
have tried to describe in this study. What Mexican employees experience at CMSC is not 
simply the capitalistic mode of production; it is the capitalistic mode of production as 
modified by a managerial philosophy deeply rooted in the concept of ““Pure Labor”,” 
“Gong De Taiwan,” and other Taiwanese work ethics and habitus. The feeling of being 
instrumentalized and mechanized is the outcome of the tension between different 
attitudes toward work and life from two disparate cultural traditions. In this context, I 
suggest that in any social space composed of people who come from multiple cultural 
backgrounds and with unevenly distributed power such as a maquiladora, cultural 
elements, especially from those with more power and resources, should be as carefully 
examined and equally weighted as gender, age, and educational background in any 
analytical framework. Once we add cultural factors from the management side into the 
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analysis, we will be better able to develop new and insightful approaches to examining 
export-oriented factories operated by enterprises from different countries that draw upon 
various cultural backgrounds.  
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